Opinion
Civil Action 3:22-CV-00434
06-08-2023
DANIEL J. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al., Defendants.
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(MARIANI, J.)
This is action was initiated upon the filing of the original complaint in this matter on March 22, 2022, by pro se Plaintiff Daniel J. Richardson (“Richardson”). (Doc. 1). On November 19, 2022, Richardson filed the amended complaint against Defendants Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and John Doe Agents (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that unnamed law enforcement officers had engaged in conduct for more than seven years that violated his civil rights, including being attacked by dogs, having firearms pointed at him, surveilling him, and making physical contact with him. (Doc. 20). Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (Doc. 21).
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss be GRANTED. (Doc. 21).
I. Background and Procedural History
Richardson initiated this action by filing a complaint on March 22, 2022, asserting claims for monetary compensation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 1985; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 399 (1971); the Fourth Amendment; Fifth Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”). (Doc. 1). On April 6, 2022, Richardson filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Doc. 7). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment, as well as a brief in support and a statement of material facts, on May 23, 2022. (Doc. 12; Doc. 13; Doc. 14). In response to the motion to dismiss, Richardson filed the motion for leave to file an amended complaint on July 12, 2022. (Doc. 15, at 1-2). On August 26, 2022, the Court ordered Richardson to show cause as to why the action against John Doe FBI Agents should not be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) for failure to serve the summons and complaint within ninety days. (Doc. 17). Richardson has not responded to the Court's Order and his amended complaint does not provide any sort of response.
On October 5, 2022, the Court adopted the undersigned's recommendation, denying Richardson's motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and dismissing all claims with prejudice except for Richardson's Bivens claims for violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments against John Doe Agents in their individual capacities and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims. (Doc. 18; Doc. 19). The Court granted Richardson the opportunity to file an amended complaint within 30 days, curing the defects in his initial pleading as to these claims. (Doc. 19, at 2). On November 18, 2022, Richardson filed his amended complaint beyond the deadline imposed by the Court. (Doc. 20). On December 2, 2022, Defendants filed the motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (Doc. 21).
Richardson's amended complaint sets forth the following facts. Richardson contends that “on or around September 11, 2015, [he] became the target of a group of unruly federal agents in the city of Scranton, PA.” (Doc. 20, ¶ 1). Richardson alleges that the John Doe Agents “stalked, arrested, followed [and] stalked [him] ever since, on or about September 11, 2015,” describing instances in that John Doe Agents allegedly terrorized him “from the sky by pinpointing him or any vehicle he is driving with a[ ] large, helicopter like, drone like manned or unmanned aircraft or aerial object....” (Doc. 20, ¶ 5). Richardson admits that he suffers from mental health issues and has received treatment for the same. (Doc. 20, ¶ 5). Richardson provides no further details as to the alleged federal officials apart from identifying several license plate numbers and the street address where such license plates were recorded. (Doc. 20, ¶¶ 3-4). As relief, Richardson requests a monetary award of $100 million dollars. (Doc. 20, ¶ 6).
The motion to dismiss has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition. (Doc. 21; Doc. 22; Doc. 24; Doc. 25).
II. Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v.Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions ....'” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1429-30). The court also need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
With the aforementioned standard in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, pro se plaintiffs are still subject to the basic pleading requirements of Rule 8. Rhett v. N.J. St. Super. Ct., 260 Fed.Appx. 513, 515 (3d Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit has further instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview St. Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
Defendants seek to dismiss this action for a myriad of reasons, including: (1) the amended complaint was filed beyond the 30-day deadline set by the Court; (2) Richardson failed to show cause as to why John Doe Agents should not be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); (3) Richardson's claims are beyond the two-year statute of limitations; and (4) the amended complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief. (Doc. 22, at 4; Doc. 25, at 38). Based upon the undersigned's review of Richardson's amended complaint, Defendants' motion to dismiss shall be granted because Richardson's claims are time-barred by applicable statutes of limitations.
