Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-CV-76237-DT.
June 6, 2000.
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Jack Rice, a state prisoner currently confined at the Thumb Correctional Facility in Lapeer, Michigan, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he is incarcerated in violation of his constitutional rights. Petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in the Crawford County Circuit Court in 1978 and was sentenced to a parolable term of life imprisonment in 1979. In support of his request for habeas relief, Petitioner raises claims concerning the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea, the propriety of his sentence, and the effectiveness of trial and appellate counsel. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner's request for habeas relief is denied and his application for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Petitioner's arrest and conviction arise from the shooting death of John Messenheimer during the course of an argument in Grayling, Michigan on September 28, 1978. Petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for dismissal of an open murder charge, an acknowledgment that he would not be charged as a habitual offender, and an agreement not to oppose parole on sentence of 10 years or greater after the service of 18 years imprisonment. On January 22, 1979, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
Following his conviction and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal as of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals, claiming that the trial court failed to notify him of the offense to which he was pleading, failed to inform him of the mandatory minimum sentence, failed to individualize his sentence, failed to fully advise him that he was waiving his trial rights, and failed to inform him of the intent necessary to establish second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. People v. Rice, No. 46185 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 15, 1980). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court which was voluntarily withdrawn on August 12, 1982.
Between 1980 and 1990, Petitioner also sought various forms of post-judgment and collateral relief from the state courts. In the course of those proceedings, Petitioner claimed that his plea was involuntary due to intoxication and threats to his family, his plea was illusory because he could not have been charged as a habitual offender, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a diminished capacity defense, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by threatening to file a supplemental information, the trial court sentenced him on inaccurate information of prior convictions, and his life sentence violated state and federal law. The state courts denied his requests.
In 1991, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court, claiming that he should be re-sentenced pursuant to People v. Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630 (1990). The trial court denied the motion on January 14, 1992. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied. People v. Rice, No. 148430 (Mich.Ct.App. Aug. 24, 1992). Petitioner's subsequent application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court was denied. People v. Rice, No. 94747 (Mich. Dec. 20, 1992).
In March, 1997, Petitioner filed another motion for relief from judgment with the trial court, raising the following issues:
I. He was sentenced on the basis of incorrect information.
II. There was an off-the-record discussion regarding his sentence between the court, the prosecution, and defense counsel in violation of state law.
III. His sentence was not individualized as required by state law.
IV. His plea agreement was illusory because he could not have been charged as a habitual offender.
V. His plea was involuntary because of threats of violence to his family.
The trial court denied the motion based upon the merits of the sentencing claim and the procedural history of the case. People v. Rice, No. 78-002-074(M) (Crawford Co. Cir. Ct. May 30, 1997). Petitioner's request for reconsideration was also denied. People v. Rice, No. 78-002-074(M) (Crawford Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 1997). Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal this decision with the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied "for lack of merit in the grounds presented." People v. Rice, No. 208874 (Mich.Ct.App. April 14, 1998). Petitioner also filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied for failure to "meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D)." People v. Rice, No. 112248 (Mich. Feb. 25, 1999).
Petitioner, through legal counsel, filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus on March 19, 1999, asserting that:
I. He was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information of prior convictions.
II. Ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the lack of individualized sentencing.
III. His plea was illusory because the prosecution could not have charged him as a habitual offender.
IV. His plea was involuntary due to threats against his family.
V. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise the off-the-record sentencing discussion and the illusory plea arguments on appeal.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on August 2, 1999, asserting that it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations period established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This Court denied the motion on August 12, 1999 and ordered Respondent to answer the petition. Respondent filed an answer to the petition on September 27, 1999, asserting that it should be dismissed on the basis of procedural default. Petitioner filed a reply to that answer on March 17, 2000.
III. Standard of Review
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996), govern this case because Petitioner filed this habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
In Williams v. Taylor, ___ U.S ___, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000), the United States Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the correct standard of review under the AEDPA. According to the Supreme Court:
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined the by Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.Id. at 1523 (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court on this issue).
