Opinion
Civil Action 4:20-CV-110
07-21-2020
DEVIN RICHARDSON, Plaintiff v. DR. L. MURRY, et al., Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
WILLIAM I. ARBUCKLE, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Devin Richardson (“Plaintiff”) initiated this civil rights action on January 21, 2020, by filing a Complaint (Doc. 1). According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was a participant in the Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) at FCI Schuykill. Plaintiff feared that as part of his transition ceremony he would be required to shake hands with an unrelated woman, which he claims is prohibited for followers of Islam. Plaintiff, on multiple occasions, informed prison staff of his concern of having to choose between completing RDAP or abiding by the dictates of his religion. Ultimately, Plaintiff did shake hands with a female staff member at the transition ceremony. On May 4, 2020, I issued a Screening Order (Doc. 8), explaining why some of Plaintiff claims fail and permitting Plaintiff to cure those defects in an amended complaint. At this time, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint. The Report and Recommendation is addressed to the Original Complaint.
II. AUTHORITY TO SCREEN COMPLAINT
Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 7). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Atamian v. Burns, 236 Fed.Appx. 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2007) (“the screening procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply to in forma pauperis complaints filed by prisoners and non-prisoners alike”). Under this statute, the Court is required to dismiss any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 828 (10th Cir. 1979) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to the expenditure of public funds and the valuable time of federal courts to prosecute an action which is totally without merit.”).
After reviewing Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1), I conclude that some of Plaintiff's claims fail. At this time, the only claim I recommend proceeds is Plaintiff's Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim against Defendant Dr. Murray.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that he brings this claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. I discuss later in this Report why the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act is the appropriate statute under which to analyze Plaintiff's allegations.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff, a follower of Islam, was a participant of RDAP at FCI Schuykill. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Because of his progress with the program, Plaintiff was expected to participate in a transition ceremony. Id. Plaintiff was concerned that, as part of the transition ceremony, he would be required to shake hands with unrelated women-in violation of his religious beliefs. Id.
Because of his concern, Plaintiff informed Drug Treatment Specialist Beachel that there is an Islamic prohibition on men shaking hands with unrelated women. Id. Plaintiff also expressed his desire to follow this religious requirement at the RDAP transition ceremony. Id.
Plaintiff submitted a BP-8 form with prison staff, explaining the religious requirements of Islam and his desire to abide by such requirements at the RDAP transition ceremony. Id.
Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Dr. Murray about his concerns and Defendant Dr. Murry told Plaintiff that Defendant Chaplain Adekola informed her that it was permissible for Muslim men to shake hands with unrelated women. Id. However, Defendant Chaplain Adekola told Plaintiff that he previously told Defendant Dr. Murray that they could not tell Plaintiff that his religious beliefs were right or wrong. Id.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff states: “As a result of submitting the BP-8 request, Plaintiff was ‘teamed' by RDAP staff on January 12, 2017.” (Doc. 1, p. 2). Plaintiff does not explain what “teamed” means or why he used quotation marks when discussing it. Based on Plaintiff allegations, I assume “teamed” is a meeting with RDAP staff - such as Defendants Dr. Murray and Chaplain Adekola.
On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff, using the prison's “Trulincs” system, notified Defendant Dr. Murray that he would shake hands with female prison staff at the RDAP transition ceremony. Id. Plaintiff noted that he would shake hands with female prison staff at the transition ceremony only because he was being compelled to choose between the dictates of his religious beliefs and transitioning in RDAP. Id.
On January 17, 2017, Plaintiff shook hands with female prison staff at the RDAP transition ceremony. Id. Defendant Dr. Murray permitted Plaintiff to transition in RDAP. Id. According to the Complaint, Defendant Dr. Murray did not permit Muslim RDAP participants who refused to shake hands with female prison staff to transition in RDAP. Id.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint (Doc. 1) on January 21, 2020. In his Complaint, Plaintiff names Dr. Murry and Chaplain Adekola as defendants. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants forced him to choose between following the requirements of his religion and transitioning in RDAP. Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Id. at pp. 2-3. As relief, Plaintiff requests monetary damages of $5,000,000 from Defendant Dr. Murray and $1,500,000 from Defendant Chaplain Adekola. Id. at p. 3.
