Opinion
No. 05-17-00387-CV
08-29-2018
RICHARD PANCHASARP, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE FOR THE RICHARD J. PANCHASARP TRUST, AND HAMPTON HOLDINGS, LP, Appellants v. SNIVELY ROYALTY ANALYSIS, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-01759
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Lang, and Justice Stoddart
Opinion by Justice Lang
Richard Panchasarp, Individually and as Trustee for the Richard J. Panchasarp Trust, and Hampton Holdings, LP, (collectively "appellants") appeal the trial court's summary judgment awarding Snively Royalty Analysis, LLC ("Snively LLC") $584,000.00 in compensatory damages against Richard Panchasarp and $19,227.59 in compensatory damages against Hampton Holdings, LP, ("Hampton") for breach of contract. In four issues on appeal, appellants contend (1) the trial court erred in "denying [a]ppellants' motion for summary judgment" because the contract was unambiguous, (2) "if the trial court did not err in denying [appellants'] motion for summary judgment" "then trial court erred in granting [appellee's] summary judgment" because the contract was ambiguous, (3) the trial court "erred in granting summary judgment to [appellee]" because appellants "raised issues of material fact on the contested elements of breach of contract," and (4) the trial court "erred in entering judgment for breach of contract against Hampton because it was not a party to the contract."
The trial court's judgment of March 1, 2017 stated only that the judgment is against Richard Panchasarp and Hampton. There is no reference in the judgment to Richard Panchasarp as Trustee for the Richard J. Panchasarp Trust.
We conclude the contract is unambiguous and appellants raised issues of material fact. Therefore, we reverse the summary judgment rendered in favor of Snively LLC against Hampton and render a judgment that Snively LLC take nothing against Hampton. Further, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Snively LLC against Richard Panchasarp and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Factual and Procedural Context
On February 19, 2013 on Snively LLC's letterhead, Victoria Snively sent a letter to Richard Panchasarp by email which referenced "Engagement for Consulting Services" ("Engagement Letter"). It is undisputed the Engagement Letter is the contract that is the subject of this litigation. That letter stated, in relevant part:
Dear Mr. Panchasarp:
Snively Royalty Analysis is honored that you have chosen our consulting services to review and analyze your natural gas royalties.
We will review your past and current royalties free of charge. When we recover underpayments for any past payment errors, Snively Royalty Analysis, LLC will receive fifty percent (50%) of the amount recovered. Further benefits due to errors corrected will be 100% payable to you, the royalty owner.
When our services are complete with either you being paid a correction or with us notifying you that you are being paid correctly, we will issue a letter that terminates this agreement, or this agreement will terminate automatically twelve months from the date it is signed.
Richard Panchasarp signed the Engagement Letter on a line at the bottom after the text and after the words "Owner Signature." The signature line shows only Richard Panchasarp's signature. Neither "Hampton" nor Richard Panchasarp as trustee of the Richard J. Panchasarp Trust appear on the signature line or anywhere on the Engagement Letter. Richard Panchasarp's signature is dated February 20, 2013.
On March 21, 2013, Victoria Snively, as president of Snively LLC, sent Chesapeake Energy Corporation ("Chesapeake") a letter ("March 21 letter") that listed wells owned by the Panchasarp Trust and Hampton. The March 21 letter stated, in relevant part:
Dear Mr. Jordan and Ms. Rolstad:
Snively Royalty Analysis has been asked to review the natural gas well royalties for Mr. Panchasarp. An authorization letter allowing us to receive information on their behalf is attached. We have the following requests and questions:
1. In the lease dated April 3, 2007 and the leases dated November 3rd 2005 4(c):
"...Royalty will be payable on oil and gas produced from the Land and consumed by Lessee on the Land for compression, dehydration, fuel, or other use."
Also 4(d):
"If Lessee compresses, transports, processes, or treats gas produced from the Land, Lessor's royalty shall not bear any of the costs associated therewith."
. . . .
