Opinion
C. A. 20-02024-SAL-KDW
12-21-2021
Jonathan Richards, Plaintiff, v. Schaeffler Group USA Inc., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Jonathan Richards (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against his now-former employer, Defendant Schaeffler Group USA Inc. (“Defendant” or “Schaeffler”), alleging reverse-sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a report and recommendation (“Report”) regarding Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 34. Having reviewed the Motion and accompanying materials, ECF Nos. 34, 34-1 through 34-8; Plaintiff's Response, ECF Nos. 38, 38-1 through 38-5; and Defendant's Reply, ECF No. 42; and applicable law, the undersigned recommends Defendant's Motion, ECF No. 34, be denied.
As it must, the court considers the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party. These facts are derived from Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff's Response thereto, and Defendant's Reply. To the extent necessary, additional facts are set out in relevant portions of this Report.
A. Overview of Plaintiff's employment
Plaintiff, a male, was employed by Defendant from 1995, until August 13, 2019, as an engineer. Compl. at ¶¶ 9-13, Pl. Dep 22, ECF No. 34-2 at 7. When he began in 1995, Mike Natusch, Schaeffler's manager of application engineering at the time of the hiring, was Plaintiff's supervisor. Pl. Dep. 22. Natusch was Plaintiff's supervisor for approximately 24 years, and, overall, Plaintiff had a positive relationship with him. Id. at 22-23. Plaintiff discussed his career goals with Natusch and believed Natusch helped him reach those goals. Id. at 23. In 2010, Natusch recommended that Plaintiff be promoted to industry manager for Fluid and Pneumatics. Id. at 34; Natusch Email, ECF No. 34-2. Plaintiff worked in this position as an industry manager until he was terminated from employment in August of 2019. At the time of his termination, Ericka Kauer was his supervisor-Kauer had become Plaintiff's supervisor in 2018. Natusch Dep. at 21, ECF No. 34-6 at 2.
B. August Meeting that Led to Termination
Kauer scheduled an in-person meeting with Plaintiff for August 9, 2019, beginning at 9:30, and scheduled it to last an hour. Pl. Dep. at 72; Calendar Meeting Notification, ECF No. 34-2 at 48; Kauer Dep. at 25, ECF No. 34-5. The meeting was referred to as “Biweekly Meeting-Jon CR-IBC-Corp-B-4” on the Event Details. Id. In deposition testimony, Plaintiff recalled that he and Kauer discussed general customers, projects, and things that needed to be done-that it was an hour-long meeting, and there was a lot that was discussed. Pl. Dep 72. Plaintiff testified that “certain things” stood out from the meeting, but he does not remember it “100 percent.” Id.
Plaintiff recalled that at the beginning of the meeting, Kauer told him that she wanted to “have this discussion outside of a regular project meeting where [they] could talk about things away from Eric [Ovendorf].” Id. at 73. Plaintiff recalled that Kauer requested that he grow the customer base and travel to visit customers. Id. at 75. He represented that it had been several months since he had travelled to visit with customers and admitted to “putting a lot of time into the engineering responsibility....” Id. Plaintiff testified that he agreed with Kauer regarding the need to increase marketing and customer development and explained to her that he “was in discussion[s] with different regions, different salesmen, different customers of potential to get into the customer, talk about new projects, new opportunities.” Id. At this point in the conversation, Plaintiff recalled that Kauer asked about “specifics of who those customers were.” Id. Plaintiff testified that he responded with specific names and offices of the new customers, and in response, Kauer asked: “You can't just give me a month? September, October, November?” Id. at 75-77. Plaintiff testified this was “[v]ery condescending” and further recalled:
She was not willing to work with me with the information. I told her again I would put the information together. This went back and forth probably about four, maybe five times. I remember looking up and seeing her face bright red. The reddest I have ever seen anybody in my life. Her ears were bright red she was furious. I had to put a stop to the escalation. I struck the table. I raised my voice, that's the only time I raised my voice to that point, and said “Stop.” All I wanted to do was get out of the room. So I stood up and went for the door. She said something along the line of you don't speak to me like that, I don't remember. That caused me to pause for a moment, and I left. That occurred over 30 seconds, maybe a minute.
. . ..