On May 4, 2020, I issued a Screening Order (Doc. 8) noting the deficiencies of Plaintiff's Complaint and granting him leave to file an amended complaint. I construed Plaintiff's RFRA claims to be under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). After review of Plaintiff's claims, I concluded that Plaintiff had sufficiently pled a claim under the RLUIPA against Defendant Dr. Murray. I concluded that Plaintiff had not sufficiently pled a RLUIPA claim against Defendant Chaplain Adekola. I also concluded that Plaintiff's First Amendment Free Exercise claims against Defendant Dr. Murry and Defendant Chaplain Adekola fail. (Screening Order, Doc. 8)
IV. LEGAL STANDARD FOR REVIEWING COMPLAINTS FILED BY A PRO SE PLAINTIFF PROCEEDING IN FORMA PAUPERIS
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by litigants given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In performing this mandatory screening function, the Court applies the same standard that is used to evaluate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed the evolving standards governing pleading practice in the federal courts, stating that “pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.” Id. at 211. It also “has to ‘show' such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
To test the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must conduct the following three-step inquiry:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and ‘“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the Plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
V. ANALYSIS
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.
A. RULE 8 AND PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT CHAPLAIN ADEKOLA
Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a claim against Defendant Chaplain Adekola. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Chaplain Adekola should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explains that, a complaint must contain, “a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Dismissal under Rule 8 is appropriate when a complaint leaves “the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action].” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 Fed.Appx. 158 (3d Cir. 2011).
Regarding Defendant Chaplain Adekola, Plaintiff states:
During this “team” the DAP-C, Dr. L. Murray informed Plaintiff that chaplain Adekola informed her that it was permissible in Islam to shake hands with women and that Plaintiff must do so at the R-DAP transition ceremony. However, prior to being “teamed” by R-DAP staff, Plaintiff was counseled by Chaplain Adekola. Chaplain Adekola explained that he informed Dr[.] Murray that he “could not tell Plaintiff that his religious views were right or wrong.”(Doc. 1, p. 2).
These are Plaintiff's only allegations against Defendant Chaplain Adekola. What Plaintiff is claiming against Defendant Chaplain Adekola is not clear. Plaintiff has not alleged enough facts for me to make a determination whether his rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause or RFRA were violated by Defendant Chaplain Adekola. Thus, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Chaplain Adekola should be dismissed.
As noted below, I construe Plaintiff's claim under RFRA to be a claim under the RLUIPA
B. FIRST AMENDMENT FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
I next address the merits of Plaintiff's First Amended Free Exercise claims. These claims are barred by the narrow scope of Bivens's actions.
Above, I concluded that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Chaplain Adekola should be dismissed under Rule 8. I also conclude that Plaintiff's First Amendment claim against Defendant Chaplain Adekola should be dismissed because his claim presents a new Bivens context.
Although Congress established a damages remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state officials for violations of the federal constitution, it did not create an analogous statute for damages against federal officials. However, there is a court created avenue for plaintiffs to seek damages against federal officials. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court “recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). “[A]ctions brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials have become known as ‘Bivens actions.'” Vanderlok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 198. Plaintiff claims Defendant Dr. Murray, in his role as the Drug Abuse Program Coordinator at FCI Schuylkill, violated his rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. Thus, I construe Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Dr. Murray to be a Bivens claim.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
In Bivens, agents acting under claim of federal authority entered a man's apartment without a warrant, arrested and handcuffed him, and searched the residence for drugs. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). Thereafter, the man was taken to a courthouse, interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Id. The man sued the agents for damages, alleging that the warrantless search and the arrest violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. The District Court dismissed the man's lawsuit because the man failed to state facts making out a cause of action. Id. at 390. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the Supreme Court held that there is an implied private cause of action for damages for a federal officer's violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights and explained that while Congress had not created a private cause of action against federal officials for damages, the Supreme Court has the power to “adjust . . . remedies so as to grant the necessary relief” to protect a constitutional right.” Id. at 392.
Since Bivens was decided in 1971, the Supreme Court “has repeatedly refused to extend Bivens actions beyond the specific clauses of the specific amendments [to the Constitution] for which a cause of action has already been implied, or even to other classes of defendants facing liability under those same clauses.” Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 200. As noted recently by another District Court in the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court has recognized an implied private action against federal officials in only three types of cases:
(1) Bivens itself - “a claim against [federal] agents for handcuffing a man in his own home without a warrant” under the Fourth Amendment;
(2) “a claim against a Congressman for firing his female secretary” under the Fifth Amendment; and,
(3) “a claim against prison officials for failure to treat an inmate's asthma” under the Eighth Amendment.Kakalas v. Marks, No. 19-1948, 2019 WL 3492232, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2019) (footnotes omitted). Because expanding Bivens is “a ‘disfavored' judicial activity, ” see Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017), a “rigorous injury . . . must be undertaken before implying a Bivens cause of action in a new context or against a new category of defendants, ” Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 200.
The first step of this inquiry is to determine whether the claims at issue present a new context. A Bivens claim presents a new context if “the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by” the Supreme Court. Ziglar, 137 S.Ct. at 1859. Examples of “meaningful differences” include but are not limited to:
the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality of specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.Id. at 1848.
