Opinion
2:22-cv-2481-MGL-MGB
07-12-2023
Gafaskie D. Richardson, Petitioner, v. Warden Donald Beckwith, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Gafaskie D. Richardson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 3-1.) This matter is before the Court on the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 15.) Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Petition and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 15) be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is currently housed in the Wateree Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. In July of 2017, a Horry County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and trafficking methamphetamine. (Dkt. No. 14 at 1; Dkt. No. 14-1 at 77-78.)Linward C. Edwards, III represented Petitioner on these charges. (Dkt. No. 14 at 1; Dkt. No. 14-1 at 78.)
This Report and Recommendation reflects the pagination assigned by the Court's automated docketing system.
On March 12, 2018, Petitioner pled guilty to the offenses for which he was indicted. (Dkt. No. 14-1 at 3-15, 78.) The Honorable Larry B. Hyman, Jr. presided over Petitioner's guilty plea hearing. (Dkt. No. 14-1 at 3-15.) Judge Hyman accepted the plea deal negotiated between Petitioner's counsel and the State, and sentenced Petitioner to concurrent ten (10) year terms of imprisonment on each charge. (Id.)
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his guilty plea conviction and sentence. He did, however, file an application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) on July 16, 2018. (Id. at 16-24.) In his PCR application, Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because: (1) “[t]rial counsel failed to review and discuss all discovery information and evidence”; (2) “he did unfairly and improperly pressure and coerce [Petitioner] into giving up [his] rights in accepting a plea offer”; (3) “he should have been able to negotiate a better deal on [Petitioner's] behalf;” and (4) trial counsel did not “challeng[e] the drug amount or weight.” (Id. at 18-19.) The State filed its return on September 20, 2018. (Id. at 25-29.)
On October 8, 2019, the Honorable William H. Seals, Jr. held an evidentiary hearing to address the issues raised in Petitioner's application. (Id. at 31-76.) Petitioner was represented by James K. Falk as his PCR counsel. (Id. at 31.) After hearing testimony from Petitioner and his trial counsel, Judge Seals determined that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and denied the PCR application. (Id. at 31-88.) The PCR court filed a formal Order of Dismissal of Petitioner's application on March 30, 2020. (Id. at 77-88.) On April 3, 2020, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. (Dkt. No. 14-2.)
On November 9, 2020, Petitioner's appellate counsel, Joanna K. Delaney, filed a Johnson petition on Petitioner's behalf. (Dkt. No. 14-3.) Petitioner's appellate counsel simultaneously sought to be relieved as counsel because Petitioner lacked meritorious grounds for relief, but she alleged the following as the sole issue on appeal:
Whether the PCR court erred where it found counsel effectively represented Petitioner in his plea to trafficking methamphetamine, where counsel erroneously advised Petitioner that he had no defense to the charge at trial because Petitioner did have a valid defense to the charge, since counsel's ineffective performance resulted in a plea that was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently tendered?(Id.) Petitioner filed a pro se response to the Johnson petition on December 2, 2020. (Dkt. No. 14-4.)
Pursuant to Rule 243(1) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, Petitioner's appeal was transferred to the South Carolina Court of Appeals for consideration. (Dkt. No. 14-5.) The Court of Appeals denied certiorari for the appeal through an Order filed on August 11, 2021. (Dkt. No. 14-6.) The remittitur was issued on September 8, 2021. (Dkt. No. 14-7.) It was filed with the Horry County Clerk of Court on September 10, 2021. (Id.)
Petitioner filed the instant pro se habeas Petition on August 1, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) In his Petition, he raises the following grounds for relief (verbatim):
Ground One: The State denied Petitioner his 6th amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by means of a unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Supporting Facts: Petitioner contends his trial counsel's performance was deficient when counsel fail to motion that the methparticles be abstracted from the non-meth particles. Thus motion would have isolated and mitigated meth amount and weight and therefore diminish his trafficking charge / indictment.