The prices shown on check details appear to include affiliate deductions for fuel. We ask that you review the deductions made to these natural gas royalties and correct all deductions disallowed by the lease to the start of production.
2. For January 2011 through present for the above noted wells for the royalty and working interests, please provide documentation to substantiate and verify the dollar amount before deductions realized by Chesapeake Operating for the natural gas and natural gas liquids if applicable.
3. For the January 2011 through present for the above noted wells for the royalty and working interests, please provide the deductions withheld including the amount and description of the deductions.
Chesapeake responded to the March 21 letter on August 24, 2013 in a letter ("Chesapeake August 24 letter") that stated, in relevant part:
Re: Pricing Dispute
Richard J. Panchasarp Trustee
Hampton Holdings LP
Johnson and Tarrant County, Texas
Mr. [sic] Snively:
Thank you for your letter dated March 21, 2013, advising you have been retained to review alleged improper deductions from the royalty payments for the interest of Richard J. Panchasarp, Trustee, and Hampton Holdings, LP.
Please find enclosed an accounting of your clients' interests. Upon review, [Chesapeake] determined that no deductions shall be made from the royalties. Your clients' accounts have been updated, and all royalties owed will be included in the May revenue distribution.
The Chesapeake August 24 letter is the only communication in the record from Chesapeake regarding royalties and distributions to appellants.
In May 2013, Chesapeake sent two checks to appellants, one in the amount of $326,539.51 payable to the Panchasarp Trust and one in the amount of $7,706.18 payable to Hampton. When Snively LLC became aware of Chesapeake's checks, it sent an invoice to appellants, requesting $163,035.00 for "50%" of the "May 2013 [c]orrection [c]heck no. 1." Appellants then paid Snively LLC $163,035.00. The record does not contain an invoice from Snively LLC to appellants respecting the May 2013 check payable to Hampton. However, Snively LLC claimed in the trial court and on appeal it did not receive compensation for its share of the May 2013 check payable to Hampton. No party disputes that the May 2013 checks were generated as a result of Victoria Snively's March 21, 2013 letter to Chesapeake.
On June 12, 2013, Ben Panchasarp, Richard Panchasarp's son, sent an email to Chesapeake that stated, in relevant part:
We also have interests in the Berry wells, Panchasarp wells, all the Burleson Lakes wells, and the 1st Baptist Church wells. I may be missing some others, but I can't remember at this particular time.
I do appreciate you taking the time to explain to me what's going on, but I am concerned because there have been more expenses the last couple of years and I'm not sure what other things that have been deducted on our proportionate interest in these wells. If you know how I may be able to obtain this material or information, I would be gratefully thankful.
According to the parties, in November 2013, Chesapeake sent two checks to appellants ("November checks"). One check was in the amount of $1,127,129.58 payable to Panchasarp Trust and one check was in the amount of $30,848.99 payable to Hampton. The record does not contain copies of the May or November checks or any documents explaining the May or November checks.
Snively LLC asserts that after Chesapeake sent the November checks, it made "successive efforts" to collect from appellants "the amounts that they owe[d]" to it, including 50% of the May 2013 check payable to Hampton and 50% of the November checks. The parties have not advised us how Snively LLC learned of the November checks. However, it is undisputed that appellants have paid Snively LLC nothing in regard to the May 2013 check payable to Hampton or the November checks.
On February 20, 2014, Snively LLC brought suit against Richard Panchasarp, individually and as trustee for the Panchasarp Trust, Hampton, and PF Partners LLC, "seeking actual damages for breach of contract as well as attorney's fees." Then, after answers were filed by those defendants, on March 25, 2015, Snively LLC filed a traditional motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract and attorney fees claims, contending appellants were "contractually liable for paying [Snively LLC] 50% of the underpayment amounts recovered that are attributable to any past errors, including the May 2013 [check payable to Hampton] and [the November] checks."
