Opinion
14-23-00297-CV
12-17-2024
SANDRA RICHARDSON, Appellant v. HOUSTON METHODIST CLEAR LAKE HOSPITAL, Appellee
On Appeal from the 190th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2020-74666
Panel consists of Christopher Chief Justice and Wise and Jewell Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ken Wise, Justice.
Appellant Sandra Richardson appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Houston Methodist Clear Lake Hospital (HMCLH) in Richardson's suit alleging age discrimination and retaliation under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). In two issues, Richardson contends that she presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of age discrimination and retaliation to survive summary judgment. We affirm.
Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.051, .055.
Background
In 2004, Richardson began working for Houston Methodist Hospital as a staff pharmacist at its Baytown location. Initially, Richardson worked part time. She later requested and was granted "PRN" status to care for her terminally ill mother. In August 2018, at the age of fifty-nine years old, Richardson requested and was granted a transfer to the Clear Lake location, HMCLH. Richardson remained a PRN pharmacist at HMCLH. That same month, Dr. Thani Gossai became the Interim Director of Pharmacy at HMCLH and Richardson's direct supervisor. Richardson claims that she soon became the target of age discrimination by Gossai. Specifically, Richardson claims that in 2018, Gossai denied her request for part-time status but permitted a younger pharmacist, Jasmine Ta, to move into a part-time position. Gossai responds that he never had any conversation with Richardson regarding a request to switch from PRN status to part-time status. He also denies that Ta moved to part-time status while under his supervision.
Richardson testified that being a PRN pharmacist has "a little bit more flexibility in scheduling." Dr. Gossai testified that "PRN means as needed, and so they're not guaranteed any hours; they just are placed on the schedule as needed." By contrast, according to Dr. Gossai, a part-time or full-time pharmacist is guaranteed a certain number of hours and is also entitled to certain other "guaranteed benefits from the organization."
Gossai assumed the role of Director of Pharmacy in April 2019. In August 2019, HMCLH hired Samantha Sangabi as a PRN pharmacist. Richardson contends that shortly after Sangabi's hire, Gossai began scheduling Sangabi to work hours normally worked by Richardson. When Richardson received the October schedule in August 2019, she emailed Gossai to ask whether his failure to schedule her to work Friday, October 18th was an "oversight." Gossai responded: "This was not an oversight as I'll be working Samantha into the mix for our growing coverage needs in the department." Gossai claims that he also reduced the hours of the other PRN pharmacist, Burce Hoffman, in order to give hours to Sangabi. Further, HMCLH points out that PRN employees are not guaranteed any specific hours or shifts.
Richardson and Gossai had a meeting in October 2019. Gossai described the meeting as Richardson's annual review, while Richardson claims that she thought the purpose was to discuss "her sudden reduction in hours." Richardson contends that Gossai gave her "a baseless poor performance evaluation" in retaliation for her reduced schedule complaint. Richardson worked one shift in December 2019. Thereafter, Gossai did not schedule Richardson to work in January, February, or March 2020. Gossai explained that he did not place Richardson on the schedule for various reasons, one being that Richardson had yet to complete a required annual skills assessment.
According to HMCLH, the assessment was due at the end of August each year. Gossai claims that he gave his employees a grace period of at least thirty days to complete the assessment, but Richardson did not complete it until February 2020. He explained that she was scheduled to work in September and October because he made those schedules before the assessment was due.
Around this time, HMCLH was transitioning to a 24-hour pharmacy. Gossai hired Sangabi for a posted full-time pharmacist position with overnight hours. Richardson did not apply for the position.
In January 2020, Richardson filed a Charge of Discrimination against HMCLH with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging age discrimination and retaliation.
In April 2020, Gossai "abruptly" informed Richardson that she was scheduled to work April 21, 2020. Richardson responded that she could not come to work because she was under a state-mandated COVID-19 quarantine after traveling to Louisiana. Gossai informed her that the quarantine did not apply to healthcare workers and that she needed to seek accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He further advised Richardson that she was scheduled to work April 24, 2020 and that if she did not seek accommodation or report to work, she would be suspended, which could lead to termination. Richardson formally resigned from her position on April 24, 2020.