Ground Two: The state denied Petitioner his 6th amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by means of a unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Supporting Facts: Petitioner contends his trial counsel's performance was deficient when counsel pressured and coerced him to plead guilty of the offense of trafficking meth when there
existed no mens rea of trafficking and Petitioner was unaware that the pills intentionally possessed, transported, introduced or brought into the state Meth. But counsel to the detriment of petitioner advised him to plead guilty stating that lack of mens rea was not a valid defense.
Ground Three: The State denied Petitioner his 6th amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by means of a unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Supporting Facts: Petitioner contends his trial counsel's performance was deficient when counsel fail to thoroughly investigate his case and fail to discuss any discovery information and evidence with him. Thorough investigation would have revealed contrary to what counsel erroneously advised Petitioner, mens rea is a required element for the offense of trafficking and state would have to prove mens rea of crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ground Four: The State denied Petitioner his 6th amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by means of an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Supporting Facts: Petitioner contends his trial counsel's performance was deficient when counsel advised him to plead guilty to the offense of trafficking when the state's trafficking charge was shallow and weak, and therefore counsel could have negotiated a more constitutional plea.(Dkt. No. 3-1 at 5, 7, 8, 10.)
After requesting and receiving extensions of time, Respondent filed a Return and Motion for Summary Judgment on December 14, 2022. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 15.) Petitioner filed a Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment on February 16, 2023. (Dkt. No. 21.)Respondent declined to reply by the February 23, 2023 deadline. Accordingly, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for habeas review.
The undersigned notes that contrary to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's name- or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented,” Petitioner's Response to the summary judgment motion is not signed. (Dkt. No. 21.) In light of Petitioner's pro se status, the undersigned has nonetheless considered his response when making the findings contained herein.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Rule 12, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (stating courts may apply in habeas cases any of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent they are not inconsistent with statutes or the § 2254 rules). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co., 597 F.3d at 576 (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).
II. Habeas Standard of Review
Habeas corpus in federal court exists to “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Federal habeas is neither an alternative to state-court relief nor an additional chance to appeal erroneous state-court rulings. See id. That preference for, and deference to, state courts is borne out in the various constraints placed on federal courts. See Shoop v. Hill, 139 S.Ct. 504, 506 (2019) (per curiam) (stating § 2254 “imposes important limitations on the power of federal courts to overturn the judgments of state courts in criminal cases”); see also Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (stating § 2254 “reflect[s] a presumption that state courts know and follow the law” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Since the Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication:
1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 86 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Federal courts must also defer to state courts' factual determinations, which are presumed correct until the prisoner rebuts that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. § 2254(e)(1).
In addition, before state prisoners may try to clear those high hurdles, two rules steer them to first pursue all relief available in the state courts. See § 2254(b)(1). The first, known as exhaustion of remedies, requires a prisoner to present his claims to the highest state court with jurisdiction to decide them. Stewart v. Warden of Lieber Corr. Inst., 701 F.Supp.2d 785, 790 (D.S.C. 2010). A federal court cannot grant a prisoner's habeas corpus petition until he exhausts his state-court remedies. § 2254(b)(1), (c). The second rule, called procedural default, comes into play when a prisoner failed to present a claim to the state courts at the appropriate time and has no means of doing so now. Stewart, 701 F.Supp.2d at 790. Federal courts may not consider a procedurally defaulted claim unless the prisoner shows either that he has cause for defaulting and that the alleged violation of federal law prejudiced him or that not addressing the claim would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). In considering whether Petitioner should receive habeas relief under these standards, the undersigned has carefully considered the record before the Court.
DISCUSSION
Respondent contends that: (1) Petitioner's petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations imposed by the AEDPA; (2) Petitioner cannot show he is entitled to equitable tolling; and (3) Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lack merit. (See generally Dkt. No. 14.) For the reasons set forth below and in light of the deferential standard set by the AEDPA, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 15) be GRANTED.