That was - - the only thing I can describe, it was a reaction because my request, [Kauer], she continued to escalate. I was not able to deescalate the situation verbally. It was a form of shock to break the escalation.Id. at 77-78. Plaintiff explained that by hitting the table he hoped it could be “enough of a shock that it would break the chain of events that kept escalating.” Id. at 90. When asked what specifically Kauer was doing to escalate the situation, Plaintiff responded that she did not allow him to reply and just “continued to come after me, demanding information that I told her that I didn't have at the time there and that I could not provide right then and there.” Id. at 78.
Plaintiff recalled that Kauer had a laptop in the conference room where the meeting was held- it was on her desk on her side of the table. Id. Plaintiff testified that he did not see Kauer's laptop or a cell phone move when he struck the table. Id. Plaintiff testified: “All I remember in that time frame was I wanted out of that room. I needed to get away and that was my sole intention.” Id. at 79. He recalled that he did not know where the escalation was going next, and he did not want it to go any further than it already had. Id.
Plaintiff testified that after he left the meeting, he went back to his desk to collect his thoughts. Id. at 85. He did not want to leave things “that way” so he returned to the conference room, opened the conference room door, did not enter, and asked Kauer if they could continue the conversation. Id. According to Plaintiff, Kauer agreed, and with her permission, he reentered the room, and sat down in the spot where he had been prior to exiting. Id. Plaintiff testified that Kauer apologized, he responded the apology was not necessary, and Plaintiff apologized as well. Id. Plaintiff recalled they began the discussion again and he “thought it was done.. .thought it was over.” Id. He testified that he reiterated to Kauer that he needed assistance and could not continue to maintain his current workload or “hold down two positions that were being asked of [him].” Id. Plaintiff testified that he believed they had come to a mutual agreement, and things were settled when the meeting finally ended. Id. at 91. Plaintiff has not spoken to Kauer since the August 9, 2019 meeting. Id.
Plaintiff testified that over the weekend, he got a feeling that human resources might get involved. Pl. Dep at 101-02. On the morning of August 12, 2019, a Monday, Plaintiff then had a meeting with Leon Nett from HR and his former supervisor, Natusch. Pl. Dep. at 101. Plaintiff recalled thinking that he was going to get reprimanded or “slap[ped] on the wrist.” Id.
On the morning of August 12, 2019, a Monday, Kauer met with Leon Nett from Human Resources (“HR”) to discuss that transpired in the meeting she had with Plaintiff the Friday before. Kauer Dep. at 43-49; Nett Dep. at 33-44, ECF No. 34-4; Natusch Dep. at 24. After meeting with Kauer and questioning her about the meeting with Plaintiff, Nett met with Natusch and asked if he would sit in on a meeting with Plaintiff and get his side of the story. Id. at 44. Nett testified he wanted to have Natusch there because of his previous manager-employee relationship with Plaintiff and because Nett wanted another person in the room. Id. at 44. Plaintiff then had an in-person meeting with Nett and Natusch. Id.; Pl. Dep. at 91.
Nett typed out notes from his meeting with Kauer and referenced them during his deposition. See Nett Dep. at 38, ECF No. 34-4 at 4; Nett August 12 Notes, ECF No. 34-4 at 18-20. Neither party has provided the court with meeting notes from Plaintiff's August 12, 2019 meeting with HR.
During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Nett first spoke, saying “you know why you're here, ” to which Plaintiff responded, “I got a pretty good understanding.” Id. Nett asked for Plaintiff's account about his meeting with Kauer. Id. Plaintiff testified that he gave Nett a very brief account of what he recalled happening at the meeting. Id. Plaintiff recalled admitting in the meeting that he had raised his voice, admitted to standing up, and admitted to striking the table once. Id. at 125-26; Nett Dep. at 48. Plaintiff specifically testified that Nett told him: “[T]his situation is different because [Kauer is] a female. And because of that, we're going to have to ask you to leave the premises.” Id. at 106. Plaintiff recalled that Nett told him he would be placed on a paid suspension. Id. at 126.
Specifically, Nett testified that they asked Plaintiff to leave the premises on a paid suspension while they reviewed what happened, determined what other steps they needed to take, and they would follow up with him in a day or two about the outcome. Nett Dep. at 51. Plaintiff testified that Nett called him the following morning, referenced a code of conduct or a company policy, and fired him. Id. Nett testified that after discussing the situation with his manager, Greg Tinnell, they decided to terminate Plaintiff because “the policy is zero tolerance, ” and the company “wouldn't stand for that type of behavior....” Nett Dep. at 54.
Transcripts from the depositions conflict on many points. See Pl. Dep.; Nett Dep., ECF No. 34-4; Kauer Dep., ECF No. 34-5. The facts as described herein are taken mainly from Plaintiff's deposition or contain uncontested facts such as time and places of meetings.
