Opinion
Civil Action 4:20-CV-0110
07-20-2023
DEVIN RICHARDSON, Plaintiff v. DR. L. MURRY, Defendant
MANNION, D.J.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION, (ON DEFENDANT DR. MURRY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DOC. 38)
William I. Arbuckle U.S. Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Devin Richardson brought this civil rights action in 2020. He has failed to respond to a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38), despite three separate Orders requiring him to do so (Docs. 41, 42, & 44). It appears to the Court that he has abandoned this case. What follows is a Poulis analysis recommending dismissal.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Devin Richardson (“Plaintiff”) began this pro se, in forma pauperis civil suit on January 21, 2020 by lodging a Complaint against Drug Abuse Program Coordinator (“DAP-C”) Dr. L. Murray and FCI Chaplain Adekola. (Doc. 1). The Court screened Plaintiff's complaint and dismissed Chaplain Adekola from this action. (Doc. 11). Thus, the only remaining claim is against Dr. Murray (“Defendant”).
I will follow the Defendant's spelling of her name (Dr. Murray) instead of Plaintiff's spelling (Dr. Murry).
Chaplain Adekola was dismissed as Plaintiff had not alleged enough facts for the Court to make a determination as to whether his rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause or RFRA were violated and thus failed to state viable claims against Defendant Adekola. (Docs. 9, 11).
A. The Facts
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff, a follower of Islam, was a participant of the Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) at FCI Schuylkill. (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 4). Because of his progress with the program, Plaintiff was expected to participate in a transition ceremony. Id. Plaintiff was concerned that, as part of the transition ceremony, he would be required to shake hands with unrelated women-in violation of his religious beliefs. Id.
Because of his concern, Plaintiff informed Drug Treatment Specialist Beachel that there is an Islamic prohibition on men shaking hands with unrelated women. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff also expressed his desire to follow this religious requirement at the RDAP transition ceremony. Id.
Plaintiff submitted a BP-8 form with prison staff, explaining the religious requirements of Islam and his desire to abide by such requirements at the RDAP transition ceremony. (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 4).
A BP-8 form is the first step in the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“FBOP”) Administrative Remedy Program. It is also known as an informal complaint or copout. A prisoner fills the form out and gives it to staff. Each facility then has its own process for resolving informal complaints. Corrections Information Council, FBOP - Administrative Remedy Program (Nov. 15, 2017), https://cic.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/cic/pagecontent/attachments/BOP%2 0Administrative%2 0Remedies%2011.15.17%20REVISED .pdf.
Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Dr. Murray about his concerns and Defendant Dr. Murry told Plaintiff that Chaplain Adekola informed her that it was permissible for Muslim men to shake hands with unrelated women. (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 4). However, Chaplain Adekola told Plaintiff that he previously told Defendant that he could not tell Plaintiff that his religious beliefs were right or wrong. Id.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff states: “As a result of submitting the BP-8 request, Plaintiff was ‘teamed' by RDAP staff on January 12, 2017.” (Doc. 1, p. 2). Plaintiff does not explain what “teamed” means or why he used quotation marks when discussing it. Based on Plaintiff's allegations, I assume “teamed” is a meeting with RDAP staff - such as Defendants Dr. Murray and Chaplain Adekola.
On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff, using the prison's “Trulincs” system, notified Defendant that he would shake hands with female prison staff at the RDAP transition ceremony. (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 5). Plaintiff noted that he would shake hands with female prison staff at the transition ceremony only because he was being compelled to choose between the dictates of his religious beliefs and transitioning in RDAP. Id.
On January 17, 2017, Plaintiff shook hands with female prison staff at the RDAP transition ceremony. (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 5). Defendant permitted Plaintiff to transition in RDAP. Id. According to the Complaint, Defendant did not permit Muslim RDAP participants who refused to shake hands with female prison staff to transition in RDAP. Id.
B. Procedural History
This case began when Plaintiff lodged his Complaint on January 21, 2020. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 7). In his Complaint, Plaintiff names Dr. Murray and Chaplain Adekola as Defendants. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Based on the aforementioned facts, Plaintiff asserts that the defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Id. at pp. 2-3. Plaintiff seeks $5,000,000 in damages from Dr. Murray and $1,500,000 in damages from Chaplain Adekola. Id.
Following a statutorily mandated screening, I recommended to District Judge Malachy E. Mannion that the Court dismiss the First Amendment Free Exercise claim against Dr. Murray, and all claims against Chaplain Adekola. (Doc. 9). In that Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), I erroneously interpreted Plaintiff's claims as a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claim instead of a RFRA claim. Id. I recommended that a RLUIPA claim be allowed to proceed. Id. Plaintiff did not file any objections to my Screening R&R, and Judge Mannion adopted it in full. (Doc. 11). The Complaint was then served on Defendant Dr. Murray.