In evaluating a state court decision under the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court further stated that a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 1522. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s `unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers only to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 1523. In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, therefore, a federal habeas court is restricted to pertinent United States Supreme Court precedent.
Lastly, § 2254(e)(1) requires that this Court presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied __ U.S. ___ 119 S.Ct. 2403 (1999).
IV. Discussion A. Sentencing Information Claim
1. Procedural Default
As an initial matter, Respondent asserts that Petitioner's claim that he was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information (Habeas Claim I) is barred by procedural default. Habeas relief may be precluded on claims that a petitioner has not presented to the state courts in accordance with the state's procedural rules. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Couch v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1991). In Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court explained that a petitioner's procedural default in the state courts will preclude federal habeas review if the last state court rendering a judgment in the case rested its judgment on the procedural default. 433 U.S. at 85.
In such a case, a federal court must determine not only whether a petitioner has failed to comply with state procedures, but also whether the state court relied on the procedural default or, alternatively, chose to waive the procedural bar. "A procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case `clearly and expressly' states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263-64 (1989). The last explained state court judgment should be used to make this determination. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-05 (1991). If the last state judgment is a silent or unexplained denial, it is presumed that the last reviewing court relied upon the last reasoned opinion. Id.
Here, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his second motion for relief from judgment based upon his failure to comply with MCR 6.508(D). That Michigan Supreme Court order simply states, "On order of the Court, the delayed application for leave to appeal . . . is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under M.C.R. 6.508(D)." People v. Rice, No. 112248 (Mich. Feb. 25, 1999). Contrary to Respondent's assertion, the Michigan Supreme Court did not clearly and expressly rely on a procedural bar. The court merely stated that Petitioner had failed to establish entitlement to relief under M.C.R. 6.508(D). This could mean either that Petitioner failed to meet the procedural requirements of the rule, or that he had not substantively established entitlement to relief. Without more, this language is insufficient to constitute a reasoned opinion on the matter, and the Court must therefore look to the lower court opinions denying Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment. See, e.g., Mallory v. Overton, No. 93-2490, 1994 WL 722833, *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 1994) (unpublished) (looking to the trial court's opinion to determine whether petitioner procedurally defaulted where Michigan Supreme Court used similar language in denying leave to appeal); Grant v. Rivers, 920 F. Supp. 769, 780-781 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (Gadola, J.) (where Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in standard, one-sentence orders, trial court's opinion denying motion for relief from judgment was last reasoned order); Thompson v. Elo, 919 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (O'Meara, J.) (same), overruled on other grounds, Rogers v. Howe, 144 F.3d 990, 994 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1998).
MCR 6.508(D) provides, in relevant part:
The defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to the relief requested. The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion
(1) seeks relief from a judgment of conviction and sentence that still is subject to challenge on appeal pursuant to subchapter 7.200 or subchapter 7.300.
(2) alleges grounds for relief which were decided against the defendant in a prior appeal or proceeding under this subchapter, unless the defendant establishes that a retroactive change in the law has undermined the prior decision.
(3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates
(a) good cause for the failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior motion, and
(b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularity that support the claim for relief. . . .
In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's delayed application for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment "for lack of merit in the grounds presented." People v. Rice, No. 208874 (Mich.Ct.App. April 14, 1998). This one-sentence denial does not constitute a dismissal on procedural grounds, though it too fails to provide a reasoned analysis of Petitioner's sentencing information claim. Accordingly, the Court will look to the trial court's order denying Petitioner's 1997 motion for relief from judgment to determine whether the state courts relied on a procedural bar in dismissing his sentencing information claim.