After receiving a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC, Richardson filed the instant suit in November 2020, alleging that HMCLH "constructively discharged her by creating a hostile work environment and abruptly removing her from the schedule for nearly four (4) months" because of her age. Richardson contended that her duties were given to Sangbai, a "substantially younger" employee. Richardson also alleged that HMCLH retaliated against her by "systematically removing her from the work schedule" after she "object[ed] to her reduction of work hours and the discriminatory treatment based on her age."
HMCLH filed a traditional and no-evidence summary judgment motion. In its no-evidence motion, as to her age discrimination claim, HMCLH argued Richardson had no evidence that (1) she suffered an adverse employment action or (2) HMCLH gave preferential treatment to similarly situated employees outside of her protected class or replaced her with someone outside of her protected class. HMCLH argued that even if Richardson could make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, she failed to present evidence demonstrating that HMCLH's reasons for reducing her hours were pretextual. Concerning her retaliation claim, HMCLH argued that Richardson failed to present any evidence that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; or (3) a causal connection existed between her alleged protected activity and any adverse employment decision. HMCLH also argued that even assuming Richardson presented a prima facie case of retaliation, she could not demonstrate pretext.
In its traditional summary judgment motion, HMCLH argued that Richardson's age discrimination and retaliation claims failed as a matter of law because she could not establish that HMCLH constructively discharged her, i.e., that she suffered an adverse employment action.
The trial court granted HMCLH's motion for summary judgment without specifying whether it was granting the traditional or no-evidence motion and without stating a basis for its ruling. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
We review the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). In reviewing either a no-evidence or traditional summary judgment motion, we must take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and draw every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmovant. M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23-24 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); Haven Chapel United Methodist Church v. Leebron, 496 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is essentially a motion for a pretrial directed verdict. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i); Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). After an adequate time for discovery, a party without the burden of proof may, without presenting evidence, seek summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to support one or more essential elements of the non-movant's claim or defense. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i). The nonmovant is required to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact supporting each element contested in the motion. Id.; Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 310. Generally, we first review the no-evidence summary judgment motion. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).
The party moving for a traditional summary judgment has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Willrich, 28 S.W.3d at 23. To be entitled to traditional summary judgment, a defendant must conclusively negate at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). Once the defendant produces sufficient evidence to establish the right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with competent controverting evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995).
When, as in this case, the trial court does not specify the grounds on which it rendered summary judgment, we must affirm that summary judgment if any of the independent grounds are meritorious. Chrismon v. Brown, 246 S.W.3d 102, 106 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
Applicable Law
Richardson asserts causes of action against HMCLH under the TCHRA. See Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.001-.556. Among other things, the TCHRA prohibits an employer from discharging an employee based on the employee's age and from retaliating against an employee engaging in certain protected activities. See id. §§ 21.051, 21.055. Modeled after federal civil rights law, the TCHRA "purports to correlate 'state law with federal law in the area of discrimination in employment.'" NME Hosps., Inc. v. Rennels, 994 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Tex. 1999) (quoting Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. 1991)). "[W]e look to analogous federal precedent for guidance in interpreting the [TCHRA]." Id.
A plaintiff can establish discrimination or retaliation under the TCHRA in two ways. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex. 2012); Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476-77 (Tex. 2001). Under the first option, an employee can present direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory actions or words. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 634. "Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption." Coll. of the Mainland v. Glover, 436 S.W.3d 384, 392 (Tex. App. -Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (quoting Jespersen v. Sweetwater Ranch Apartments, 390 S.W.3d 644, 653 (Tex. App. -Dallas 2012, no pet.)).
Alternatively, because direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation is a "rarity" in employment cases, a plaintiff can present indirect or circumstantial evidence of discrimination or retaliation. Id. (citing Russo v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied)). Under this approach, Texas courts employ the burden-shifting framework outlined by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Glover, 436 S.W.3d at 392. Applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to the TCHRA, a plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of discrimination if she meets the "minimal" initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 634. For example, in an age discrimination case, a plaintiff may create an inference of impermissible discrimination by presenting evidence that she was (1) a member of the protected class (i.e., at least forty years old), (2) qualified for the position, (3) terminated from employment, and (4) replaced by someone outside the protected class. See Kaplan v. City of Sugar Land, 525 S.W.3d 297, 302-03 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 632). A plaintiff offering such evidence raises a presumption of discrimination because the employer's challenged acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. See Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 634.