I. Statute of Limitations
Pursuant to the AEDPA, a person “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” and who seeks federal habeas relief is subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year period to file a § 2254 petition commences upon the latest of the following dates:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Here, the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations began running at the “conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner's judgment of conviction therefore became final “when his time for seeking review with the State's highest court expired.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 654 (2012) (clarifying the Court's prior cases concerning 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)). The one-year period to file a § 2254 petition, however, is tolled during the time “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Even if the limitations period is not tolled under the statute, a § 2254 petition may nevertheless be considered timely if the petitioner can demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. The Supreme Court recognized that the limitations period may be equitably tolled if the petitioner shows (1) he has been diligently pursuing his rights and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way, preventing him from timely filing his habeas petition. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Therefore, “specific circumstances . . . could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case.” Id. at 650. The Fourth Circuit has nevertheless cautioned that the application of equitable tolling should “be guarded and infrequent,” and “reserved for those rare instances where-due to circumstances external to the party's own conduct-it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.” Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000).
Here, the undersigned recommends granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment because the instant Petition is barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner did not timely file this Petition within the one-year limitations period outlined in § 2244(d)(1)(A), and he is not entitled to equitable tolling.
Petitioner's conviction and sentence were entered on March 12, 2018. (Dkt. No. 14-1 at 3-15.) Petitioner then had ten (10) days to file a notice of appeal. He did not file a notice of appeal, so the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations began to run upon the expiration of those ten (10) days. On July 16, 2018, Petitioner filed his PCR application, which tolled the statute of limitations. (Id. at 16-24.) Prior to that date, one hundred and fifteen (115) days had elapsed against the statute of limitations, leaving Petitioner two hundred and fifty (250) days within which he could timely file a federal habeas petition after the statute of limitations resumed.
Petitioner's PCR application was dismissed on March 30, 2020. (Id. at 77-88.) On April 3, 2020, he filed a notice of appeal. (Dkt. No. 14-2.) On August 11, 2021, the Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's Johnson petition for writ of certiorari. (Dkt. No. 14-6.) The Horry County Clerk of Court's Office filed the remittitur on September 10, 2021. (Dkt. No. 14-7.)
Accordingly, the statute of limitations remained tolled until, at the latest, September 10, 2021.Petitioner's statute of limitations began to run again on September 11, 2021. The one-year statute of limitations expired in May of 2022, approximately eight months (two hundred and fifty days) after the remittitur was filed. However, Petitioner did not file the instant Petition until August 1, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Petition is therefore untimely. (Dkt. No. 14 at 10.)
“South Carolina district courts have offered varied opinions on whether (1) the decision date, (2) the remittitur date, or (3) the date of receipt of the remittitur controls for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations. Brown v. Warden of Perry Corr. Inst., No. 5:22-cv-352-HMH-KDW, 2022 WL 17559867, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 21, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 17555509 (D.S.C. Dec. 9, 2022) (referencing Smith v. Warden, Lieber Corr. Inst., No. 4:13-3090-BHH, 2014 WL 5503529, at *6 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2014); Johnson v. Warden, Lee Corr. Inst., No. 2:14-cv-0768 DCN, 2015 WL 1021115, at *9 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2015); Beatty v. Rawski, No. 1:13-cv-3045-MGL-SVH, 2015 WL 1518083, at *2-6 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2015). Out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned has used the latest possible date here.
Petitioner does not contest that his Petition is untimely, nor does he argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling such that the untimely filing can be excused. (See generally Dkt. No. 21.) In fact, Petitioner's Response to Respondent's summary judgment motion does not address the timeliness of his Petition at all. (Id.) Further, the record before the Court does not justify a finding that Petitioner was diligent in pursuing his rights, nor that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely filing his habeas petition. “[E]quitable tolling is appropriate only when the government's wrongful conduct prevents a petitioner from filing a timely petition or when extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner's control make timely filing impossible.” Bogan v. South Carolina, 204 Fed.Appx. 160, 160-61 (4th Cir. 2006). The undersigned therefore recommends that equitable tolling is not justified in this instance, and that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely.