The trial court's May 30, 1997 Opinion and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment and December 8, 1997 Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration both indicate that the trial court considered the merits in denying Petitioner's sentencing information claim. The trial court found that the plea and sentencing transcripts contradicted Petitioner's factual allegations regarding his criminal record. The court also reviewed Petitioner's exhibits concerning prior convictions and found them not to constitute new evidence. Although the Court noted that Petitioner had previously filed numerous post-conviction motions, it cannot be said that the trial court clearly and expressly relied upon a procedural default in denying Petitioner relief. The Court thus concludes that Petitioner's sentencing information claim is not barred by procedural default.
The Court will now address the merits of the claim.
2. Merits of Sentencing Information Claim
Petitioner claims that he was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information because the pre-sentence report referenced two criminal offenses for which he was not convicted. Wide discretion is accorded a state trial court's sentencing decision and claims arising out of that decision are not generally cognizable upon federal habeas review, unless the petitioner can show that the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory limits or is wholly unauthorized by law. A sentence may violate due process if it is carelessly or deliberately pronounced on an extensive and materially false foundation which the defendant had no opportunity to correct. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 1990) (criminal defendant must have a meaningful opportunity to rebut contested information at sentencing). Additionally, Petitioner must show that the trial judge relied on the allegedly false information. United States v. Polselli, 747 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1984); Draughn v. Jabe, 803 F. Supp. 70, 80 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
In this case, Petitioner has not shown that his sentence was carelessly or deliberately pronounced on an extensive or materially false foundation. As noted by the state trial court, the record contains copies of two dismissal orders relevant to this claim. The first is a copy of an Order of Dismissal regarding Petitioner's prior felony conviction in California, entered in 1980. The second is an Order Nolle Prosequi from the Wayne County Circuit Court, entered in 1981. Both of these dismissal orders were granted as a result of Petitioner's 1978 second-degree murder conviction and sentence and were entered after his plea and sentencing. See Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, People v. Rice, No. 78-002-074(M) (Crawford Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 1997). Thus, it cannot be said that the pre-sentence report was inaccurate or contained materially false information at the time it was considered by the trial court. Moreover, Petitioner had an opportunity to challenge the pre-sentence report and raised no objections, explanations, or disagreements. See Opinion and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment, People v. Rice, No. 78-002-074(M) (Crawford Co. Cir. Ct. May 30, 1997) (citing 1/22/79 Sentencing Tr. pp. 3-4, 6-7). The fact that the sentencing report may have contained an inaccuracy does not justify federal court intervention under such circumstances. Petitioner is thus not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because counsel was ineffective. Specifically, Petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to assert that his sentence was not individualized under state law (Habeas Claim II). Petitioner also claims that appellate counsel failed to challenge an off-the-record sentencing discussion and to assert that Petitioner's plea agreement was illusory on direct appeal (Habeas Claim V). Respondent contends that these claims are barred because Petitioner has not presented them to the state courts.
A prisoner filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must first exhaust all state remedies. Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994); Clemmons v. Sowders, 34 F.3d 352, 354 (6th Cir. 1994). Exhaustion requires that a prisoner "fairly present" the substance of each federal constitutional claim to the state courts using citations to the United States Constitution, federal decisions using constitutional analysis, or state decisions employing constitutional analysis in similar fact patterns. Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1516 (6th Cir. 1993). State prisoners "must give the state courts one full fair opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 1732 (1999); see also Rust, 17 F.3d at 160 (exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the state's highest court has been given a full and fair opportunity to rule on the petitioner's claims). A petitioner must present each ground to both appellate courts, even if the State's highest court only provides discretionary appellate review. O'Sullivan, 119 S.Ct. at 1733-34; Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990). The burden is on the petitioner to prove exhaustion. Rust, 17 F.3d at 160.
As stated in Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982), "[i]t is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts . . . or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made." A Michigan prisoner is required to raise each issue he seeks to present in a federal habeas proceeding before the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. Hafley, 902 F.2d at 483.
In this case, Petitioner has not exhausted his available state court remedies for his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He did not present these specific claims to the state courts during any of his appellate or post-conviction proceedings. He raises these issues for the first time on federal habeas review.
