If that purpose is to cancel and set aside the judgment attacked, that of itself is strongly persuasive that the attack is direct. Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) sec. 306; Powell, Garard Co. v. Erath Co., Tex. (C.C.A.) 274 F. 305; Gray County, Tex., v. Hamer (C.C.A.) 277 F. 155; Mastin v. Gray, 19 Kan. 458, 27 Am. Rep. 149; Crosbie v. Brewer, 68 Okla. 16, 158 P. 388, 173 P. 441; Richardson v. Carr, 68 Okla. 46, 171 P. 476. In the case at bar the real purpose of the suit is clear.

When, however, an attempt is made to avoid, defeat, evade, or deny the force and effect of a judgment in a manner not authorized by law, and by a procedure not designed for that purpose, the attack is classified as collateral." Seminole County et al. v. Gulf Pipe Line Co., 168 Okla. 136, 32 P.2d 42; Powers v. Brown, 122 Okla. 40, 252 P. 27; Richardson v. Carr, 68 Okla. 46, 171 P. 476; Griffin v. Culp, 68 Okla. 310, 174 P. 495. But in McIntosh v. Holtgrave, 79 Okla. 63, 191 P. 739, it is pointed out that a domestic judgment may be attacked in any one or more of three ways: (a) By direct attack, which is an attempt to avoid or correct it in some manner provided by law; (b) a collateral attack, which is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it; and (c) by an equitable proceeding to set aside such judgment for fraud practiced by the successful party, said fraud inducing or entering into such order or judgment, where such fraud is extrinsic to the issues in the proceedings attacked, and especially where the court has been imposed upon by such fraud.

Such language leaves room for argument that, even where the requirement is that annulment be the "sole" purpose, the attack is nevertheless direct if such annulment be the "primary" purpose, or something more than an "incidental" one. At the opposite extreme is at least one case, Richardson v. Carr, 68 Okla. 46, 171 P. 476. There plaintiff sued to quiet title, alleging that defendant claimed through a sale under a judgment void for want of jurisdiction.

Cochran v. Barcus, 112 Okla. 180, 240 P. 321; Watkins v. Jester, 103 Okla. 201, 229 P. 1085. When, however, an attempt is made to avoid, defeat, evade, or deny the force and effect of a judgment in a manner not authorized by law, and by a procedure not designed for that purpose, the attack is classified as collateral. Powers v. Brown, 122 Okla. 40, 252 P. 27; Richardson v. Carr, 68 Okla. 46, 171 P. 476; Griffin v. Culp, 68 Okla. 310, 174 P. 495. A proceeding before the Court of Tax Review, wherein the validity of a judgment of one of the district courts of the state is questioned, is a collateral attack upon such judgment.

(Kan. 4136; St. 1893, sec. 3931. Kan. 4273; St. 1893, sec. 4068.) The cases by this court and the Supreme Court of Kansas discussing the propositions here involved and these sections of the statute cited by counsel, which seem to be all the cases by these courts bearing upon this question, are: Dunlap v. McFarlin, 25 Kan. 488; Bannister v. Carroll (Kan.) 22 P. 1012; Jones v. Warnick (Kan.) 30 P. 115; Raymond v. Nix et al., 5 Okla. 656, 49 P. 1110; Ballew v. Young, 24 Okla. 182. 103 P. 623; Richardson v. Carr, 68 Oklahoma, 171 P. 476; Pettis v. Johnston, 78 Okla. 277, 190 P. 681. An examination of these cases will disclose that none of them are in point on all the essential particulars here involved, but each, perhaps, is in point by analogy to the particular question involved in the instant case. As hereinbefore stated, the record in this case discloses that on the 19th day of September, 1914, the plaintiff filed his petition, with a copy of the note sued on attached thereto and marked "Exhibit A," and on the same day filed an affidavit of attachment in which it was alleged that the defendant was a non-resident of the state of Oklahoma, and that said cause of action and said debt arose upon contract made wholly within this state and the defendant was about to convert his property or a part thereof into money for the purpose of placing it beyond the reach of his creditors, and was about to assign, remove, and dispose of his property or a part thereof with the intent to defraud, hinder, and delay his creditors; a

At least one case defines "collateral attack" as an "objection" incidentally made to a former proceeding during a later one — a definition suggesting the necessity of expressly objecting to an earlier judgment in order to run afoul of the doctrine. Richardson v. Carr, 68 Okla. 46, 171 P. 476 (1917). One of the general rule's features is its invocation of a presumption that judgments, when impeached collaterally, are in all respects valid.