Appellants counterclaimed for breach of contract on April 6, 2015 claiming Snively LLC failed to "issue a letter terminating the agreement" after it was paid $163,035.00 following its initial invoice. On April 15, 2015, Appellants amended their pleadings to include a usury counterclaim. On June 20, Snively LLC filed a traditional and no evidence motion for summary judgment on appellants' counterclaim, contending appellants' breach of contract counterclaim "must fail" because appellants could not prove damages and claiming usury laws were "inapplicable to this case." On June 22, 2016, appellants filed a traditional motion for summary judgment arguing that Snively LLC "take nothing based on the unambiguous terms of the contract." On September 6, 2016, the trial court granted Snively LLC's motion for summary judgment, dismissed with prejudice appellants breach of contract cause of action, and stated "[t]he only remaining issues for the jury to decide are [Snively LLC's] damages, [Snively LLC's] attorney's fees, and the usury counter-claim."
A trial was held on September 13, 2016. At the beginning of trial, appellants' counsel stated he "ha[d] an issue to raise with the Court on what [the parties] [were] trying on the rest of [the] case." After reviewing the pleadings and the rulings, the trial court stated "causation was established...that establishe[d] both liability and damages" as to the breach of contract claim and therefore the only issues left for a jury were the attorneys' fees and a "pending usury counterclaim." Ultimately, the trial court only submitted to the jury the parties' attorney fees claims and "held for later consideration" the usury claim. On March 1, 2017, the trial court signed an amended final judgment that Snively LLC "shall recover damages from [appellants]" of $563,564.79 in compensatory damages from Richard Panchasarp and $19,277.59 in compensatory damages from Hampton. The amended final judgment also dismissed Richard Panchasarp's usury claim with prejudice. No damages were awarded against the third appellant, PF Partners, LLC. On April 18, 2017, Richard Panchasarp, individually and as Trustee for the Richard J. Panchasarp Trust, and Hampton perfected this appeal.
II. Contract Parties
A. Applicable Law
It is well-settled that the law does not presume agency. Sw. Bell Media, Inc. v. Trepper, 784 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ). "When an individual signs a contract without indicating that he is signing in a representative capacity, he is liable on the contract." Wright Grp. Architects-Planners, P.L.L.C. v. Pierce, 343 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011); see also Caraway v. Land Design Studio, 47 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) (concluding appellant signed note in his individual capacity when his "signature on the note [bore] no indication of his representative capacity."). "If [a] contract clearly shows on its face that it is the obligation of the person who signed it, parol evidence is inadmissible to show that the person intended only to bind his principal." Pierce, 343 S.W.3d at 200.
B. Application of Law to Facts
First, we address issue four. In that issue, appellants argue "[t]he trial court erred in entering judgment for breach of contract against Hampton because it was not a party to the contract." Appellants do not raise an issue as to Richard Panchasarp's individual liability under the Engagement Letter. Snively LLC responds that "[i]n the summary judgment proceeding, [a]ppellants failed to argue that Hampton was not a contract party" and therefore appellants waived this argument on appeal. However, appellants argue on appeal it was Snively LLC's burden to establish each element of its breach of contract claim, including the existence of a valid contract between Snively LLC and Hampton. We agree with appellants. See SeaBright Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 465 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. 2015). Appellants were not required to file an answer or response to Snively LLC's traditional motion for summary judgment or preserve this issue on appeal in order for us to address it. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979) ("While it would be prudent and helpful to the trial court for the non-movant always to file an answer or response, the non-movant needs no answer or response to the motion to contend on appeal that the grounds expressly presented to the trial court by the movant's motion are insufficient as a matter of law to support summary judgment.").
In support of its position that Hampton was a party to the Engagement Letter, Snively LLC cites (1) deposition testimony from Richard Panchasarp who was identified by the videographer of the deposition as a "representative of Hampton," (2) the summary judgment affidavit of Ben Panchasarp, and (3) appellants' "supplemental answer." Appellants respond that "the contract is between Richard Panchasarp and Snively Royalty Analysis, LLC only; it does not mention Hampton." Again, we agree with appellants.