II. Merits
Even assuming, arguendo, that the instant Petition is timely, it should still be dismissed because each of Petitioner's grounds for relief fails on the merits. As noted, the Petition asserts that Petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of counsel in various ways. (Dkt. No. 3-1.) First, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel's performance was deficient because counsel failed to “motion” that meth particles be abstracted from non-meth particles, which could have diminished his trafficking charge and indictment. (Id. at 5.) Next, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel's performance was deficient because counsel pressured him into pleading guilty and advised him that lack of mens rea was not a valid defense. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel's performance was deficient because counsel failed to thoroughly investigate his case and failed to discuss any discovery information or evidence with him. (Id. at 8.) Finally, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel's performance was deficient because counsel failed to negotiate a better plea deal. (Id. at 10.) The undersigned considers these potential grounds for relief, below.
A. Legal Standard
Under the Sixth Amendment, Petitioner, as a criminal defendant, had a right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Petitioner may prove ineffective assistance of counsel by showing that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that such deficiency prejudiced him. Id. at 687. An attorney's performance is deficient if it was unreasonable under the circumstances of the case and under then-prevailing professional norms. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). Prejudice is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability” means “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384.
Strickland is highly deferential to counsel, and § 2254(d) is highly deferential to state courts. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. That means when a state court has adjudicated an ineffective assistance claim on the merits, this Court's review is “doubly deferential.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, the question becomes “not whether counsel's actions were reasonable,” but “whether there is any reasonable argument that [Petitioner's] counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.
Subsection 2254(d)'s standards are to be applied to the decision from the highest state court to decide the claim at issue on the merits. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). When the highest state court rules summarily, the federal habeas court should “look through” that unexplained decision to the last state-court decision that provides a relevant rationale, and “should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id. In this case, the PCR court was the only state court to issue a reasoned decision on Petitioner's claims. As such, the undersigned considers the PCR court's reasoning in analyzing Petitioner's grounds for relief.
B. Analysis
1. Ground One
In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was deficient because he “fail[ed] to motion that the meth-particles be abstracted from the non-meth particles.” (Dkt. No. 3-1 at 5.) According to Petitioner, this “motion would have isolated and mitigated meth amount and weight and therefore diminish[ed] his trafficking charge / indictment.” (Id.)
Where, as here, habeas claims are considered on the merits in state court proceedings, this Court must apply a highly deferential standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Court may not grant relief unless a state court decision on the merits “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id.
To qualify as “contrary to” United States Supreme Court precedent, a state court decision either must arrive at “a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a question of law” or “confront[ ] facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant [United States] Supreme Court precedent and arrive[ ] at a result opposite” to the United States Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). A state court decision “involves an unreasonable application” of United States Supreme Court case law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the United States Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case.” Id. at 407. This Court must presume state court findings correct unless clear and convincing evidence rebuts them. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
In this case, the PCR court considered Petitioner's assertions and found them unpersuasive. More specifically, the PCR court conducted an evidentiary hearing and considered testimony from Petitioner and his trial counsel before determining that Petitioner “ha[d] not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application.” (Dkt. No. 14-1 at 31-88.) The PCR court explained, in pertinent part:
Applicant alleges Counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and challenge the weight of the drugs for which he was convicted. “Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the weight of any controlled substance referenced in this article is the weight of that substance in pure form or any compound or mixture thereof.” S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-392; see also State v. Johnson, 410 S.C. 10, 763 S.E.2d 36 (Ct. App. 2014) (affirming trial court's ruling that the relevant weight of methamphetamine included the weight of any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing methamphetamine); State v. Kerr, 299 S.C. 108, 382 S.E.2d 895 (1989) (affirming the same ruling, but with respect to cocaine).