RFRA prohibits the Government from “substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, [unless the Government can show that the burden] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. RFRA was found to be unconstitutional as applied to the states. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In response, Congress passed RLUIPA, which only applies to states in the areas of land use and incarceration. Thus, RFRA applies to the federal government, and RLUIPA applies to the states.
On December 14, 2021, the United States of America, as an interested party, filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 17). The United States argued that RLUIPA does not apply to federal actors, so the case should be dismissed. (Doc. 18, p. 1). Plaintiff vigorously opposed the Motion, stating that he asserted a RFRA claim, not a RLUIPA claim. (Doc. 21-1, pp. 9-10). Acknowledging this mistake, I asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on Plaintiff's RFRA claim. (Doc. 23). Instead, on May 18, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 24). On August 2, 2022, I issued an R&R recommending the United States' Motion to Dismiss be denied as moot and that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied. (Doc. 31). On August 25, 2022, with leave of the Court, Defendant filed an Objection to that R&R. (Docs. 34-35). On September 29, 2022, Judge Mannion adopted that R&R in full, overruling Defendant's objection. (Docs. 36-37). In her objection, Defendant raised for the first time the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 35, pp. 4-7). In adopting that R&R, Judge Mannion directed the Clerk of Court to remand this case to the undersigned for the issuance of a new Report and Recommendation on Defendant's qualified immunity defense. (Doc. 36, p. 2; Doc. 37, pp. 8-10).
Also on September 29, 2022, Defendant Murray filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment formally raising the qualified immunity defense. (Doc. 38). Defendant filed her Statement of Facts and Brief in Support of that Motion on October 3, 2022. (Docs. 39-40). Plaintiff then had the standard twenty-one (21) days to file a brief in opposition to Defendant's motion and a responsive statement of facts, giving him until on or before October 24, 2022 to file. Plaintiff did not.
On October 31, 2022, the Court issued a Briefing Order that required Plaintiff to file a brief in opposition and responsive statement of facts on or before November 21, 2022. (Doc. 41). In that Order the Court warned Plaintiff that failure to file a brief in opposition may lead to his case being dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Plaintiff did not file anything.
On November 28, 2022, the Court issued a second Briefing Order that required Plaintiff to file a brief in opposition and responsive statement of facts on or before December 28, 2022. (Doc. 42). In that Order the Court again warned Plaintiff that failure to file a brief in opposition may lead to his case being dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Plaintiff did not timely file a response.
However, on December 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Extension of Time to file a brief in opposition. (Doc. 43). In that Motion, Plaintiff stated that he needed an extension of time because he needed “relevant documentation” that he could not obtain because he was “currently illegal locked out of his apartment by the landlord and has been since December 1st, 2022.” Id. at p. 2. The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion on January 3, 2023, making Plaintiff's brief in opposition and responsive statement of facts due on or before February 6, 2023. (Doc. 44). In that Order the Court told Plaintiff that no further extensions would be granted and again warned him that failure to file a brief in opposition may lead to his case being dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Plaintiff still has not filed a brief in opposition or responsive statement of facts.
In total, Plaintiff has had more than 288 days to file a brief in opposition or responsive statement of facts and he still has not done so despite three Court Orders. (Docs. 41, 42, 44).
III. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 41(B) LEGAL STANDARD
With this background in mind, I now turn to the legal standard that guides the Court's analysis in this case.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” A court's authority to dismiss extends past granting a motion by the defendant. In fact, “[u]nder Rule 41(b), a district court has authority to dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute or to comply with a court order.” “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in the courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); Price v. Williams, No. 1:08-CV-583, 2019 WL 1620287, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2019) (citing Woods v. Malinowski, No. 17-17, 2018 WL 3999660, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 18, 2018) report and recommendation adopted as modified by 2018 WL 3997344 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2018)).
Qadr v. Overmyer, 642 Fed.Appx. 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curium) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)); see also Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that a court can dismiss a case sua sponte under Rule 41(b)).
Id.
Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order rest in the sound discretion of the Court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. That discretion, while broad, is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order],
we evaluate its balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Id. (citing Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)).
In exercising this discretion “there is no ‘magic formula' that we apply to determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.” Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case.” Consistent with this view, it is well-settled that “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.”
Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
I will now apply the Poulis legal standard to the facts and procedural history of this case.
Plaintiff has failed in his obligation to respond to Dr. Murray's Motion for Summary Judgment and has disregarded three orders directing him to respond. Furthermore, my evaluation of the Poulis factors compels dismissal.
The first Poulis factor requires that the Court consider the party's personal responsibility. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this case. His status, however, does not excuse compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and does not excuse Plaintiff from his obligation to abide by orders of court. The sole responsibility for meeting those obligations in this case is Plaintiff's. Plaintiff has not met his obligations in this case because he did not properly respond to Dr. Murray's Motion and did not respond to the orders directing him to do so. Accordingly, I find that the first factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
Cannon v. Moore, No. 1:19-CV-1700, 2022 WL 2932218, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2022) (finding that a pro se litigant was responsible for failing to comply with the Court's rules and orders), report and recommendation adopted 2022 WL 2918898 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2022).