Mr. Tinnell was the HR manager over all of the Americas.
Plaintiff testified that he was familiar with the policy but thought he had not violated it. Id. at 107. Plaintiff testified he did not know who from the company made the decision to terminate him. Id. He testified that after the incident he was embarrassed about what happened, but he did not think his behavior was “improper.” Id. at 125. Plaintiff testified that he was treated differently than other employees who had had similar disagreements with their managers, but Plaintiff did not know whether, in those instances, any employees had reported their disagreements to HR. Id. at 136. Plaintiff filed an administrative charge of discrimination with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (“SHAC”) and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on October 25, 2019. Pl. Dep. 150, EEOC Charge, ECF No. 34-9. Plaintiff timely filed the instant action herein on April 27, 2020, and Defendant removed it to this court on May 28, 2020. ECF No. 1.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he brought this action within ninety (90) days of receipt of his Notice of the Right to Sue. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 5.
II. Standard of Review
A. Motions for Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own affidavit or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact). In discrimination cases, a party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable jury could rule in the non-moving party's favor. Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002) (Title VII). The court cannot make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, but the court should examine uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence offered by the moving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The court must determine whether a party's offered evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of discrimination and look at the strength of a party's case on its own terms. See id. at 148 (stating that “[c]ertainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational fact-finder could conclude that the action was discriminatory”).
B. Burden of proof in Title VII claims
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may demonstrate a violation of Title VII through direct or circumstantial evidence. When direct evidence is lacking, a plaintiff may produce circumstantial evidence and proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Plaintiff argues he can survive summary judgment by demonstrating direct evidence of discrimination or under the burden shifting framework, see Pl.'s Mem. 6-16.
Under the burden-shifting framework, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of a violation of Title VII, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight, 601 F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2010). If the defendant meets the burden to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was “not its true reason[ ], but [was] a pretext.” Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
While intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth, the ultimate burden of persuasion that the defendant engaged in intentional discrimination remains at all times with the plaintiff. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47 (“The ultimate question is whether the employer intentionally discriminated, and proof that ‘the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason . . . is correct.'”) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993)). Nonetheless, in considering an employee's pretext argument, there is nothing in the “McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that says ‘a plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination.” Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Investments, LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149)). “To the extent that the evidence supporting a plaintiff's prima facie case also undermines the employer's [non-discriminatory] justification, that evidence may be called upon by the trier of fact in determining whether or not the proffered justification is pretextual.” Id. at 220. The court is ever mindful, too, that inquiry which is “meant only to aid courts and litigants in arranging the presentation of evidence.” Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 515-16 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988)).
Direct evidence of discrimination is “evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly on the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.” Cassity v. Geren, 749 F.Supp.2d 380, 402 (D.S.C. 2010) (citing Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds, Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, (2003)). To evaluate whether a “nexus” exists between discriminatory statements and an adverse employment action, “[c]ourts have considered the context of the statement, its temporal proximity to the adverse employment action, and the status of the person making the statement.” E.E.O.C. v. CTI Global Solutions, Inc., 815 F.Supp.2d 897, 906 (D. Md. 2011). An adverse employment action in the discrimination context is one that adversely affects the terms, conditions, or benefits of the plaintiff's employment. James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375-76 (4th Cir. 2004).
III. Analysis
A. Title VII sex-discrimination claim
Defendant first argues it is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claim, arguing he fails to allege any dispute in a material fact through direct or circumstantial evidence. Def. Mem. 11-12. Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's supposed material fact is not genuinely at issue. Id. at 12-14. Next, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination and, even if he could, Defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory business reason for terminating Plaintiff. Id. at 14-21. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks any evidence of a genuine issue of material fact that Defendant's proffered reason for terminating him is pretext for discrimination. Id. at 21-23
Plaintiff argues the statement from Defendant's HR Director-that he is treating the investigation differently because of Kauer's gender-constitutes direct evidence of discrimination and meets the direct evidence standard. Pl. Br. at 6-11. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that he can survive summary judgment even under the burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 11-16. The undersigned will begin by examining Plaintiff's claims under the direct evidence standard.
