Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-0210 (ESH).
March 29, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is the fourth lawsuit in which plaintiff attempts to challenge his suspension from the practice of law by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In this suit, he adds the District of Columbia, the Office of the D.C. Bar Counsel, the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, and Elizabeth J. Branda, formerly a prosecuting attorney for the Office of the D.C. Bar Counsel, as defendants and also seeks to enjoin the District of Columbia Court of Appeals from further prosecuting a disciplinary case against him.
Recognizing that each prior lawsuit has been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court ordered plaintiff to show cause why this case should not also be dismissed. (Order, Feb. 2, 2005.) Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack jurisdiction to review judicial decisions by state or District of Columbia courts, as well as claims inextricably intertwined with such decisions. See Richarson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, No. 04-101, slip op. at 2 n. 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2004) ( "Richardson III") (explaining Rooker-Feldman doctrine in detail). Previous dismissals of plaintiff's cases have held that, because plaintiff's constitutional challenges to his suspension were inextricably intertwined with a challenge to the suspension itself, this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ( "Richardson I"); Richardson v. Dist of Columbia Court of Appeals, 962 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C 1997), aff'd No. 97-7085, 1997 WL 811754 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077 (1998) ( "Richardson II"); Richardson III, No. 04-101, slip. op. (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2004). For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that plaintiff has again failed to set forth any basis for attacking his suspension, and the Court therefore will dismiss this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff's response to the February 2 Show Cause Order argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the instant suit's claims because they (1) were "non-existent or unrelated" when the District of Columbia court's decision was rendered, (2) are based on "improper procedures" leading up to the judgment and not the judgment itself, (3) arise out of the District of Columbia court's nonjudicial functions (particularly "prosecutorial misconduct"), or (4) are based on the District of Columbia court's "lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Pl.'s Resp. to Show Cause Order at 17-20 (emphasis in original).) None of these arguments is persuasive.
Plaintiff also argues in a separate section that his "claims that the state court violated due process in the adjudication that resulted in the judgment" are excepted from Rooker-Feldman. This argument that is identical to number (2) above.
I. Claims "Unrelated" To District of Columbia Court's Judgment
Plaintiff first argues that his claims of due process violations, an illegal search and seizure, and "disproportionality of suspension penalty" under the Eighth Amendment are unrelated to the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and thus may be heard by this Court. The "unrelated" due process violations alleged by plaintiff all concern the actions of bar prosecutors and administrators, not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and will be dealt with in the Court's discussion of the nonjudicial function exception below. Plaintiff's "disproportionate penalty" claim appears to be based on the automatic extension of his license revocation for noncompliance with a D.C. Bar Rule. This is the exact argument — and even the same rule — that was addressed and rejected by this Court in Richardson III. No. 04-101, slip op. at 2-4 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2004). The Court's reasoning need not be repeated here. As for any other Eighth Amendment challenge to his suspension, as plaintiff has repeatedly been told, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review state court judgments even where a constitutional violation is alleged.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the bar prosecutors' subpoena of his bank records in 1996 was an illegal search and seizure which is unrelated to the D.C. Court of Appeals' judgment and therefore exempted from Rooker-Feldman. ( See Pl.'s Resp. at 17.) Nowhere does plaintiff's Complaint allege this claim, and even if it did, the statute of limitations would divest the Court of jurisdiction. "Since Congress has not provided any federal statute of limitations for actions under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, federal law looks to state law." Harley v. District of Columbia, 1985 WL 8794 at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 1985). The local law provides for a three-year statute of limitations. D.C. Code § 12-301(8). Thus, plaintiff's claim of an illegal search is approximately six years too late.
II. Procedural Due Process Claims
Plaintiff's next claim that he should be able to challenge the procedures leading to his suspension on due process grounds has already been rejected. See Richardson III, slip. op. at 4 (where the "net effect of any relief it could grant would be to reverse the Court of Appeals' final judgment," the federal district court is not permitted to hear the case); Richardson I, 83 F.3d 1513, 1515-16 (plaintiff's "attack on the rule [permitting temporary suspension without an evidentiary hearing] cannot be contemplated without his attack on his suspension"). As was the case in his previous lawsuits, the first four "due process violations" alleged by plaintiff are intertwined with, if not identical to, the suspension itself. ( See Pl.'s Resp. at 18 (listing six due process violations including, for example, "license revocation based solely upon hearsay evidence").) The final two "due process violations" listed by plaintiff in support of his argument are allegations of prosecutorial misconduct identical to those upon which plaintiff's "nonjudicial function" argument is based.
Nor is the Court persuaded by plaintiff's suggestion that his failure to raise his federal constitutional claims in state court requires that they be heard now. See Dist. of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983) ("By failing to raise his [constitutional] claims in state court a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review of the state court decision in any federal court.").
III. Claims Regarding Nonjudicial Functions
Plaintiff also attempts to recast the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' conduct as being executive, administrative, and prosecutorial and thereby not constituting judicial action. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 4.1-4.7.) This attempt to refashion his suit is nothing short of frivolous. As in all his other lawsuits, plaintiff objects to the procedures that led up to his suspension from the D.C. Bar, and particularly to the practice of effectuating an interim suspension through an ex parte judicial notice procedure. He now additionally contends that in 2003, he discovered the existence of an "undocketed" 1992 investigation which was later merged with a 1994 investigation file and formed the basis of his 1995 temporary suspension. Plaintiff claims that he had not been informed of the existence of the 1992 investigation prior to that time and that this fact gives rise to a fraudulent nondisclosure and even a civil conspiracy claim. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 5.12, 5.14) But regardless of when plaintiff discovered the facts underlying his claims, it remains that these procedural challenges are inextricably intertwined with the suspension itself. Unlike Feldman, where the district court had jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges to a D.C. bar rule, here, plaintiff challenges only the procedures applied in his particular case.
Plaintiff alleges that Branda determined that the 1992 allegations against plaintiff did not constitute probable cause for opening ("docketing") a bar disciplinary investigation. (Compl. ¶ 4.2.)
IV. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Claim
Plaintiff's final argument that a challenge to the District of Columbia Court of Appeal's subject matter jurisdiction may be heard in this Court is completely without merit. The lower federal courts do not sit to review challenges to state court decisions, including challenges to the state court's jurisdiction. See generally Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
CONCLUSION
Judge Sporkin observed eight years ago that plaintiff was "trying to get, at the very least, a second bite at the apple." Richardson II, 962 F. Supp. at 2. Plaintiff's attempt to get yet another bite by recasting his claims as attacks on nonjudicial entities or independent constitutional violations will not be countenanced. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims and therefore dismisses his complaint. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
This action also faces the substantial obstacle of res judicata, which requires that all claims against a party be brought in a single action, not in piece-meal fashion as plaintiff has repeatedly done in this Court. See generally U.S. Indus. v. Blake Construction Co., 765 F.2d 195, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985).