The facts presented by the State during the plea proceeding established that Applicant was the subject of two controlled drug buys at his residence in April and May of 2017; law enforcement agents purchased 33.5 grams of methamphetamine tablets and 6.8 grams of cocaine. (Tr. 9, II. 5-16). The State noted that the meth tablets initially tested positive for MDMA, and Counsel later explained in mitigation that Applicant “didn't have knowledge that the MDMA
pills were, in fact, I guess a composite of methamphetamine.” (Tr. 9, II.19-24; Tr. 11, II. 21-23). Applicant confirmed the facts as presented by the State, and explained “[i]t's, like I say, I be doing music, a lot of partying.” (Tr. 10, II. 5-15).
Applicant did not specifically mention the weight of the drugs at the evidentiary hearing, but echoed Counsel's remarks during the plea proceeding that he had not known the tablets contained meth, and that he believed he had been selling ecstasy. Applicant revealed that the State wanted him to be a snitch, but he declined, even though (as he noted on cross-examination) he knew who “set him up” and told Counsel that he had been set up. Applicant recalled getting the lab reports for the testing of the cocaine and marijuana, but not the meth. Applicant testified he asked Counsel to permit him to speak directly with the solicitor; Applicant told the solicitor that he was willing to plead guilty to all of the charges except for those related to meth, but the solicitor was not interested and wished to secure a conviction for which Applicant would have to serve at least 85% of the sentence. Contrary to his prior contention that he had been selling the pills he thought to be ecstasy, Applicant claimed that he was using the pills, not selling them, and that he had two kinds. On cross-examination, Applicant conceded his guilt as to the cocaine, but that he wanted to go to trial regarding the meth. Applicant denied ever seeing his discovery. Applicant testified his chief concern had been the total length of his sentence.
Counsel was unable to recall precisely when he received the lab reports from law enforcement, but explained that the illicit pills field tested positive for MDMA, and only after the lab testing did the State find they contained meth. Counsel testified that the lab report was able to establish just how much of the pills were meth. Counsel described the State's case as “airtight,” supported by two confidential informant purchases, a valid search warrant, and Applicant's willing cooperation to show law enforcement where his drugs were when they executed the search warrant. Counsel opined that not knowing the pills were meth was not a valid defense. On cross-examination, Counsel testified he met with Applicant around ten times, and that he reviewed the discovery materials with Applicant and provided a copy. Nonetheless, Counsel recalled that Applicant promptly admitted to everything and that he did not need to see the discovery. Counsel did not perceive any basis to challenge the weight or type of drugs. Counsel testified that the State initially extended an offer where Applicant would plead guilty in exchange for twelve years, but that he was able to negotiate the ten year offer on the day of Applicant's plea. On redirect examination, Counsel clarified that the lab report which reflected the discovery of meth in the pills was in the discovery, and that Applicant saw the report.
Applicant again took the stand to deny meeting with Counsel as often as Counsel claimed. Applicant additionally denied he ever saw the lab report for meth.
The Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden of showing ineffective assistance of counsel. No evidence or arguments have been presented to the Court
to show any colorable basis on which Applicant could have challenged the weight of the drugs. That multiple drugs were identified as part of the mixture does not diminish the State's ability to attribute the entirety of the weight of the substance to one of the illicit drugs which comprise the mixture. The Court does not find credible Applicant's testimony that he did not review discovery with Counsel, nor does the Court find credible Applicant's testimony that he did not see the lab report identifying meth in the pills seized by law enforcement. The Court finds Counsel's testimony broadly credible. Counsel received discovery from the state, including the lab reports from the testing of the seized narcotics, reviewed the reports, and reviewed the reports with Applicant such that he would have known the weights of the drugs and their substance. Counsel performed as expected and required under the Constitution.
Further, the Court does not find credible Applicant's testimony that he wanted and still desires to go to trial to challenge his conviction for trafficking meth. Applicant knew he was pleading guilty to trafficking meth prior to doing so. As Applicant partly admitted during evidentiary hearing, his primary concern was not which drug he was pleading to, but rather the duration of his sentence. This Court is thus not convinced that even if there were some identifiable and actionable discrepancy in the weight of the drugs, that Applicant would not have pled guilty but would have proceeded to trial. For all of these reasons, the Court finds Applicant has failed to demonstrate any deficiency on the part of Counsel, or that but for the deficiency alleged he would not have pled guilty but would have proceeded to trial, and accordingly his request for relief by way of this allegation is DENIED.(Id. at 81-84.)