1. Direct Evidence
Plaintiff contends that discriminatory statements allegedly made by Nett constitute direct evidence of discriminatory discharge and disparate treatment in this case. See Pl. Br. at 6-11. Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated because his actions were directed at a woman. See Complaint at ¶¶ 1213, ECF No. 1-1. He bases this allegation on Nett's comment that “this situation is different because she's a female. And because of that, we're going to have to ask you to leave the premises.” Pl. Dep at 106. Plaintiff argues that “Nett's discriminatory intent poison[ed] the whole process, ” and Nett was the “primary influencer” in Defendant's decision to terminate him. Id. at 6-7. Further, Plaintiff maintains that contrary to Defendant's argument, Nett's comment is material to this analysis. Thus, at issue before the court is whether Nett's statement amounts to direct evidence of reverse-gender discrimination. In order to constitute direct evidence, “the plaintiff must present evidence which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the challenged decision.'” Martin v. Alumax of S.C., Inc., 380 F.Supp.2d 723, 728 (D.S.C. 2005) (Braziel v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc., 943 F.Supp. 1083, 1095 (D. Minn.1996)
Direct evidence of discrimination is “evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly on the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision.” Laing v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013). To evaluate whether a “nexus” exists between discriminatory statements and an adverse employment action, “[c]ourts have considered the context of the statement, its temporal proximity to the adverse employment action, and the status of the person making the statement.” E.E.O.C. v. CTI Global Solutions, Inc., 815 F.Supp.2d 897, 906 (D. Md. 2011). An adverse employment action in the discrimination context is one that adversely effects the terms, conditions, or benefits of the plaintiff's employment. James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375-76 (4th Cir. 2004).
Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot show that this evidence is material and admitted that he did not know what Nett meant by the alleged statement. Def. Br. 12. Defendant argues that the “leadership” team made the decision to terminate Plaintiff, and thus, Plaintiff's purported evidence cannot be direct evidence attributable to the decision maker. Id. Defendant represents that the alleged statement was “given as the reason [Plaintiff] had to leave the premises when he was placed on paid administrative leave so that an investigation could be conducted, not at the time or as the reason for his termination.” Id. at 13.
In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned must find that Nett made the statement in the manner described by Plaintiff. Plaintiff's own testimony regarding what Nett stated to him, a sworn statement offered under oath, though certainly self-serving, constitutes evidence and created a genuine issue of material fact. See Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1239 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252) (finding it is axiomatic that courts must not make determinations of credibility or weigh the evidence at the summary judgment). “[T]he party opposing the motion is entitled to have his or her version of the facts accepted as true and, moreover, to have all internal conflicts resolved in his or her favor.” Energy Corp. of Am. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 543 F.Supp.2d 536, 544 (S.D. W.Va. 2008) (citing Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)); see also Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Plaintiff is entitled to have all her evidence considered. Moreover, the credibility of her evidence must be assumed.”).
Though Defendant cites testimony that conflicts with Plaintiff's testimony, this evidence only goes to the credibility of the evidence, not the existence of it. Furthermore, the undersigned finds Defendant's attempt to separate Nett from the “leadership team” or “decision maker” weak. See Def. Mem. at 11-12. Clearly, Nett, the HR director and investigator of the incident, in large part made the decision to terminate Plaintiff or was part of the team that made the decision. Further, Defendant's attempt to distinguish that the comment was made, not in reference to the decision to terminate Plaintiff, but in requesting that he leave the premises is also not persuasive. The statement was made in the context of an HR investigation, by the HR director of the region, and the day before Plaintiff was terminated. It is difficult to imagine how else such a statement could be interpreted as not reflecting a discriminatory attitude or use of gender as a factor in a termination decision.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds Plaintiff has presented evidence, though admittedly contested evidence, that Defendant's termination decision could have been impacted by the genders of Plaintiff and his supervisor. The timeliness of the decision to terminate Plaintiff connects this alleged comment to Defendant's decision to terminate him. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment based on its direct evidence argument.
Based on the undersigned's finding concerning direct evidence, it is unnecessary to determine whether Plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of discrimination to the court. “Indeed, the McDonnell Douglas framework is of little value when direct evidence of discrimination is available.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 319 (4th Cir. 2005). See e.g., Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 430 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (“We apply the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to resolve claims of age discrimination when the plaintiff produces no direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination sufficient to warrant a ‘mixed-motive' analysis.”); Diamond, 416 F.3d at 318 n.4 (4th Cir. 2005) (“In the event that a plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination or simply prefers to proceed without the benefit of the burden-shifting framework, she is under no obligation to make out a prima facie case.”).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 34, be denied as to Title VII discrimination claim.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”