Opinion
No. COA15-742
04-19-2016
BRIAN E. RICHARDS, Plaintiff, v. TIM BELL RACING, LLC, DAVID BELL, BONNIE BELL, and TIM BELL, individually, Defendants.
Homesley & Wingo Law Group PLLC, by Clark D. Tew, for the Plaintiff-Appellant. Jones, Childers, McLurkin & Donaldson, PLLC, by Kevin C. Donaldson, for the Defendants-Appellees.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Iredell County, No. 14 CVS 00959 Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 14 January 2015 by Judge Theodore S. Royster in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 November 2015. Homesley & Wingo Law Group PLLC, by Clark D. Tew, for the Plaintiff-Appellant. Jones, Childers, McLurkin & Donaldson, PLLC, by Kevin C. Donaldson, for the Defendants-Appellees. DILLON, Judge.
Brian Richards ("Plaintiff") appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his claims against David Bell and Bonnie Bell ("Mr. and Mrs. Bell" or the "Bells") for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
Plaintiff is an individual with professional experience in the field of motorsports. Defendants include Mr. and Mrs. Bell and their son Tim Bell. Tim Bell is a North Carolina resident and the sole member of Tim Bell Racing, LLC ("TBR"), a North Carolina limited liability company owned and operated as a professional automobile racing team in Mooresville, North Carolina.
Mr. and Mrs. Bell are citizens of California, but travel to North Carolina regularly to visit their son. Although the Bells are not officially members of TBR, they offer business and management advice to their son during their visits. The Bells also often direct the management and day-to-day operations of TBR via e-mail and telephone communications with various employees, industry professionals, and State regulatory agencies.
In 2013, Plaintiff entered into a contract with TBR to serve as its Team Manager. Several months later, Tim Bell terminated Plaintiff's employment. Tim Bell indicated that this decision was influenced by his parents, particularly by his father.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against Tim Bell, asserting claims related to his termination. The trial court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to add claims against Mr. and Mrs. Bell for tortious interference with contract and for conversion. Mr. and Mrs. Bell filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the Bells' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
The determination of whether jurisdiction is statutorily and constitutionally permissible due to contact with the forum "depends on the particular facts of each case." Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 705, 208 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1974). On review we must sustain the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent evidence in the record. Bank of America Securities LLC v. Evergreen Intern. Aviation, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 690, 694, 611 S.E.2d 179, 183 (2005). However, we review de novo the issue of whether the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusion of law that the court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Miller v. Szilagyi, 221 N.C. App. 79, 82, 726 S.E.2d 873, 877 (2012).
III. Analysis
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the Bells' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Before a defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction in our courts, the requirements of North Carolina's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution must be satisfied. Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 676, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630-31 (1977).
In the present case, the trial court's sole finding which is relevant to this issue is that "[the Bells'] contacts with North Carolina are substantially related to their son, who is a citizen and resident of North Carolina, and his business." We agree that this finding is supported by competent evidence in the record. However, based on a de novo review, we hold that this finding does not support the trial court's conclusion that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the Bells. Specifically, we hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4) provides for jurisdiction over the Bells and that the exercise of jurisdiction over the Bells would not offend due process. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the trial court.
A. Long-Arm Statute
On appeal, Plaintiff asserts that personal jurisdiction over Mr. and Mrs. Bell is proper under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4), which provides for jurisdiction as follows:
(4) Local Injury; Foreign Act. — In any action claiming injury to person or property within this State arising out of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or about the time of the injury[:]N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4)(a) (2015). It is not necessary for a defendant to be physically present in North Carolina to solicit in this state within the meaning of the statute. See Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Industries Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 368, 348 S.E.2d 782, 787 (1986) (stating that lack of action by a defendant in a jurisdiction is not fatal to the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction). Additionally, the statute requires "only that the action 'claim' injury to person or property within this state in order to establish personal jurisdiction. It does not mandate evidence or proof of such injury." Godwin v. Walls, 118 N.C. App. 341, 349, 455 S.E.2d 473, 480 (1995).
(a) Solicitation or services activities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of the defendant[.]
