We have noted that "[w]hether a parent or guardian may undertake to change the name of a minor child as 'next friend' of the child has not been decided." Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 570 n. 5 (2002). As the issue was not raised below and has not been pressed on the appeal, we do not pass upon it.
Specifically, "a court should not attribute greater weight to the father's interest in having the child bear the paternal surname than to the mother's interest in having the child bear her name." Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 571, 767 N.E.2d 84 (2002), quoting Jones, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 663, 604 N.E.2d 45. A father has no more right for a child to bear his surname than does a mother. See Jones, supra. "Indeed, consideration of parental preference does not appropriately focus the inquiry on what the child needs, nor on the effect on the child of a change in his [or her] surname."
2. Discussion. "When assessing a decision regarding a modification of child support, an appellate court ‘review[s] for an abuse of discretion.’ " Wasson v. Wasson, 81 Mass.App.Ct. 574, 576, 965 N.E.2d 882 (2012), quoting from Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 568, 572, 767 N.E.2d 84 (2002). "[A] judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge made ‘a clear error of judgment in weighing’ the factors relevant to the decision, such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives."
Petition of Two Minors for Change of Name, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 850, 856 (2006). Relevant considerations are to be found in Jones v. Roe, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 660 (1992); Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 571-572 (2002); and Petition of Two Minors, supra. We specified in Jones that among the considerations relative to the best interest equation are "the effect of the change in the child's surname on the preservation and development of the child's relationship with each parent and other siblings; the length of time the child has utilized a given name; the age of the child as it may relate to his or her identification with the surname; and the difficulties and embarrassment that the child may experience from bearing the present or proposed surname."
The father has not shown that the judge's factual findings concerning health insurance contributions were clearly erroneous or that the judge impermissibly exercised his discretion. See Connolly v. Connolly, 400 Mass. 1002, 1003 (1987); Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 572-573 (2002), and cases cited. The amended consolidated judgment dated September 13, 2010, is affirmed.
This language has been interpreted to mean that it is the amount by which a noncustodial parent's income exceeds the threshold income level of $75,000 to which the guidelines need not be applied. See Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 573 n. 9 (2002); Pearson v. Pearson, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 159-160 (2001). The guidelines dictate that "[i]n cases where income exceeds [$75,000], the court should consider the award of support at the [$75,000] level as a minimum presumptive level of support to be awarded.
June 27, 2002 Further appellate review denied: Reported below: 54 Mass. App. Ct. 568 (2002).
These findings are amply supported in the record and we discern no abuse of discretion. See Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 568, 572 (2002). See also Chan v. Chen, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 79, 84 (2007).
“[J]udges have considerable discretion under the guidelines, and the exercise of this discretion may result in a range of proposed support orders.” Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 568, 572 (2002). We review for an abuse of discretion.
Discussion. "When assessing a decision regarding a modification of child support, an appellate court 'review[s] for an abuse of discretion.'" Wasson v. Wasson, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 574, 576 (2012), quoting from Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 572 (2002). The father argues that the judge's November 25, 2014, order modifying the amount of child support was invalid because it was issued without an evidentiary hearing.