The TCHRA does not impose a prima facie case requirement; rather, the elements of a prima facie case are established by case law. See Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 638.
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Willrich, 28 S.W.3d at 24; Okpere v. Nat'l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 524 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). If an employer moving for summary judgment proves as a matter of law a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action, the burden then shifts to the employee to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer's reason was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. See Willrich, 28 S.W.3d at 24; Okpere, 524 S.W.3d at 822. As explained in more detail below, the plaintiff's burden at the third stage varies depending on whether a discrimination or retaliation claim is at issue.
Age Discrimination Claim
In her first issue, Richardson contends that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her age. See Tex. Lab. Code §21.051(1). The TCHRA protects those who are forty years or older from age discrimination. See id. § 21.101. At the time of her resignation, Richardson was sixty-one years old.
Richardson argues that the trial court erred in granting HMCLH's motion for summary judgment as to her age discrimination claim because she presented both direct and circumstantial evidence of age discrimination. Though she resigned her employment, Richardson alleges that she was constructively discharged after Gossai removed her from the schedule for months. She also argues that she was replaced by someone younger-Samantha Sangabi.
A. Direct Evidence
As noted earlier herein, an employee can prove discrimination by either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 634. In her brief, Richardson claims that she provided direct evidence of discrimination, pointing to "a statement" made by a younger pharmacist, Johnny Pham, that Richardson "was old, unable to learn, and not a fast learner." Such a comment is not direct evidence of discrimination. Direct evidence (if believed) "proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption." Jespersen, 390 S.W.3d at 653 (emphasis added); see also Lopez v. Exxon Mobil Dev. Co., No. 14-16-00826-CV, 2017 WL 4018359, at *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 12, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Jespersen and concluding that senior managers' description of employee as "old and stubborn" was not direct evidence of age discrimination). Because we would have to infer or presume from Pham's comment that HMCLH terminated Richardson because of her age, the comment is circumstantial evidence, not direct evidence. See Jespersen, 390 S.W.3d at 653.
B. Prima Facie Case under McDonnell Douglas
In the absence of direct evidence, we apply the McDonnell Douglas framework. HMCLH does not dispute that Richardson has established elements two and three of her prima facie case of age discrimination-that she was qualified for her position and within the protected class (over age forty) at the time of her alleged constructive discharge. Instead, HMCLH challenges Richardson's assertions that she was constructively discharged and that she was replaced by someone outside the protected class or by someone younger.
Because we conclude that Richardson failed to present a scintilla of evidence that HMCLH's stated reasons for reducing her hours were a pretext for age discrimination, we presume without deciding that Richardson met her prima facie burden. See Hudgens v. Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., 615 S.W.3d 634, 642-43 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (presuming appellant presented prima facie case of age discrimination but determining no evidence of pretext); Okpere, 524 S.W.3d at 828 (presuming same in disability discrimination case). We discuss the issue of pretext below.
C. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason for Adverse Employment Action
Presuming Richardson established a prima facie case of age discrimination, the burden shifted to HMCLH to present evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Hudgens, 615 S.W.3d at 643 (citing Willrich, 28 S.W.3d at 24). HMCLH met its burden by adducing evidence that Gossai did not place Richardson on the schedule for several reasons: (1) Sangabi applied and was hired for a full-time position (while Richardson remained PRN) and full-time employees are guaranteed certain hours, while PRN employees are not; (2) Richardson failed to timely complete a department-wide "Ancillary Skills Fair" assessment required of all employees; (3) Richardson's productivity was lower than that of her peers; (4) Richardson received negative feedback from her peers; and (5) Richardson made more errors than her peers. This showing satisfies HMCLH's burden to establish a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. See Winters v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 568, 578 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (employer's belief that employee's performance is inadequate constitutes legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination). HMCLH's burden is one of production, not persuasion. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); Russo, 93 S.W.3d at 437-38.
