Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5869-13T2
05-02-2016
MARIE RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HELEN M. MILLING, Defendant-Respondent.
Cutolo Mandel, L.L.C., attorneys for appellant (Jeffrey S. Mandel, of counsel and on the brief). Law Offices of Styliades and Jackson, attorneys for respondent (G. Samuel Hoffman, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Lihotz and Fasciale. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-3203-12. Cutolo Mandel, L.L.C., attorneys for appellant (Jeffrey S. Mandel, of counsel and on the brief). Law Offices of Styliades and Jackson, attorneys for respondent (G. Samuel Hoffman, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Marie Richardson appeals from a July 11, 2014 order dismissing her complaint with prejudice and granting summary judgment to defendant. Following our review, we conclude genuine issues of material fact exist. We therefore reverse.
This case arises out of an automobile rear-end collision. We derive the following facts from the motion transcript.
On November 11, 2010, plaintiff was a passenger in a bus operated by her co-employee, Michelle Herbert. As the bus approached an intersection, it rear-ended defendant's vehicle. The factual dispute pertains to what color the traffic light was, and whether defendant's alleged negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
Plaintiff did not name Herbert as a defendant because of the workers' compensation exclusivity bar, N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, which provides an employee cannot be liable for unintentionally causing injury to a co-employee if the injury is compensable under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 to -35.22. --------
Plaintiff could not see the traffic signal at the intersection. Herbert indicated, consistent with her statements recorded in the police report, defendant "slammed on her brakes" even though the traffic signal was green. Defendant contends she was traveling approximately fifty miles per hour, and although all nearby vehicles continued through the intersection, she stopped because the traffic signal was yellow.
Defendant testified in her deposition that, when she saw the traffic signal was yellow, she checked her rearview mirror to confirm it was safe to stop. She indicated once she saw the bus approaching from behind and realized it could not stop in time, she took her foot off the brake pedal to minimize potential injury. Defendant also indicated traffic from a Walmart perpendicular to the parties was traveling into the intersection at this time.
The judge determined that plaintiff could not attribute any fault to defendant because no tickets were issued at the scene. The judge "assume[d]" defendant's assertion that traffic from Walmart was traveling towards her meant the traffic signal facing the parties was likely yellow or red, not green. Moreover, the judge determined that even if the traffic signal was green, Herbert still had a duty to drive a reasonably safe distance behind defendant to avoid collision. As a result, the judge rendered an oral opinion granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and entered the order under review.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge inappropriately engaged in factfinding, failed to view the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and erred in his legal analysis. We agree.
We review a summary judgment order de novo, applying the same standard governing the trial court, Oyola v. Xing Lan Liu, 431 N.J. Super. 493, 497 (App. Div.) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 86 (2013), and according no deference to its legal conclusions, Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382-83 (2010) (citations omitted). Under that standard, summary judgment is appropriate where, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. 4:46-2(c); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to weigh the evidence, but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial. Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 212 (1986)). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a rational factfinder, viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the non-movant, could resolve the issue in the non-movant's favor. Ibid. When considering a motion for summary judgment, a judge is to refrain from credibility determinations. Ibid.
Here, faced with conflicting accounts of the accident, the judge improperly resolved factual issues in defendant's favor, including the color of the traffic signal and the cause of the accident. Moreover, the judge reasoned that even if the traffic signal were green, plaintiff still could not recover because, by virtue of colliding into the rear of defendant's vehicle, Herbert must have been following unreasonably close to defendant, violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-89.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-89 provides, in pertinent part: "The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard to the speed of the preceding vehicle and the traffic upon, and condition of, the highway." A driver is negligent if he or she causes injury by deviating from this standard. Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 10 (1969); Eaton v. Eaton, 119 N.J. 628, 642-43 (1990) (violating a statute which "specifically incorporates a common-law standard of care" is negligence (citing Dolson, supra, 55 N.J. at 10)).
The mere occurrence of a rear-end collision does not automatically establish a driver followed the preceding vehicle at an unreasonable distance, N.J.S.A. 39:4-89, thereby proving negligence; this is not a matter of strict liability. The finder of fact determines, in light of the surrounding circumstances, whether a driver conformed to the relevant standard of care. Paiva v. Pfeiffer, 229 N.J. Super. 276, 283 (App. Div. 1988).
In the seminal case, Dolson, supra, 55 N.J. at 11, our Supreme Court considered the evidence of the surrounding circumstances when evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct and its causal connection to the accident. Importantly, the testimony establishing the defendant's liability was undisputed. Id. at 11-12. That is not the case here. Plaintiff disputes material aspects of defendant's deposition testimony, including the color of the traffic signal.
We also conclude the judge erred by reasoning, because defendant was not found guilty of any motor vehicle violations, plaintiff could not attribute any fault to defendant. Defendant need not necessarily have been issued a ticket and proven guilty to be liable in this personal injury lawsuit.
In a negligence action, a plaintiff must establish: "(1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) actual damages." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (citation omitted). A proximate cause produces the injury complained of in a "natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause." Ibid. (citation omitted). A driver must exercise reasonable care in the control, management, and operation of his or her vehicle, and a driver has a right to assume other drivers will adhere to this standard of care. Goldstone v. Tuers, 189 N.J. Super. 167, 169 (App. Div. 1983) (citations omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude defendant breached her duty of care by attempting to stop at a green light, and that her conduct was a proximate cause of the accident and plaintiff's resulting injuries. We emphasize one actor need not be the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, Kubert v. Best, 432 N.J. Super. 495, 508 (App. Div. 2013) (citations omitted), and any purported negligence attributable to plaintiff or Herbert would not necessarily bar recovery, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1.
Reversed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION