Rice v. Pigman

2 Citing cases

  1. Tosi v. Jones

    115 Ohio App. 3d 396 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 16 times
    Noting that the "cause of action has, in modern times, been supplanted by the tort actions for malicious prosecution and abuse of process" along with other state statutory causes of action

    See Golden Commissary Corp. v. Shipley (D.C.Mun.App. 1960), 157 A.2d 810, 813, 14 American Jurisprudence 2d (1964) 853, Champerty and Maintenance, Section 17. Although the doctrines of champerty and maintenance appear in numerous Ohio cases as contract defenses (see Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio St. 475, 31 N.E. 747; Stewart v. Welch, 41 Ohio St. 483; Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132; LoGuidice v. Harris, 98 Ohio App. 230, 57 O.O. 263, 128 N.E.2d 842; Rice v. Pigman, 94 Ohio App. 122, 51 O.O. 313, 114 N.E.2d 738; Finders Diversified, supra), our research has failed to disclose a single Ohio case which recognizes a cause of action in tort arising out of these ancient doctrines, and appellant has cited none. We thus conclude that Ohio has never recognized a common-law tort for champerty and maintenance.

  2. Dombey, Tyler, Etc. v. Detroit, Toledo Iron

    351 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1965)   Cited 12 times
    Construing Ohio law

    E.g., Gross v. Campbell, 118 Ohio St. 285, 160 N.E. 852 (1928); Brown v. Ginn, 66 Ohio St. 316, 325, 64 N.E. 123 (1902); Stewart v. Welch, 41 Ohio St. 483, 503 (1885); Weakly ex rel. Bell v. Hall, 13 Ohio 167, 175 (1844); Lo Guidice v. Harris, 98 Ohio App. 230, 235, 128 N.E.2d 842 (1954). It appears, however, to be the Ohio rule that the champertous attorney may still recover the reasonable value of services rendered in quantum meruit. Brown v. Bruner, 10 Ohio App. 314 (1919); see Ong v. Worden, 37 Wkly. Law Bull. 108, aff'd per curiam, 55 Ohio St. 695, 48 N.E. 1115 (1897) (semble); 9 Ohio Jur. (2) Champerty Maintenance, § 4 (1954); but cf. Rice v. Pigman, 94 Ohio App. 122, 127, 128, 114 N.E.2d 738 (1953). Although allowance of such recovery is characterized by Williston as "anomalous," 6 Williston on Contracts § 1713, p. 4842 (rev. ed. 1938), it appears to be the majority rule.