A. Richardson's claims are time-barred.
The limitations period for federal civil rights claims is calculated in accordance with “the general residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions” pertaining to the state where the federal court sits. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360,368 (3d Cir. 2000). Therefore, the appropriate statute of limitations is determined by reference to Pennsylvania's personal injury laws. According to Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must file any actions pursuant to Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 within two years. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524; see also Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. Pa. 1989) (holding that § 1985 claims are subject to two-year statute of limitations); Johnstone v. United States, 980 F.Supp. 148, 153 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (limitation periods for Bivens claims are determined by “borrowing the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims.”). Therefore, Richardson's claims against Defendants are subject to a maximum two-year statute of limitations.
Having established the appropriate statute of limitations, the Court must then rely on federal rather than state laws to determine the time of accrual for a civil rights cause of action. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991); Armington v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 767 F.Supp. 661, 664-65 (E.D. Pa. 1991). Generally, a claim accrues in a federal cause of action when “a plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action,' that is, when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.' ” Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Bay Area Laundry and DryCleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)). For Bivens claims, accrual occurs “when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury that forms the basis of the action.” Wooden v. Eisner, 143 Fed.Appx. 493, 494 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Sameric Corp. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998)). Similarly, civil rights claims accrue when a plaintiff has knowledge or should have knowledge of the injury or injuries that underlie his action. Genty, 937 F.2d at 919. With regard to § 1985 claims, “[t]he statute of limitations . . . runs from the date of each overt act causing damage to plaintiff.” Bougher, 882 F.2d at 80.
Here, Richardson filed § 1985 and Bivens claims against Defendants arising out of alleged instances of stalking, intimidation, and deprivation of civil rights performed by multiple government agents. (Doc. 20, at 1-3). Although Richardson does not establish the identity of any individual John Doe Agents or allege their involvement in this case, the only date provided in the amended complaint is September 11, 2015. (Doc. 20, at 1-3). Richardson vaguely alleges that Defendants' actions thereafter continued for seven years, however, he does not identify any other dates, times, or descriptions of the alleged violations. (Doc. 20, at 1-4). Thus, the undersigned finds that Richardson's claims accrued on September 11, 2015, because a reasonable person would have knowledge of the alleged injuries that underlie this action. See, e.g., Lopez v. Brady, No. 4:CV-07-1126, 2008 WL 4415585, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2008) (setting the date on which the plaintiff's Bivens claim accrued as the date the plaintiff “had all the facts necessary for him to pursue or to begin to investigate those Bivens claims”). Richardson filed the original complaint on March 22, 2022, more than six (6) years later. (Doc. 1). Consequently, the instant action was filed outside of the two-year statute of limitations.
Equitable tolling may apply to claims brought against the Government. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 93-96 (1990) (because federal statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional, “the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.”). “Equitable tolling is a rare remedy to be applied in unusual circumstances.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 396.
According to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, tolling is generally only appropriate in three instances:
(1) where a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with respect to her cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her claim as a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) where the plaintiff asserts her claims in a timely manner but has done so in the wrong forum.”
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 643 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations marks and citations omitted).
To obtain the benefit of equitable tolling, a party also must show that he “exercised due diligence in pursuing and preserving her claim.” Omar v. Blackman, 590 Fed.Appx. 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
The undersigned finds that equitable tolling does not apply in this case. Liberally construing the amended complaint, Richardson has not alleged any facts that would allow the Court to consider equitably tolling the statute of limitations such that would render Richardson's action timely. Although Pennsylvania's state tolling standards for personal injury claims are narrower and less lenient than their federal counterparts, Richardson would be unable to satisfy any of the conditions for equitable tolling even under the more flexible federal standards. First, Richardson has not presented any evidence of deception on Defendants' behalf. Nor does the factual record reflect an active effort, by either Defendants or a third party, to bar Richardson from exercising his rights. Lastly, there is no evidence to suggest that Richardson made a previous attempt to bring this action to the wrong forum. Thus, Richardson's cause of action accrued on September 11, 2015, and he has not demonstrated any facts that would suggest this cause of action should be equitably tolled. See, e.g., Omar v. Blackman, No. CV 10-1071, 2013 WL 12099395, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2013), aff'd, 590 Fed.Appx. 162 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that plaintiff's § 1983, § 1985 and Bivens claims were time-barred and equitable tolling did not apply where plaintiff was unable to satisfy any basis for tolling); Mishra v. Nolan, No. 2:05CV693, 2005 WL 3116038, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2005), aff'd, 187 Fed.Appx. 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that Bivens action “was filed well after the statutory period had elapsed,” where plaintiff offered no “grounds that would support the application of the equitable tolling doctrine.”). Therefore, because no extraordinary circumstances prevented Richardson from timely filing the instant action, the undersigned finds that Richardson's § 1985 and Bivens claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Richardson's claims be dismissed with prejudice.