Generally, a federal district court should dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that contains unexhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 522 (1982); Rust, 17 F.3d at 160. While the exhaustion requirement is strictly enforced, it is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for bringing a habeas petition. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987); Pillette v. Foltz, 824 F.2d 494, 496 (6th Cir. 1987). For example, an unexhausted claim may be addressed if pursuit of a state court remedy would be futile, Witzke v. Withrow, 702 F. Supp. 1338, 1348 (W.D. Mich. 1988), or if the unexhausted claim is meritless such that addressing it would be efficient and not offend federal-state comity. Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir. 1987). A habeas petition may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the petitioner's failure to exhaust the remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
In this case, Petitioner's pursuit of state court remedies would be futile. If a petitioner fails to present a claim to the state courts and is barred by state law from pursuing further relief, his petition should not be dismissed for lack of exhaustion because there are no remedies available for him to exhaust. Hannah v. Conley, 49 F.3d 1193, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1994); Rust, 17 F.3d at 160. Instead, the federal habeas court must treat the issue as a procedural default and Petitioner will not be allowed to raise this new claim unless he can show cause to excuse his failure to present this claim in an appropriate manner to the state courts and actual prejudice to his case at trial or on appeal. Id.
The Court will not dismiss the present petition on exhaustion grounds because Petitioner has depleted his available state remedies. Under M.C.R. 6.502(G), a defendant may only bring one motion for relief from judgment. Petitioner has already filed at least two such motions. Any subsequent motion for relief from judgment will be returned by the trial court without filing unless it is based upon a retroactive change in law or is based upon a claim of newly discovered evidence. Petitioner has made neither claim in his habeas petition. He would therefore be unable to bring a new motion for relief from judgment before the state trial court. Accordingly, this Court concludes that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims have been procedurally defaulted.
A state prisoner who fails to comply with a state's procedural rules waives the right to federal habeas review absent a showing of cause for noncompliance and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation, or a showing of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991); Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1996).
In this case, Petitioner does not establish cause to excuse his failure to present his ineffective assistance of counsel claims to the state courts. Petitioner asserts as cause his pro se status and lack of legal knowledge, inadequacy of the prison law library, and ineffective assistance of counsel. However, a petitioner's pro se status or lack of legal knowledge does not constitute cause. Hannah, 49 F.3d at 1197. Moreover, Petitioner's claim that the law library was inadequate is belied by the fact that he managed to file numerous motions for post-conviction relief in the state courts, including two motions for relief from judgment. Lastly, Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit given that there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Ritchie, 11 F.3d at 590-92. Petitioner cannot use a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as the basis for establishing cause because counsel's alleged ineffectiveness does not excuse Petitioner's own failure to raise all of his claims in a petition for post-conviction relief Hannah, 49 F.3d at 1197 (citing Ewing v. McMackin, 799 F.2d 1143, 1151 (6th Cir. 1986)). Because Petitioner has failed to establish cause, this Court need not consider the issue of prejudice. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986); Long v. McKeen, 722 F.2d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1983).
"If petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim." McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95. In analyzing such a claim, the inquiry is a narrow one in which the petitioner must "point to a constitutional violation that probably resulted in the conviction of one who was actually innocent." Ritchie v. Eberhart, 11 F.3d 587, 593 (6th Cir. 1993). Actual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614; 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998). The Court is not persuaded that Petitioner is actually innocent of the second-degree murder offense to which he pleaded guilty. The record indicates that Petitioner pointed a gun at his victim and shot him at close range during the course of an argument. The Court concludes that a miscarriage of justice will not result from the failure to review Petitioner's defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
C. Involuntary Plea Claim
Petitioner also alleges that his guilty plea was involuntary because he pleaded guilty due to threats to his family (Habeas Claim IV). When a petitioner is convicted as a result of a guilty plea, habeas review is limited to whether the plea was made voluntarily, intelligently, or knowingly. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Appeals voluntary if it is not induced by threats or misrepresentations and the defendant is made aware of the direct consequences of the plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). The voluntariness of a plea "can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it." Id. at 749. The plea is intelligent and knowing where there is nothing to indicate that the defendant is incompetent or otherwise not in control of his or her mental faculties, is aware of the nature of the charges, and is advised by competent counsel. Id. at 756. The plea must be made "with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Id. at 748.
