The plaintiff's interpretation of 'before endorsement,' in § 81U, as limiting the planning board to a one-time opportunity to impose the security requirement, does not comport with the town's statutory mandate to ensure the safe construction of ways and services before the lots are built on, sometimes several owners later. See generally Richard v. Planning Bd. of Acushnet, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 216, 219 (1980) (securing construction of ways and services is mandatory under the statute, and '[w]e are to interpret the subdivision control statutes so as to further that goal'). See, e.g., Berg v. Lexington, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 569, 581 (2007).

Again, in Casagrande v. Town Clerk of Harvard, 377 Mass. 703 (1979), we invoked the "adequate access" standards of § 81M to decide that frontage on a narrow, partly paved road too narrow for two vehicles to pass was insufficient to bypass planning board approval as a subdivision. See also Richard v. Planning Bd. Of Acushnet, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 216, 219 (1980) (stated legislative purpose of Subdivision Control Law is safe, convenient access). Cf. Spalke v. Board of Appeals of Plymouth, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 683, 690 (1979).

The plaintiff's interpretation of “before endorsement,” in § 81U, as limiting the planning board to a one-time opportunity to impose the security requirement, does not comport with the town's statutory mandate to ensure the safe construction of ways and services before the lots are built on, sometimes several owners later. See generally Richard v. Planning Bd. of Acushnet, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 216, 219 (1980) (securing construction of ways and services is mandatory under the statute, and “[w]e are to interpret the subdivision control statutes so as to further that goal”). See, e.g., Berg v. Lexington, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 569, 581 (2007).

The planning board's approval may have legal significance under the zoning by-law's definition of "street" if the way depicted on an approved plan has been constructed as approved (Rockville Avenue is shown on the assertedly approved plan as a way forty feet in width) but not where it has never been constructed at all. Compare Richard v. Planning Bd. of Acushnet, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 216, 218-220 (1980); Perry v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 150-153, 154-155. G.L.c. 41, § 81L, definition of "subdivision," exception ( b), as amended by St. 1965, c. 61. Zoning by-law of Lexington § 2, definition of "street, road, or way," par. b (1987).

As the 1981 plan does not contemplate compliance with the condition, it is, in effect, a new plan, necessitating independent approval. Richard v. Planning Bd. of Acushnet, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 216, 218 (1980). Compare Goldman v. Planning Bd. of Burlington, 347 Mass. 320, 324-325 (1964).

It is clear from the case law that has emanated from the decisions interpreting the exemption from the subdivision approval process found in G.L.c. 41, § 81L(c), that a "way in existence" for purposes of clause (c) may not be merely a plan proposal or "paper street" but must in fact be a "physical way on the ground." Rettig v. Planning Bd. of Rowley, 332 Mass. 476, 481 (1955); Perry v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 144, 151 (1983); Richard v. Planning Bd. of Acushnet, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 216, 219 (1980). In addition to establishing that a way be in existence on the ground prior to the adoption of the Subdivision Control Law by a municipality, petitioners of a plan seeking an ANR endorsement must also establish that the ways within the plan have "sufficient width, suitable grades and adequate construction to provide for the needs of vehicular traffic in relation to the proposed use of the land abutting thereon."