The Engagement Letter makes no reference to Hampton. Further, Richard Panchasarp signed only his name at the bottom of the Engagement Letter and did not indicate he signed as an agent for Hampton. See Pierce, 343 S.W.3d at 200. Therefore, we conclude Hampton was not a party to the Engagement Letter. Issue four is decided in appellants' favor.
III. Summary Judgment Motions
Appellants' issues one through three address the trial court's disposition of the summary judgment motions as to whether the Engagement Letter's terms are ambiguous and whether material issues of fact were raised that preclude summary judgment. Snively LLC and appellants both filed traditional summary judgment motions. Snively LLC moved for summary judgment on the grounds that appellants were "contractually liable for the payment requirement set forth in the [Engagement Letter]" because appellants "lack any evidence to show any genuine issue as to any material fact and the [Engagement Letter] plainly provides that [appellants] have a contractual payment obligation to" Snively LLC. Appellants "move[d] for summary judgment that [Snively LLC] take nothing based on the unambiguous terms of the contract." The trial court did not grant appellants' summary judgment motion, but granted Snively LLC's.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Pinkus v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 487 S.W.3d 616, 621 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (citing SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 641). In traditional motion for summary judgment practice, the movant has the burden to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 641. In reviewing a traditional summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 641; Smith v. O'Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if a reasonable fact-finder could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless a reasonable fact-finder could not. SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 641; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). If the trial court's order does not specify the grounds on which the summary judgment was granted, we must affirm that summary judgment if any of the grounds specified in the motion are meritorious. See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003).
The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law, which we review de novo. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 650-51 (Tex. 1999).
B. Applicable Law
"A successful breach of contract claim requires proof of the following elements: (1) a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach." Petras v. Criswell, 248 S.W.3d 471, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).
When the parties disagree over the meaning of an unambiguous contract, the court must determine the parties' intent by examining and considering the entire writing in an effort to give effect to the parties' intentions as expressed in the contract. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983); Nicol v. Gonzales, 127 S.W.3d 390, 394 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). The parties' intent must be taken from the agreement itself, and the agreement must be enforced as written. Wells Fargo Bank, Minn., N.A. v. N. Cent. Plaza I, L.L.P., 194 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied); Nicol, 127 S.W.3d at 394; see also Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995) (only where contract is first determined to be ambiguous may courts consider parties' interpretation or admit extraneous evidence to determine true meaning of instrument). Further, under the "Four Corners Rule," the parties' intent must be "ascertained from the instrument as a whole and not from isolated parts thereof." Calpine Producer Servs., L.P. v. Wiser Oil Co., 169 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). Unless the agreement shows that the parties used a term in a technical or different sense, we give the terms their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning. Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996).
C. Application of Law to Facts
1. Unambiguous Contract
Now, we address appellants' issues one and two as to the question of ambiguity. In its summary judgment motion, Snively LLC argued the language in the Engagement Letter that states the engagement terminates upon "you being paid a correction" is a "part of the agreement whose meaning stems from the previous part" of the agreement. Snively LLC argued the previous part of the agreement references "underpayments" which is plural, and "any past errors" which is also plural. Accordingly, Snively LLC argued the word "correction" references "as a whole, all payments recovered and received from past errors." Therefore, Snively LLC contends the Engagement Letter "expressly obligate[d] [appellants] to pay [Snively LLC] from [sic] both the May 2013 correction check and the November 2013 correction check, as they both represent payments recovered from past errors."
Conversely, appellants argued in their summary judgment motion that the Engagement Letter "unambiguously provides as follows:
a. The contract automatically terminated after Chesapeake made the May 2013 correction payment and after [Snively LLC] invoice [sic] for that payment; and
b. In any event, the November payment constitutes "[f]urther benefits due to errors corrected [which are] 100% payable to you, the royalty owner" and thus belong to the Panchasarps."