Based on the foregoing, the PCR court aptly considered Petitioner's claims relating to his attorney's purported failure to challenge the weight of methamphetamine particles contained in the drugs. In determining that Petitioner's counsel was not ineffective on this basis, the PCR court provided an accurate interpretation of the relevant facts in the record and reasonably applied the law to those facts. The PCR court explained that the specific weight of methamphetamine particles was irrelevant for purposes of Petitioner's conviction, based on the text of the applicable statute. The PCR court also explained that the State's lab reports confirm the overall weight of the drugs found in Petitioner's possession. The PCR court went on to explain counsel's testimony that he believed the State had an “airtight” case against Petitioner, Petitioner “admitted to everything,” and he did not see any valid reason to challenge the weight of the methamphetamine particles in the drugs that were tested. Ultimately, the PCR court found counsel's testimony more persuasive than Petitioner's. The PCR court further noted that Petitioner's behavior during his guilty plea hearing indicated that he would not necessarily have proceeded to trial, even if his counsel's actions were lacking. Thus, the PCR court concluded that Petitioner did not show that his counsel's performance was deficient, nor that he was prejudiced. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Keeping in mind that this Court's review of a state court's adjudication of the merits of an ineffective assistance claim is “doubly deferential,” Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123, the undersigned finds no error in the PCR court's evaluation of the merits of Ground One. Moreover, Petitioner has submitted no meaningful argument as to how the PCR court's determination of these issues qualifies as legally or factually unreasonable, and such failure precludes relief in this Court. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 3-1, 21.) In the absence of any evidence (let alone clear and convincing evidence) lending to a contrary result, this Court must presume the PCR court's findings are correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The undersigned therefore recommends that Ground One lacks merit and should be dismissed.
2. Ground Two
Ground Two also lacks merit. As noted, Petitioner's second ground for relief states that Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective because he “pressured and coerced [Petitioner] to plead guilty of the offense of trafficking meth when there existed no mens rea of trafficking and Petitioner was unaware that the pills intentionally possessed, transported, introduced or brought into the state [were meth].” (Dkt. No. 3-1 at 7.) Petitioner claims that his trial counsel advised him to plead guilty, “stating that lack of mens rea was not a valid defense,” and that this advice was detrimental to Petitioner. (Id.)
In considering this ground for relief, the PCR court explained:
Applicant alleges Counsel was ineffective by improperly pressuring and coercing him into pleading guilty. Applicant's claim is rebutted by the record and may be quickly resolved. During the plea proceeding, the plea court inquired, and Applicant answered:
Q. Mr. Richardson, anyone promise you anything, threatened you in any way, done anything inappropriate or improper to make you enter this plea against your will?
A. No, sir.
Q. Are you pleading freely and voluntarily?
A. Yes, sir.
(Tr. 11, 11. 16-22). Applicant presented no credible evidence at the evidentiary hearing to show any undue pressure or improper coercion on the part of Counsel, or anybody else, to elicit his guilty plea. Applicant presented no credible evidence to set aside his sworn statements of voluntariness at the plea proceeding. The Court finds Applicant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty, and accordingly his claim for relief by way of this allegation is DENIED.(Dkt. No. 14-1 at 85.)
As with his first ground for relief, the undersigned finds no error in the PCR court's reasoning here. The PCR court again reviewed the facts relevant to Petitioner's claim and applied the law to those facts. The PCR court noted Petitioner's testimony that he was not influenced to enter the guilty plea against his will. The PCR court further noted that Petitioner presented nothing more than his own self-serving statements to dispel his prior sworn testimony that his guilty plea was entered into freely and voluntarily. Petitioner has not provided-and the record does not contain-any evidence to indicate that the PCR court erred in concluding that Petitioner's argument was unconvincing. The undersigned must therefore defer to the PCR court's findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In sum, Ground Two is meritless and should be dismissed.