B. The amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
In the exercise of caution, the undersigned finds that even if Richardson's claims are not time-barred, the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. While the court is obligated to liberally construe Richardson's pro se pleading to ensure meaningful consideration of his claim, Richardson's amended complaint does not state what constitutional provision or statute under which his claims arise or set forth any intelligible claims against any party. (Doc. 20); see Haines, 404 U.S. at 520.
Defendants consist of the FBI and John Doe Agents. (Doc. 20, at 1). The amended complaint does not set forth any allegations specifically directed at either of these entities, or offer facts to establish how Richardson knew the alleged Defendants were federal agents. Nevertheless, the claims against the FBI must be dismissed because claims against a federal agency are not cognizable under Bivens. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994); Dambach v. United States, 211 Fed.Appx. 105, 108 (3d cir. 2006). Further, the claims against John Doe Agents must be dismissed as Richardson has failed to provide the Court with their identities and addresses for purposes of service of his amended complaint. See Fulton v. United States, 198 Fed.Appx. 210, 214 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating plaintiff is responsible for identifying the parties named as defendants in order to effectuate service); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(1) (“The plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint served . . .”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) (“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the [C]ourt -on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff - must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant ....”).
Further, the allegations are devoid of both a statement of jurisdiction and a statement as to the nature of the claim entitling him to relief as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1). The amended complaint does not state what constitutional or statute under which Richardson's claims arise. (Doc. 20). However, assuming the amended complaint involves those bases that the Court permitted Richardson to amend, such claims arise under the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (Doc. 1; Doc. 20). “Vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens . . . a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Allegations of personal involvement must be made with “appropriate particularity, in that a complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time, place, and person responsible.” Smalls v. Sassaman, No. 1:17-cv-2237, 2019 WL 4194211, *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2019) (granting motion to dismiss based on lack of involvement in the alleged constitutional violations); see also Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005); Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2003).
Here, Richardson's failure to narrate any facts concerning any Defendants' alleged wrongdoing frustrates even the most lenient of analytical approaches. Even when liberally construed in the light most favorable to the pro se plaintiff, the Court finds that the amended complaint fails to articulate any facts from which a conspiratorial agreement between Defendants can be inferred, nor does it allege any facts regarding any role of the individual John Doe FBI Agents in such a conspiracy, any overt acts taken by a federal agent to further any conspiracy, or any discriminatory animus behind any actions. Furthermore, Richardson does not assert any facts to establish any plausible Bivens claims against Defendants in their individual capacities and, to the extent Richardson alleges Bivens claims against the FBI or John Doe FBI Agents in their official capacities, the undersigned finds that those claims are barred by sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has unequivocally stated, “Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior .... Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (citations omitted); see also Argueta v. United States Immigration and Customs Enf't, 643 F.3d 60,71 (3d Cir. 2011). Richardson's Bivens claims, to the extent they are based solely on a theory of respondeat superior, therefore fail as a matter of law. See Ojo v. Luong, 709 Fed.Appx. 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2017) (FBI agents entitled to sovereign immunity from suit under Bivens for alleged Fifth amendment violations committed in their official capacities).
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be GRANTED and that the amended complaint be DISMISSED.
IV. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. “A district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.' ” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices &Products Liab. Litig., 564 Fed.Appx. 672, 673 (3d Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake, 232 F.3d at 373). Here, leave to amend would be futile because, even when construed in the light most favorable to Richardson, the claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. (Doc. 20). It is therefore respectfully recommended that Richardson not be granted leave to file a second amended complaint, and that all claims against Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.
V. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 21) be GRANTED, and that all claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In addition, it is recommended that the Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated June 8, 2023. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.