Once HMCLH established these legitimate, non-discriminatory bases for its actions, the burden shifted back to Richardson to demonstrate that the stated reasons were false and a pretext for intentional discrimination. See Hudgens, 615 S.W.3d at 641 (citing Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 782 (Tex. 2018); Toennies, 47 S.W.3d at 477; Willrich, 28 S.W.3d at 24).
D. Pretext
On appeal, Richardson summarily addresses pretext as follows: "Mr. Gossai's articulated reason for removing Ms. Richardson from the work schedule [on October 18, 2019] was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination because an additional employee on the schedule [Sangabi] would only provide adequate coverage for the "growing needs" of the department." At most, Richardson suggests Gossai's stated reason for not scheduling Richardson on October 18, 2019, is false. But Richardson bore the burden to demonstrate not only that the stated reason was false, but also that age discrimination was Gossai's true motive. See Hudgens, 615 S.W.3d at 643 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. 2003)). That she has failed to do.
Returning to the comments allegedly made by pharmacist Johnny Pham, Richardson cites her own petition as proof of Pham's comments. Pleadings are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807, 818-19 (Tex. 2021) ("Clearly, a party cannot rely on its own pleaded allegations as evidence of facts to support its summary-judgment motion or to oppose its opponent's summary-judgment motion.") (internal footnotes and citations omitted); Buzbee v. Clear Channel Outdoor, LLC, 616 S.W.3d 14, 27 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (noting that "generally pleadings are not evidence," as "assertions in a petition are nothing more than allegations").
Even still, nothing in the record establishes Pham as someone with authority over Richardson. Though Richardson argues that "the slurs directed at [her] and the subsequent allocation of [her] hours to a younger pharmacist[] constitute circumstantial evidence of age discrimination," there is no indication that Pham had any involvement in making the pharmacy's work schedule. As HMCLH points out, the Texas supreme court has held that "stray remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination and statements made remotely in time by someone not directly connected with termination decisions do not raise a fact issue about the reason for termination." AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Rather, "[s]tatements and remarks may serve as evidence of discrimination only if they are (1) related to the employee's protected class, (2) close in time to the employment decision, (3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision, and (4) related to the employment decision at issue. Id. at 593. The comments from Pham referenced by Richardson's petition do not meet this standard. And Richardson does not contend that Gossai made any comments regarding her age whatsoever.
Richardson cites no other evidence to support her contention that Gossai's stated reasons for removing her from the schedule were a pretext for age discrimination. She does not address HMCLH's proffered reasons concerning her failure to complete the required skills assessment, work performance, or feedback from peers. At her deposition, Richardson testified as follows:
A. I don't have knowledge of why [Gossai] did what he did, but I know that was very disparaging to me to be put on the schedule
[in April 2020] and then to be threatened that if I don't show up that I will be terminated.
Q. Okay. And do you have any reason to think that -- that action was done because of your age?
. . . .
A. I can only tell you why -- what -- what I felt as an employee of Methodist . . . that I felt like I was being discriminated against because of my age. That's all I can tell you. I can't tell you what was in Mr. Gossai's head. I can tell you what I felt as an employee for 15 years at Methodist Hospital.
Richardson's testimony suggests nothing more than an unsubstantiated feeling that HMCLH was discriminating against her based on her age. But "[a]n employee's subjective belief that [her] employer has given a false reason for the employment decision is not competent summary judgment evidence." Chandler v. CSC Applied Techs., LLC, 376 S.W.3d 802, 814 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied); McNeel v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 526 S.W.3d 750, 760 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (quoting Chandler); see also Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 773 n.44 (citing Mills v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833, 841-42 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[I]f the subjective beliefs of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases could, by themselves, create genuine issues of material fact, then virtually all defense motions for summary judgment in such cases would be doomed.")).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Richardson failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. See Hudgens, 615 S.W.3d at 643 (noting that to create genuine issue of material fact as to pretext, plaintiff must show both that stated reason was false and that discrimination was the true reason). Thus, the trial court correctly granted HMCLH's motion for summary judgment as to her age discrimination claim.