3. Ground Three
Petitioner's third ground for relief fails, as well. In Ground Three, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to thoroughly investigate Petitioner's case and failed to share discovery materials with Petitioner. (Dkt. No. 3-1 at 8.) Petitioner claims that if his counsel had more thoroughly investigated the case, this “would have revealed [that] mens rea is a required element for the offense [of trafficking methamphetamine].” (Id.) The PCR court considered and dismissed these claims, reasoning:
Applicant alleges Counsel was ineffective in failing to review and discuss the discovery materials with him. The relevant facts were already set forth in the prior section, and the claim is disposed by this Court's factual findings therein. The Court finds Counsel did receive discovery, did review it in its entirety, did review it all with Applicant, and discussed the substance with him. The Court finds credible Counsel's recollection of the number of meetings with Applicant, and does not find credible Applicant's dispute that they met on fewer occasions. The Court does not find credible Applicant's testimony that he did not see portions of his discovery, or that Counsel did not discuss parts of it with him. Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that Counsel failed to review with Applicant the portion of the lab report indicating the discovery of methamphetamine, Applicant has failed to offer any credible evidence to show that he would have acted differently. As noted in the prior section, Applicant knew he was pleading guilty to trafficking methamphetamine at the time of the plea, and his primary concern was the duration of his sentence, not which of the blended drugs he was pleading guilty to. Altogether, the Court finds the record refutes Applicant's allegation, such that Applicant cannot meet his burden of proving either prong of Hill, and his request for relief by way of this allegation is DENIED.(Dkt. No. 14-1 at 84-85.)
The “prior section” referenced by the PCR court here is recounted in Section II.B.1 above.
As with Petitioner's first two grounds for relief, the PCR court appropriately considered Petitioner's claims and provided a sensible analysis of the legal issue presented. The PCR court determined that Petitioner's testimony was not credible and that, even if it was, counsel's failure to share certain discovery material with Petitioner did not prejudice Petitioner because the record indicated that he would have pled guilty anyway. As before, Petitioner provides no evidence and no meaningful argument to support his contentions that the PCR court erred.Upon review, the undersigned finds that the PCR court's determination of this issue is legally and factually reasonable. The Court must therefore accept the PCR court's findings. Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123. Petitioner's third ground for relief should be dismissed.
To the extent Petitioner argues that he was unaware that his pills contained methamphetamine, specifically, and that the jury therefore could have found him not guilty, this argument is unconvincing. (Dkt. No. 21 at 3.) As the PCR court and Petitioner's counsel noted, not knowing the pills were meth was not a valid defense. (Dkt. No. 14-1 at 83); see also State v. Miles, 421 S.C. 154, 163, 805 S.E.2d 204, 210 (Ct. App. 2017) (proving the defendant knew the specific type of drug is not required in trafficking and other controlled substance offenses). Further, “[Petitioner] promptly admitted to everything,” saw the lab report which reflected the discovery of meth in the pills, knew he was pleading guilty to trafficking meth prior to doing so, and was not primarily concerned with which drug he was pleading to, but rather the duration of his sentence. (Dkt. No. 14-1 at 83-84.)