Respondent alleges that this claim is barred by procedural default. As with Claim I, supra, the trail court rendered the last reasoned opinion on this claim. The trial court's May 30, 1997 Opinion and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment indicates that the trial court did not discuss the merits of this particular claim, but simply stated that Petitioner had previously filed numerous post-conviction motions and denied relief. This claim may therefore be procedurally barred. Given the minimal discussion by the trial court, however, this Court will not rely upon the default and will instead address the merits of this claim.
In this case, the state court record reveals that Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary:
Court: And, Mr. Rice, what is your plea?
Mr. Rice: Guilty.
Court: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty?
Mr. Rice: Yes.
Court: Have any promises, have any threats or inducements been made to you in order to have you enter that plea other than were set forth on the record and made part of the plea bargain and sentence bargain?
Mr. Rice: No, sir.
Court: Are you pleading guilty entirely of your own free will and free choice?
Mr. Rice: Yes, sir.
12/27/78 Plea Tr., pp. 17-18. (Petitioner then proceeded to provide an account of the victim's death and his role therein.)
Petitioner has not presented evidence to contradict the statements contained in the plea transcripts or to support his claim that he pleaded guilty because of threats to his family. Conclusory allegations, without any evidentiary support, do not provide a basis for habeas relief. See, e.g., Workman v. Bell, 160 F.3d 276, 287 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 264 (1999) (conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not warrant habeas relief); Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1042 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1107 (1999) (same); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 301 (3d Cir. 1991) (conclusory allegations do not provide basis for evidentiary hearing in habeas proceedings). Petitioner has failed to establish that his plea was induced by threats to his family or that it was otherwise involuntary. Petitioner is thus not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
D. Illusory Plea Bargain Claim
Lastly, Petitioner alleges that his plea bargain was illusory because the prosecutor could not have charged him as an habitual offender (Habeas Claim III). This claim is without merit. In denying Petitioner's 1997 motion for relief from judgment, the trial court concluded that Petitioner's illusory plea bargain claim was contradicted by Petitioner's admission that he had been convicted of a felony, as set forth in the following portion of the plea transcript:
Court: Do you understand that if you've been [previously] convicted of a felony, you may be charged as an habitual offender and the maximum sentence could thereby be increased? That, presumably, would not apply in this case as I understand there is an agreement not to charge you as an habitual offender in any event. Mr. Kent, is that correct?
Mr. Kent: That's correct.
Court: Mr. Bensinger?
Mr. Bensinger: That's correct, your Honor,
Court: All right. As I understand that it's . . . further part of the plea bargain that you'll not be charged as a habitual offender.
Mr. Rice: Yes, sir.
Court: Have you been previously convicted of a felony?
Mr. Rice: Yes, sir.
People v. Rice, No. 78-002-074(M) (Crawford Co. Cir. Ct. May 30, 1997) (citing 12/27/78 Plea Tr., pp. 7-8) (emphasis in trial court opinion).
Having considered the matter, the Court concludes that the state court's determination in this regard is reasonable. Furthermore, the Court notes that Petitioner benefitted from his plea agreement. The prosecution dropped an open murder charge and agreed not to oppose Petitioner's release on parole after the service of 18 years imprisonment. Petitioner has failed to establish that his plea bargain was illusory or that he is otherwise entitled to habeas relief on the basis of his plea.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the Court DENIES Petitioner's request for habeas relief and DISMISSES his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.