We overrule Richardson's first issue.
Retaliation Claim
In her second issue, Richardson contends that she presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to survive summary judgment on her retaliation claim. Richardson claims that HMCLH retaliated against her "when she engaged in a protected activity by making a complaint regarding her reduction in hours."
A. Retaliation under the TCHRA
The TCHRA prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for engaging in certain protected activities. See Tex. Lab. Code § 21.055. Protected activities consist of: (1) opposing a discriminatory practice, (2) making or filing a charge, (3) filing a complaint, and (4) testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. See id.; San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2015). To prevail in a retaliation case, the employee must first establish a prima facie case showing that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., 214 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2004)). The causation standard for the McDonnell Douglas prima-facie-case element is not onerous and can be satisfied merely by proving close timing between the protected activity and the adverse action. Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 782. However, if the employer provides evidence of a legitimate reason for the adverse action, the employee must prove the adverse action would not have occurred "but for" the protected activity. Id. The but-for causation standard is significantly more difficult to prove than prima facie causation. Id.
B. Analysis
Concerning her retaliation claim, in her response to HMCLH's motion for summary judgment and in her briefing to this court, Richardson contends that she engaged in protected activity when she "complained" to Gossai via email about his failure to schedule her to work on Friday, October 18, 2019. The record reveals the following exchange between Richardson and Gossai:
Richardson does not contend that HMCLH retaliated against her for engaging in the protected activity of filing a complaint with the EEOC. In any event, the adverse action Richardson complains of-a negative performance evaluation on October 22, 2019-occurred prior to her EEOC complaint.
Email from Richardson to Gossai, August 20, 2019, 9:10 PM
Subject: Oct schedule
Good Evening,
Thani, I noticed on the October schedule that I was not scheduled for Friday [the] 18th. Was this an oversight?
Sandra
Email from Gossai to Richardson, September 3, 2019, 11:59 AM
Hey Sandra,
Sorry for the delay, as I was trying to get a few things completed before I left on PTO. This was not an oversight as I'll be working Samantha into the mix for our growing coverage needs in the department.
Thank you!
tg
Email from Richardson to Gossai, September 3, 2019, 2:46 PM
Thani,
Thank you for the answer.
Sandra
The Texas supreme court has held that to constitute protected activity, an employee's complaints must at least "alert the employer to the employee's reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination is at issue." Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 786. Although "magic words" are not required to invoke the TCHRA's retaliation protections, vague complaints of "harassment," "hostile environment," "discrimination," or "bullying" are insufficient. Id. at 786-87. Rather, there must be some indication of motivation on the basis of the protected class. See id. at 787. "A vague charge of discrimination will not invoke protection under the statute." Azubuike v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 970 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.), overruled in part on other grounds by Glassman v. Goodfriend, 347 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
Here, Richardson's email does not even vaguely hint at discrimination. Nothing about her email suggested a belief that age discrimination was afoot. Richardson did not make any mention of age in asking Gossai why she was not scheduled to work on October 18, 2019, or reference any other employees. Compare Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 585-86 (Tex. 2017) (concluding Hispanic employee did not engage in protected activity for purposes of retaliation claim when he asked his employer's human resources director why white employee was still working but he was not; statement did not alert employer to alleged discrimination), with Metro Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Ridley, 540 S.W.3d 91, 99-100 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (concluding that employee engaged in protected activity by making internal complaint that supervisor's criticisms were due to employee's race and gender and by making separate complaint that employer retaliated against employee by refusing to allow her to return after medical leave with physical restrictions). Richardson's email, standing alone, does not give HMCLH the requisite notice of possible age discrimination. We therefore conclude that she failed to demonstrate a protected activity under the TCHRA. Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 786; see also Warrick v. Motiva Enter., L.L.C., No. 14-13-00938-CV, 2014 WL 7405645, at *8 (Dec. 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("An employer cannot retaliate against an employee for voicing opposition to discriminatory practices if the employee has not actually voiced such opposition."). Richardson therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See Dias, 214 S.W.3d at 676.
We overrule her second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's grant of HMCLH's motion for summary judgment.