4. Ground Four
Petitioner's fourth ground for relief cannot save his Petition. In Ground Four, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel's performance was deficient because counsel advised him to plead guilty “when the state's trafficking charge was shallow and weak, and therefore counsel could have negotiated a more constitutional plea.” (Dkt. No. 3-1 at 10.) The PCR court considered and rejected this claim, explaining:
Applicant contends Counsel was ineffective in failing to negotiate a more favorable plea agreement. “Prosecutors have broad powers in the plea bargain process[.]” Reed v. Becka, 333 S.C. 676, 684, 511 S.E.2d 396, 400 (Ct. App. 1999). “Under the separation of powers doctrine, which is the basis for our form of government, the Executive Branch is vested with the power to decide when and how to prosecute a case.” Id. (quoting State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 291-92, 400 S.E.2d 341, 346-47 (1994)). “Prosecutors may pursue a case to trial, or they may plea bargain it down to a lesser offense, or they can simply decide not to prosecute the offense in its entirety.” Id., 333 S.C. at 684, 511 S.E.2d at 400-01. “The Judicial Branch is not empowered to infringe on the exercise of this prosecutorial discretion; however, on occasion, it is necessary to review and interpret the results of the prosecutor's actions. We must, therefore, analyze the State's agreement within our judicial constraints.” Id.
“[A] defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain.” Id. (citing State v. Easier, 322 S.C. 333, 471 S.E.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1996), aff'd as modified, 327 S.C. 121, 489 S.E.2d 617 (1997)). “Furthermore, a trial judge is not required to accept a plea. Id. (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)). “A plea agreement is only an ‘offer' until the defendant enters a court-approved guilty plea. A defendant accepts the ‘offer' by pleading guilty. Thus, until formal acceptance of the plea by the court has occurred, the plea binds no one, not the defendant, the State, or the court.” Id., 333 S.C. at 688, 511 S.E.2d at 402 (citing Harden v. State, 453 So.2d 550 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); see also State v. Nesbitt, 411 S.C. 194,201 n.7, 768 S.E.2d 67, 71 n.7 (2015) (“We note that the Due Process clause is not implicated until the defendant enters his guilty plea, and that plea is accepted by the court. Therefore, if the defendant enters into a negotiated plea agreement prior to the court's acceptance of his guilty plea, that agreement is a mere executory promise that, standing alone, has no constitutional significance, as it binds neither the government nor the defendant.”); Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009) (“Although the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts.”). The only exception is where a defendant can show he has detrimentally relied upon a plea agreement. Id., 333 S.C. at 688-89, 511 S.E.2d at 402-03. Otherwise, a prosecutor may withdraw a plea offer at any time prior to an actual entry of the guilty plea. Id., 333 S.C. at 689- 90, 511 S.E.2d at 403-04.
Counsel could not force the State to offer a more generous plea offer, and Applicant offers no evidence to show that Counsel could have presented anything further to the State that would have prompted the prosecution to extend a more favorable plea offer. To the contrary, Applicant's testimony was that the State was focused on securing a conviction which would produce a sentence of which Applicant would be required to serve at least 85%, and rejected Applicant's offer to plead to everything except the indictment for trafficking methamphetamine. Counsel capably negotiated with the State to reduce its plea offer by two years; he could do no more. Accordingly, Applicant cannot meet his burden of proof under Strickland through this allegation, and his request for relief is DENIED.(Dkt. No. 14-1 at 86-87.)
Based on the foregoing, the PCR court again considered Petitioner's ground for relief and reasonably rejected it. First, Petitioner has presented no evidence that a more favorable plea deal was possible. As such, he cannot show prejudice under Strickland. See Horne v. United States, 1:19-cv-196, 2020 WL 7408240, at *4 (M.D. N.C. May 21, 2020) (explaining that the petitioner's allegation of prejudice failed because there was no evidence on the record that counsel could have secured a more favorable plea agreement). Further, Petitioner points to nothing within the PCR court's decision that could be interpreted as “contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . [] that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Rather, the PCR court appropriately considered the facts in the record and judiciously applied the law to those facts. Accordingly, the Court must defer to the PCR court's disposition of Petitioner's claim. Ground Four lacks merit and should be dismissed.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 15.) be GRANTED, and that the Petition be DISMISSED.
Certificate of Appealability
If the Respondent's summary judgment motion is granted, the District Judge will need to decide whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. A certificate may be issued only upon a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where a petitioner's constitutional claims have been denied on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The undersigned sees no reason to grant a certificate of appealability and would, therefore, recommend denying the certificate of appealability.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 15). The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this case with prejudice and DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).