Appellants contend the "the word 'a' when used before a noun expressing quantity means the quantity 'one' as in 'one correction.'" Therefore, appellants argue "[a]s a matter of law the Panchasarps were 'paid a correction' in May 2013, which triggered the termination of the agreement." Appellants further argue "the adjective 'further' means 'more distant or remote; more extended; additional; more.'" According to appellants, the "November payment fits into the plain meaning of 'further benefits'" because it "was payment for benefits that were: more distant or remote - by half a year - than those paid in May; due for production that was more distant or remote in time (older production) than the corrections paid in May; more extensive than the May benefits; and new, additional to, and over and above the May payments."
Snively LLC argued in response to appellants' motion for summary judgment that the word "further" means "more and new, as in, any new benefits to come to the [appellants] once [Snively LLC] completed its work, such as corrected prospective royalty payments." We agree with Snively LLC and conclude the contract is unambiguous.
The words "a correction" reference all payments recovered as a result of Snively LLC's efforts to correct past errors by Chesapeake. Accordingly, the Engagement Letter entitles Snively LLC to 50% of all payments received by appellants from past errors of Chesapeake that were "recovered" as a result of Snively LLC's efforts.
The record does not show that the May 2013 checks were conclusively shown to be the sole "correction" received by appellants because of Snively LLC's efforts. Accordingly, Snively LLC's services were not conclusively shown to be complete upon the issuance of the May 2013 checks. Additionally, the record does not show the November checks were conclusively shown to constitute "further benefits due to errors corrected" because Snively LLC's services were not, as a matter of law, complete. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in not granting appellants' motion for summary judgment.
2. Issues of Material Fact
Finally, we address appellants' third issue. There, appellants argue the trial court erred in granting Snively LLC's motion for summary judgment on Snively LLC's breach of contract claim because appellants' "response raised numerous issues of material fact on the contested elements of breach of contract." Specifically, appellants assert "there is no evidence that Snively [LLC] performed work that resulted in the November 2013 correction payments." In support, appellants cite Victoria Snively's deposition testimony, arguing Victoria Snively "admitted she did not receive or analyze any further information or make any further demand to Chesapeake until after it made the November 2013 payment."
In conjunction with our analysis of this issue, we consider Victoria Snively's deposition testimony that stated, in relevant part:
Q. Okay. Now, we know now, do we not, that in November of 2013 before you had done your completion of the review, that Chesapeake on its own sent an additional check to the Panchasarps, right?
A. Right. Now, there's a communication - I want to clarify. There's a communication at some point shortly after November with Will Jordan [of Chesapeake] where he says, we're holding off on the updating of the accounting because they are making the complete corrections to the royalties. And it's in one of the e-mails. I don't have the date of that. . .
Q. So Will from Chesapeake informed you in November or December 2013 that Chesapeake was making further changes even before sending you the more detailed accounting for further review.
A. That's right.
Q. You don't have any personal knowledge, do you, as to why Chesapeake decided to make further correction payments?
A. No, I don't.
Further, we consider appellants' contention that "Ben Panchasarp corresponded with Chesapeake in June 2013 regarding their improper inclusion of expenses in past revenue distributions" and therefore "[t]his raised a fact issue on whether [Panchasarp's] efforts or Snively[] [LLC's] efforts caused Chesapeake to make the November 2013 payments."
Snively LLC responds in its appellate brief that appellants argue for the first time on appeal "that there is no evidence that Snively [LLC] performed the contract or tendered performance on the contract - specifically, that Snively [LLC] did work resulting in the November 2013 correction payments" and therefore appellants waived this argument. However, the record reflects appellants argued in their response to Snively LLC's original motion for traditional summary judgment that "there is no admissible evidence that [Snively LLC] recovered the disputed [November checks] from Chesapeake." Therefore, we conclude the issue of performance was not waived and we will consider that argument. See McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tex. 1993) ("The non-movant must expressly present to the trial court, by written answer or response, any issues defeating the movant's entitlement.").
