To hold to the contrary under the circumstances of this case would, in effect, be to hold that a landlord may escape liability for personal injuries caused by dangerous conditions existing on his premises to the extent that he has previously ignored complaints by the injured party regarding those conditions. Cf. Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204 ( 316 S.E.2d 770) (1984). Judgment reversed. Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Benham and Beasley, JJ., concur.

There is no evidence of record which would show that appellees did agree to any request by appellant to make repairs to the heater. Compare Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204 ( 316 S.E.2d 770) (1984); Plant v. Lowman, 134 Ga. App. 752 ( 216 S.E.2d 631) (1975); Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174 ( 210 S.E.2d 350) (1974). However, the burden was upon appellees, as movants for summary judgment, to produce evidence that they had not agreed to any request by appellant to repair the heater.

“It has often been held that the true basis for a landlord’s liability to a tenant for injuries resulting from a defective or hazardous condition existing on the premises is the landlord’s superior knowledge of the condition and of the danger resulting from it.” Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204 , 205 (316 SE2d 770 ) (1984). In accordance with the superior knowledge principle, it has been held that where a portion of leased premises is dangerously out of repair and such condition is patent and known to the tenant, who continues to use that area, the tenant cannot recover from the landlord for damages resulting from the condition.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hohnerlein v. Thomas, 186 Ga. App. 282-283 ( 367 SE2d 95) (1988); Alexander v. Rhodes, 104 Ga. 807 ( 30 SE 968) (1898); Hearn v. Barden, 115 Ga. App. 708 ( 155 SE2d 649) (1967); Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204 ( 316 SE2d 770) (1984); Hall v. Thompson, 193 Ga. App. 574-575 ( 388 SE2d 381) (1989). It follows that, in order for Eschette to recover from Lariscy for injuries she claimed were caused or contributed to by a defect in the stairs, she was required to show that Lariscy had superior knowledge of the defect.

Because it is undisputed that Johnston never discussed the absence of a handrail with Ross, and Ross made no assurances to Johnston about repairing the defect, this case is not concerned with application of the "patent defect" rule where a tenant has relied on assurances of repair. See Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204 ( 316 S.E.2d 770) (1984) (holding five judges to four that tenant with knowledge of patent defect was not barred from recovery where landlord made assurances of repair; dissent asserting that Supreme Court authority applying "patent defect" rule barred recovery). The Supreme Court's holding in Thompson v. Crownover did, however, temper the application of the "patent defect" rule.

Compare Carey, supra, 218 Ga. App. at 326 (unlit stairway provided only access to apartment, essentially relegating plaintiff to being a prisoner in his own home). See Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204, 207 ( 316 S.E.2d 770) (1984) (landlord not insulated from liability as a matter of law where tenant had received and relied upon repeated assurances from resident manager that light over stairwell would be repaired).Judgment affirmed.

This we decline to do. See Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204, 207 ( 316 S.E.2d 770) (1984). A jury must determine whether McCullough exercised reasonable care for his own safety.

Thus, the risk of being cut was an inherent risk plaintiff assumed by undertaking to fix the window herself under the circumstances presented in this case. Plaintiff's reliance on cases such as Richardson v. Palamour Court Apartments, 170 Ga. App. 204 ( 316 S.E.2d 770) (1984) and Phillips v. King, 214 Ga. App. 712 ( 448 S.E.2d 780) (1994), in support of her contention that the superior knowledge and assumption of the risk doctrines should not be applied in the case at bar, is misplaced. Unlike the facts presented in those cases, here there was no coercion of circumstances or necessity which would justify the course of action plaintiff took. Although plaintiff claims she had to try and fix the window herself because she had no telephone and was afraid that if she left her apartment to alert maintenance her son might come home and be faced with an open eighth story window, the record clearly shows that plaintiff had other options. Specifically, the door to her son's bedroom had a lock on it that plaintiff could have used while she went to alert someone about the window.

The basis of such liability is the landlord's superior knowledge of the hazard or defective condition, and generally if the plaintiff has equal knowledge of a hazard, the landlord will not be liable for the plaintiff's injury. See generally Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 ( 272 S.E.2d 327). Where a portion of leased premises is dangerously out of repair and such condition is known to the tenant who continues to use that area, the tenant cannot recover from the landlord for damages resulting from the condition; but the severity of the doctrine of assumption of risk has been ameliorated in cases where its application would make the plaintiff "`a captive'" in his own home. Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204, 206 ( 316 S.E.2d 770); see Hull v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 Ga. App. 269, 270 ( 235 S.E.2d 601). When the dangerous area is the plaintiff's only access or only safe or reasonable access to his home, the tenant's equal knowledge of the danger does not excuse the landlord of damages caused by his failure to keep the premises in repair.

" (Citations omitted.) Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204, 205 ( 316 S.E.2d 770) (1984). The four-justice majority in Thompson did, however, conclude that, despite the tenant's knowledge of the defective heater, she was not barred from recovery because a question of fact existed in that case under the "necessity rule."