Our Supreme Court and our own Court have noted that telephone calls and e-mail messages can be "solicitations" within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4)(a). See Brown v. Ellis, 363 N.C. 360, 678 S.E.2d 222 (2009) (allegation in complaint that defendant initiated telephone and e-mail conversations with a North Carolina resident physically located in the state was sufficient to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4)(a)); see also Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 734, 537 S.E.2d 854, 857 (2000) (agreeing with the trial court that alleged telephone contacts, including telephone calls and e-mail messages, were solicitations within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4)).
In this case, Plaintiff alleged in his amended complaint that Mr. and Mrs. Bell tortiously interfered with his employment contract with TBR. In response to the Bells' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff submitted affidavits and numerous exhibits consisting of e-mail and telephone conversations between himself and Mr. and Mrs. Bell. Plaintiff further stated via sworn affidavit that the Bells were "extensively involved" in negotiating his contract with TBR through telephone conversations, consistently communicated with him regarding TBR's operations and their expectations for his management of the team, and ultimately induced Tim Bell to terminate Plaintiff's employment with TBR.
On appeal, the Bells argue that they only had contact with North Carolina through their relationship with their son. However, the record on appeal reveals that they are consistently involved with the management of TBR, a North Carolina LLC, and with administrative tasks integral to its operations. Specifically, the record shows the following:
Mr. Bell regularly exchanged e-mails with Plaintiff regarding the management and day-to-day operations of TBR. These e-mails reveal that Mr. Bell was involved in reviewing contracts in which TBR was involved, dictating the terms of said contracts, drafting agreements on behalf of TBR, directing Plaintiff to perform certain actions in the course of his employment with TBR, and during visits to North Carolina, spent time in TBR's shop performing maintenance tasks. In one such e-mail, Mr. Bell stated that he would plan his next visit to Charlotte around the availability of equipment for TBR. There is also evidence in the record, in the form of an audio recording of Tim Bell, which tends to show that Mr. Bell required certain items to be inserted into Plaintiff's termination agreement. Further, Mrs. Bell exchanged e-mails with Plaintiff regarding TBR's financial management, including TBR's insurance coverage, tax audits, and worker's compensation issues. Additionally, the record also shows that she signed insurance documents filed with the State of North Carolina as the "CFO" of TBR.
Based on this information in the record, we conclude that both Mr. and Mrs. Bell were involved in solicitation and service activities within North Carolina. These activities certainly rose to the level of providing "fair warning" that they could be sued in North Carolina for injuries arising from their activities "purposefully directed" toward Plaintiff. Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 366, 348 S.E.2d at 786. We hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4) allows for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Bells, provided that the Bells also have the requisite "minimum contacts" with North Carolina.
B. Minimum Contacts
We now turn to whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The pivotal inquiry under the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution is whether the defendant has established "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945). In making this determination, we consider the following factors: "(1) quantity of the contacts, (2) nature and quality of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of the cause of action to the contacts, (4) the interest of the forum state, and (5) convenience to the parties." Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling, 133 N.C. App. 139, 143, 515 S.E.2d 46, 49 (1999).
As discussed previously, the Bells have regularly visited North Carolina and have directed communications toward North Carolina for the purpose of helping to manage the finances and daily operations of TBR and offering advice and direction to Plaintiff in his role as an employee of TBR. There is evidence that despite the Bells' contention that their visits to North Carolina were solely social visits, during which they offered business advice to their son, Tim Bell, the Bells in fact directed a portion of their activities during these visits to TBR and its employees, including Plaintiff.
In addition, North Carolina has a strong interest in adjudicating this dispute. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2184, 85 L. Ed.2d 528, 543 (1985). It involves a North Carolina plaintiff employed by a North Carolina limited liability company, and the Bells, who have purposefully directed activities at the Plaintiff and the LLC at issue. The Bells appear to visit North Carolina regularly to see their son and to assist with the operation of TBR. As such, we cannot conclude that defense of this suit in North Carolina would constitute a substantial burden on the Bells.
IV. Conclusion
The parent-child relationship does not obviate the necessity for full and thorough consideration of the statutory authorization and constitutional protections implicated by the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In this case, we hold that the Bells' contacts with North Carolina, independent of their relationship with their son, allow for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, we hereby reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Chief Judge McGEE and Judge DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).