Opinion
Case No. 3:03CV7728.
December 30, 2004
ORDER
This is a social security case that was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation, which has been filed. The plaintiff has filed a timely objection to the Report and Recommendation, and the defendant has filed a response.
For the reasons that follow, and based on de novo review, the objection shall be overruled.
Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental social security income ("SSI") on May 21, 2001. Her application asserted that she had been disabled since June 19, 1999, due to incapacitating pain in her neck, arms and shoulders, and pervasive, persistent, and severe pain throughout her upper body and lower back.
Plaintiff was last employed by Laidlaw Transit Services as a bus driver and dispatcher, last working as a bus driver from 1996 to 1999. A vocational expert testified that plaintiff could not return to her past employment. He also testified that jobs were available in the national economy that she could perform with her impairments.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded, inter alia that: the plaintiff's medically determinable impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4; her statements about her impairments and their impact on her ability to work were not entirely credible in light of plaintiff's testimony, her medical treatment, her medical history, her description of activities and life style and her assertions about her ability to work; she had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to do medium work or work which required maximum lifting of fifty pounds and frequent lifting of twenty five pounds and no overhead reaching and no interacting with the public or in close proximity or with co-workers; and plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Act.
In addition to reviewing the course of plaintiff's treatment for her complaints of pain, the Magistrate Judge noted that plaintiff had been treated for depressive disorder, including suicidal ideations, on November 29, 1999. The Magistrate Judge also noted that plaintiff had been the subject of psychiatric and mental residual functional evaluations which concluded that plaintiff suffered from appetite disturbance, sleep disturbance, decreased energy, feelings of guilt and worthlessness, and disturbance of mood, accompanied by mild dysthymia. Medically it was concluded that plaintiff's affective disorder was the basis of only slight restrictions in daily living and difficulties in maintaining social functioning. On March 1, 2001, plaintiff was diagnosed with dysthymic disorder and was found to have a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) of 55 to 60.
A GAF of 50 denotes serious symptoms (ex: suicidal ideation, severe obsessive rituals) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (ex: no friends, unable to hold a job). AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, p. 30 (4th ed. 1994).
Plaintiff's objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation are that the Magistrate Judge: 1) omitted significant portions of the plaintiff's medical history; and 2) erroneously concluded that the ALJ properly discounted the opinion of medical personnel who have been treating the plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, I find neither objection well-taken.
With regard to the second issue, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ had viewed the opinions of plaintiff's treating physicians, Dr. Soloman and Dr. Thomas, appropriately.
The ALJ concluded, and the Magistrate Judge agreed, that Dr. Soloman's opinions about plaintiff's mental status were not supported by the medical record. This is correct: there is no evidence derived from acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques to establish the existence of a medically diagnosed severe mental impairment. Accordingly, the ALJ was correct to discount the medical opinions of Dr. Solomon that plaintiff suffered a disabling mental impairment and give less weight to such decision. Though the regulations provide that a treating source will be accorded deference because of the longitudinal history that is provided through a long-term treatment relationship, the Commissioner is not bound by a conclusory statement offered by a treating physician that is unsupported by detailed and objective documentation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2004); Duncan v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 855 (6th Cir. 1986).
With regard to Dr. Thomas, who evaluated plaintiff before the onset of her period of disability, finding evidence of mild carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ simply referred to Dr. Thomas's evaluation as part of plaintiff's historical background without finding that the plaintiff suffered from disabling carpal tunnel syndrome. Thus, there is no evidence that the ALJ gave any weight to Dr. Thomas's opinion in determining that plaintiff was not disabled.
As the Commissioner points out, although the plaintiff asserted that her onset date was July 19, 1999, she filed her SSI application on May 21, 2001. An SSI claimant is not entitled to SSI benefits prior to the date that she files her SSI application. 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. Accordingly, the relevant evidence begins with May 21, 2001, the date of plaintiff's SSI application. Any description of earlier medical evidence merely provides background about the plaintiff's medical condition before she became eligible for SSI benefits. The magistrate judge was not required to discuss all of the medical evidence prior to May 21, 2001, because that evidence was not relevant to plaintiff's application.
The Magistrate Judge discussed plaintiff's medical treatment after the May 21, 2001, application date. That sufficed as the basis for her medical review of the Commissioner's determination, which, in turn, sufficed for her determination that the decision to deny benefits was proper.
In light of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED THAT plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge be, and the same hereby overruled.
The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
So ordered.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the Order filed December 30, 2004, it is herebyOrdered that plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge be, and the same hereby overruled. Judgment is entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. Case closed.
So ordered.