We also recognize that Snively LLC further argues on appeal it was entitled to traditional summary judgment because it "execut[ed] timely and efficiently an adequate analysis of [appellants'] past and current royalties, concluding that [appellants] had in fact been underpaid by Chesapeake." Accordingly, Snively LLC asserts its "work alone resulted in the November corrections" and it "is entitled to fifty percent of recovery paid from Chesapeake to [appellants] due to any past underpayment error, regardless of whether those payments came in one or two checks."
In support, Snively LLC cites Victoria Snively's affidavit, where she stated, in relevant part:
For many years, I have represented various royalty owners in their efforts to collect money for past royalty-underpayment errors, including many royalty owners seeking recovery from Chesapeake Operating, Inc. and related Chesapeake entities. I have handled several representations in which my efforts resulted in royalty-underpayment recoveries on behalf of my clients. Producers like Chesapeake Operating will make a series of payments to royalty owners in order to accomplish the overall objective of restoring to them the full amount of royalty-underpayment error. Certain payments will cover certain time periods, so that one payment covers a certain time period, while a subsequent payment covers a different time period. I experienced the foregoing payments involving different time periods when [Snively LLC's] work resulted in the two or more checks to the Panchasarp related Defendants: that is, the May 2013 correction check to Richard Panchasarp covering underpayments from May 2011 to February 2013
and the November 2013 correction check covering underpayments from the start of the well to April 2011.(Emphasis added).
In its motion for summary judgment, Snively LLC also contended that "in the practice of recovering underpayments, it is an industry norm that revenue accounting departments, such as Cheasapeake's, send multiple payment checks for past errors."
Finally, Snively LLC contends on appeal that appellants' argument that its "own communications with Chesapeake might have caused the Chesapeake November royalty-underpayment corrections" is incorrect because "[Ben Panchasarp's] communications concerned working interests (not royalty interests)." Snively LLC contends only its March 21 letter could have resulted in the November checks because it requested in that letter that Chesapeake "review the deductions made to these natural gas royalties and correct all deductions disallowed by the lease to the start of production" and the November checks "represented money owed to [appellants] from underpayment errors on their leases from the start of the well to April 2011." (Emphasis added).
The parties have cited no evidence in the record that the November checks sent by Chesapeake to appellants resulted from Snively LLC's efforts. While Snively LLC cites Victoria Snively's affidavit testimony as evidence that its "work alone" resulted in the November checks, Victoria Snively's deposition testimony contains evidence in conflict with that affidavit testimony because Victoria Snively admitted in her deposition that she had no personal knowledge of why Chesapeake sent the November checks. Further, appellants cite the letter Ben Panchasarp wrote to Chesapeake before Chesapeake sent the November checks arguing this letter "raise[s] a fact issue on whether Ben Panchasarp's efforts or Snively[] [LLC's] efforts caused Chesapeake to make the November 2013 payments." Snively LLC asserts in response that Ben Panchasarp's letter concerned working interests and not royalty interests. Therefore, the work of Snively LLC alone contributed to the November checks. However, our analysis shows there is no evidence in the record whether the November checks sent by Chesapeake related to royalty interests, working interests, both, or neither, because the record does not contain copies of the checks or any documents explaining the checks.
To prevail on summary judgment, Snively LLC had the burden to show there was no issue of material fact as to its performance under the agreement and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 641. Snively LLC failed to meet that burden. On this record, we conclude a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the sending of the November checks by Chesapeake to appellants was the result of Snively LLC's work.
IV. Conclusion
We conclude the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Snively LLC against appellants. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment against Hampton and render a judgment that Snively LLC take nothing against Hampton. Further, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Snively LLC against Richard Panchasarp and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/Douglas S. Lang/
DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE 170387F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-01759.
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang, Chief Justice Wright and Justice Stoddart participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, we (1) REVERSE the trial court's judgment; (2) RENDER judgment that appellee Snively Royalty Analysis, LLC take nothing against appellant Hampton Holdings, LP; and (3) REMAND this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion.
It is ORDERED that appellants Richard Panchasarp and Hampton Holdings, LP recover their costs of this appeal from appellee Snively Royalty Analysis, LLC. Judgment entered this 29th day of August, 2018.