The second Poulis factor requires that the Court consider whether Plaintiff's conduct has resulted in any prejudice to Defendant. In this context, examples of prejudice are “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Prejudice for purposes of the Poulis analysis, however, does not mean irremediable harm. “[T]he burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Defendants seek timely resolution of this case that began over three and a half (3.5) years ago based on facts occurring over six (6) years ago. Plaintiff's failure to comply with court rules and respond to court orders frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. Accordingly, I find that the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984).
Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 2003).
Id.
The third Poulis factor requires the Court to consider whether Plaintiff has exhibited a history of dilatoriness over the life of this case. “[C]onduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a ‘history of dilatoriness.'”“Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Plaintiff does not have a history of dilatoriness over the life of this case. Plaintiff previously followed three different Court Orders instructing him to respond on other issues. Thus, I find the third factor weighs against dismissal.
Adams, 29 F.3d at 875 (“a party's problematic acts must be evaluated in light of its behavior over the life of the case.”).
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 261.
Adams, 29 F.3d at 874.
The fourth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider whether Plaintiff's conduct was willful or in bad faith. In this context, “[w]illfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” The Court issued two Orders directing a response from Plaintiff. (Docs. 41-42). Plaintiff then filed a Motion for an Extension of Time to respond, (Doc. 43), which the Court granted, ordering Plaintiff to respond on or before February 6, 2023. These orders were sent to Plaintiff through the mail, and nothing in this record suggests they were not received. Plaintiff is familiar with submitting a brief in opposition and responsive statement of material facts, having done so in this case previously (and successfully). (Docs. 21, 27, 30). Plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time demonstrates that Plaintiff knows how to seek more time to respond from the Court. (Doc. 43). Plaintiff's subsequent failure to respond to the Court in any way when he clearly knows how to contact the Court suggests his failure to respond is a deliberate choice. While Plaintiff was apparently “illegally” locked out of his apartment beginning on December 1, 2022 with no known end-date, Plaintiff had thirty-seven (37) additional days from his original due date of October 25, 2023 to respond before he became locked out for a total of fiftyeight (58) days. Plaintiff knows how to communicate with the Court and has not done so in the over 160 days that have elapsed since his last response due date of February 6, 2023. Further all three Orders requiring Plaintiff to respond warned Plaintiff that failure to file a brief in opposition may lead to his case being dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. 41, 42, & 44). Based on all of this information, I infer that Plaintiff's failure to respond was a deliberate choice. Accordingly, I find that the fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
Id. at 875.
The fifth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the effectiveness of alternate sanctions. Dismissal is a sanction of last resort, and it is incumbent upon a court to explore the effectiveness of lesser sanctions before ordering dismissal.Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this case. Therefore, it is unlikely that monetary sanctions would be effective. Moreover, Plaintiff's failure to respond to the Court's prior Orders leads to an inference that further orders would not be effective. Accordingly, I find that the fifth factor weighs in favor of dismissal because no other sanction would be effective.
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
The sixth and final Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the meritoriousness of the claim. A claim is deemed “meritorious” for the purposes of the Poulis analysis when the allegations of the complaint, if established at trial, would support recovery. To evaluate this factor, a court uses the standard for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. “[F]or purposes of pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish aprima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” The claim need only be plausible.Plaintiff's remaining RFRA claim is meritorious. The Court has concluded previously that Plaintiff states a prima facie RFRA claim, which goes beyond what is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 36-37). Further, Plaintiff's RFRA claim has already survived one motion for summary judgment.However, Defendant has “presented summary judgment arguments which since they are not rebutted appear to be meritorious.” Accordingly the sixth factor weighs against dismissal.
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870.
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263.
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id.
See Docs. 31, 36, 37.
Fowler v. Tennis, No. 3:09-CV-01726, 2011 WL 1988418, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:09-CV-01726, 2011 WL 1990555 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2011).
Again, “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” While Plaintiff does not have a history of dilatoriness and his claim has merit, this is not enough to overcome the fact that Plaintiff, who is personally responsible for compliance with court orders, appears to have willfully failed to prosecute his claim and follow the Court's Orders. Further it does not appear to the Court that any other sanctions would be effective. This case started over three and a half years (3.5) ago and Defendants are prejudiced by the degradation of evidence through the passage of time and the delay in resolution caused by Plaintiff's failure to respond. Thus, having balanced the Poulis factors and concluded that four of the six those factors weigh in favor of dismissal, I recommend that this case be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff has failed to prosecute his case.
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373).
The Court notes that if Plaintiff does intend to proceed, he can file objections to this recommendation.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) This case be DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
(2) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38) be DEEMED MOOT; and
(3) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.