Opinion
1:21-CV-76 (LAG)
12-23-2024
VALENCIA RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. SHAKERA LETRESE BURNS, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
LESLIE A. GARDNER, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Before the Court is the Parties' Consent Motion for Protective Order. (Doc. 90). Therein, the Parties ask the Court to enter a consent protective order to protect confidential materials of the Georgia Department of Corrections. (Id. at 1). The Parties represent that the entry of a protective order is necessary to limit the disclosure of particular Standard Operating Procedures “coded as ‘yellow' or ‘red' policies [that] ha[ve] been determined by the [Georgia Department of Corrections] to potentially compromise the security of their facilities and the safety of offenders, correctional staff, and the general public.” (Id. at 2). The Georgia Department of Corrections “has agreed to produce these policies in question to the parties, subject to their agreement to the terms and entry of the [proposed] protective order[.]” (Id.).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), the Court may enter a protective order upon finding good cause. Stipulated protective orders have become “commonplace in the federal courts” to allow the parties “to designate particular documents as confidential . . . and postpone[] the necessary ‘good cause' required for entry of a protective order until the confidential designation is challenged.” Chicago Trib. Co. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, the Court finds a protective order is warranted to protect the confidential materials of the Georgia Department of Corrections. The Parties' Consent Motion (Doc. 90) is GRANTED, and the Parties' proposed Consent Protective Order (Doc. 90-1) is hereby ADOPTED and made the ORDER of the Court.
SO ORDERED.