"Following a lengthy postponement in moving to amend a complaint, the movant must offer a satisfactory explanation for the hiatus." In re 'Agent Orange' Prod. Liab. Litig., 220 F.R.D. 22, 24-25 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1990) (counsel's lack of awareness of statute was unsatisfactory excuse for 17-month delay in asserting new claim); Sala v. Gates Constr. Co., 155 F.R.D. 414, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying plaintiff's motion for leave seeking to assert new legal theory four years after plaintiff's injury and more than two years after plaintiff filed complaint). "[T]he longer the period of an unexplained delay, the less will be required of the nonmoving party in terms of a showing of prejudice."
1 Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 28, 43 (2d Cir. 1979), it may still be appropriate to deny leave to amend when a case has progressed to such an advanced stage that discovery is nearly complete and the proposed amendments would require additional extensive discovery. See Sala v. Gates Const. Co., 155 F.R.D. 414, 415-16 (E.D.N.Y. 1994);William Iselin Co., Inc. v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 703 F. Supp. 1084, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Here, the dismissal of the non-Section 1983 type causes of action occurred at the very outset of the case, so that the focus of the discovery proceedings thus far has been geared towards only the Section 1983 claims.
Defendant relies primarily upon a number of cases in the Second Circuit that have held, for example, that a plaintiff had unduly delayed in requesting to amend "over four years" since the injury and "over two years" since the filing of the complaint. ( See id. at 6-7 (citing to, inter alia, Katz v. Morgenthau, 892 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1989); Sala v. Gates Constr. Co., 155 F.R.D. 414, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)).) Defendants' arguments are not entirely in sync with the caselaw, however, because it is well established that, as a general matter, mere delay does not provide a basis to deny leave to amend.
Several months of the delay may be explained by Magistrate Judge Go's request in April 2003 that Plaintiff withdraw its original motion for certification of a class action pending this Court's decision on the motion to amend. Defendant cites several cases in which leave to amend was denied for reason of delay, including Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir.1990); Woolcott v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., Inc., 1996 WL 685735, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. November 25, 1996); Phoenix Racing, Ltd. v. Lebanon Valley Auto Racing, 53 F.Supp.2d 199, 209 (N.D.N.Y.); Archie v. Grand Cent. Partnership, Inc., 997 F.Supp. 504, 536 (S.D.N.Y.1998); Sala v. Gates Constr. Co., 155 F.R.D. 414, 415 (E.D.N.Y.1994). In all of these cases, however, discovery had closed and the moving parties were seeking to add new claims or defenses to their complaints.
This is particularly so considering that Allah has not offered any justification or excuse for his delay. See Sala v. Gates Const. Co., 155 F.R.D. 414, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("It is Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate why . . . leave [to amend the complaint] should be granted in the face of an overly long delay.") (citations omitted). The failure to name Blaetz in the original complaint thus "must be considered a matter of choice."
Letters requesting relief of the Court are routinely treated as motions. See, e.g., Barrett v. F.W. Woolworth Corp., 1997 WL 752416, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1997) (treating letter from plaintiff's counsel to court as Rule 60(b)(1) motion); Sala v. Gates Constr. Co., 155 F.R.D. 414, 415 n. 2 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (" the Court often accepts letters in place of more formal motions when a letter is sufficient to explain the reasons for such motion" ). Selletti's time to appeal my July 25, 1997 order has now expired.