Furthermore, as discussed above, Courts have declined to extend Bivens beyond the specific clauses of already recognized claims or to new classes of defendants. Therefore, a material difference exists when a claim is asserted under a different clause of a constitutional amendment that has been found to give rise to a Bivens claim, or where the claim involves a new class of defendants.
Courts have assumed, without deciding, that a Bivens action under the First Amendment is actionable. Randolph v. FCI Allenwood, 2018 WL 2276246 at *9 (Apr. 24, 2018), report and recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 2263733 (May 17, 018). However, the Supreme Court has “never held that Bivens extends to First Amendment claims.” See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 n. 4 (2012). Specifically, the Supreme Court has “not found [in a Bivens action] an implied damages remedy under the Free Exercise Clause.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). Because Plaintiff's First Amendment claims involve different constitutional rights than have been recognized in previous Bivens cases, they are meaningfully different and present a “new context.”
Once the Court has identified that the claim presents a new context, it must decide whether to imply a new Bivens remedy to that claim. In doing so, the Court should consider: (1) whether there is any “alternative, existing process capable of protecting the constitutional interests at stake, ” Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 200; and (2) whether there are “special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, ” Ziglar, 137 S.Ct. at 1857.
In conducting the special factors inquiry, the court “must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id. at 1857. As discussed in Ziglar:
[I]f there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damage remedy as part of the system of enforcing the law and correcting a wrong, the courts must refrain from creating the remedy in order to respect the role of Congress in determining the nature and extent of federal-court jurisdiction under Article III.Id. at 1858.
Thus, Courts should assess the impact on governmental operations systemwide, including the “burdens on Government employees who are sued personally, as well as the projected costs and consequences to the Government itself....” Id.
I find that there is an alternative remedy. Plaintiff has also sued under RLUIPA. Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages for having to choose between following the requirements of his religion and receiving the benefits of a prison program. Plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment and RLUIPA arise under the same set of facts. These two claims appear to be identical. Thus, Plaintiff has an alternative remedy for his alleged harm, rather than creating an implied remedy for First Amendment violations under Bivens. Plaintiff's First Amendment Bivens action is thus barred and should be dismissed.
As noted later in this Report, Plaintiff's RFRA claim is actually a claim under the RLUIPA - which serves as an alternative remedy.
C. RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under RFRA. However, Plaintiff's claim is actually under the RLUIPA. “Congress enacted RLUIPA and its sister statute, . . . RFRA . . . ‘in order to provide very broad protection for religious liberty.'” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014). Congress passed RLUIPA after the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). RFRA and RLUIPA are similar with claims under RLUIPA being limited to “only land use regulations . . . and the religious rights of institutionalized persons.” Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
RLUIPA “allows prisoners ‘to seek religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA.” Id. at 358 (quoting Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Unio do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006)).
Under the RLUIPA,
a substantial burden exists where: 1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to choose between adhering to the requirements of Islam and receiving the benefits of completing RDAP. Further, Plaintiff alleges that other Muslim men who where supposed to transition in RDAP but refused to shake hands with female prison staff were not permitted to transition in RDAP. Defendant Dr. Murray's requirement that Plaintiff must shake hands with female prison staff, in violation of his religion, may constitute a substantial burden on Plaintiff's free exercise of religion. Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim under RLUPIA against Defendant Dr. Murray. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Dr. Murray under RLUPIA should not be dismissed and should proceed.
This is the only claim I would recommend should proceed.
VI. LEAVE TO AMEND
At the outset, I note that I concluded that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim under the RLUIPA against Defendant Dr. Murray. I further concluded that Plaintiff's First Amended free exercise claims against both Defendants fail and that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a RLUIPA claim against Defendant Chaplain Adekola. “District courts are to offer amendment in pro se civil rights cases unless doing so would be ‘inequitable or futile.'” Flynn v. Dep't of Corr., 739 Fed. App'x. 132, 136 (2018) (quoting Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007)). Granting Plaintiff leave to amend at this stage would be futile. Plaintiff was given an opportunity to file an amended complaint and failed to do so. At this time, Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim against Defendant Dr. Murray is the only claim I recommend should proceed.
VII. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. Plaintiff's First Amendment Free Exercise claim against Defendant Dr. Murray be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim;
2. Plaintiff's First Amendment Free Exercise claim against Defendant Chaplain Adekola be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim;
3. Plaintiff's Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim against Defendant Chaplain Adekola be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim; and
4. Plaintiff's Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim against Defendant Dr. Murray should be allowed to proceed.
5. Court direct service of the Complaint (Doc. 1) and any order adopting this Report and Recommendation on Defendant Dr. Murray.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3 which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.