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Rice v. Meriden Housing Authority

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
Mar 27, 2009
2009 Conn. Super. Ct. 5924 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009)

Opinion

No. CV03-0479556 S

March 27, 2009


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT PONTOLILLO'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE A VERDICT


The jury returned a verdict against the defendant attorney on the claim of tortious interference with contractual and beneficial relations Mr. Rice had or held with the Meriden Housing Authority. First the court will discuss what the Connecticut Appellate Courts have said concerning this tort. In Hi-Ho Tower Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 27 (2000) the court said:

It is well established that the elements of a claim for tortious interference with business expectancies are: (1) a business relationship between the plaintiff and another party; (2) the defendant's intentional interference with the business relationship while knowing of the relationship; and (3) as a result of the interference, the plaintiff suffers actual loss.

The Appellate Court basically repeated this definition in American Diamond Exchange v. Alpert, 101 Conn.App. 83, 90 (2007) when it said:

A. successful action for tortious interference with business expectancies requires the satisfaction of three elements: (1) a business relationship between the plaintiff and another party; (2) the defendant's intentional interference with the business relationship while knowing of the relationship; and (3) as a result of the interference, the plaintiff suffers actual loss.

In Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 351 (2007) said:

A claim for intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to establish: (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship; (2) the defendant's knowledge of that relationship; (3) the defendant's intent to interfere with the relationship; (4) that the interference was tortious; and (5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff that was caused by the defendant's tortious conduct.

As said in Conrad v. Erickson, 41 Conn.App. 243, 246-47 (1990): "actual loss is an essential element of the tort of intentional interference with business relations." Quoting from earlier case law the court summed up the law on this tort in Appleton v. Bd. Of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 212-13 (2000) presaging Rioux and using the language therein as to the fifth element of the tort — there must be actual loss but this is further qualified by the statement that the loss suffered must be "caused by the defendant's tortious conduct."

Our law reflects the general law in this area, see 44B Am.Jur.2d, "Interference," §§ 36-46, pp. 334-43. Tortious interference can be based on retaliation or ill will, Cavicchi v. Koski, 67 Mass.App.Ct. 654 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006). Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 626 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 1994). It has also been held under this tort that maliciously procuring the termination of an employee may result in liability for damages, § 45 of Am.Jur. article, page 342.

There is no question that the defendant had great animus toward Rice; Rice had tried to have him removed as attorney for the MHA. The court agrees with many of the factual observations made by this thorough plaintiff's lawyer in his December 26, 2007 brief that tried to establish this animus. But given the requirements of this tort the court had reservations about its viability against this defendant. It decided to let the case go to the jury as our Appellate Courts advise, the case is going to be appealed in any event and no matter what the court does on this motion and what an Appellate Court thinks of this decision by letting the case go to the jury, perhaps it need not be tried again. The reservations the court had also, in the court's memory, are not as limited as plaintiff's counsel suggests.

Yes there was an employment contract, true there was great ill will on the part of the defendant attorney toward Rice, no doubt he would have liked to see Rice terminated and a jury could find he acted solely out of ill will which is a basis for finding tortious activity, it could even find the defendant prepared his report and his testimony at the termination on hearing with the purpose of having Rice terminated, a jury could find that his report and testimony was tendentious and misleading — note the court says "a jury could find" since the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the winning side, here the plaintiff, on these motions.

The problem, however, is that even given the foregoing and the obvious fact that Mr. Rice certainly suffered an actual loss in losing his job, how can it be said Pontolillo caused or brought about that loss under our case law. The commission voted to terminate Rice not Pontolillo. He was present as a witness during the termination hearings but not during the deliberative process. Rice was terminated for the DUI conviction not on the basis of the report submitted by the defendant or his testimony. Attorney McKeon who represented the MHA in drafting the charges against Rice was the person who suggested adding the DUI episode as another reason to terminate Rice. There was nothing presented to indicate the defendant suggested adding this reason for termination or even that Chairman Danby did who was represented by the defendant in his private affairs. Attorney Quinn during the deliberative process is the one who suggested that the report prepared by the defendant could not be used as a basis to terminate Rice. If McKeon had not added the DUI reason to the notice sent to Rice, he would not have been fired.

As to the report the evidence was that Danby requested the defendant to prepare it. It seems clear that he did so with great relish, at least the jury could so believe, but there is no evidence that this task was one of his own creation.

There was no evidence the defendant personally approached commission members and encouraged them individually or as a group to fire Rice even for his report let alone the DUI conviction.

If we examine the end of the January 6, 2003 deliberations, one commission member said (Turley) "The obligation of funds, I feel is almost more critical (than the DUI)." He was obviously upset about this as his ensuing remarks show. But he is not joined in a similar chorus with other commission members. In fact Attorney Quinn, who appeared to be one of the few neutral participants in this trial, referred to his law degree in saying he could not establish a "cause" reason in the contract for anything brought out in the defendant's report. He said then as a board member that the DUI situation did establish cause. A vote was held right after these remarks and Rice was terminated because of the DUI conviction. The plaintiff's brief says right after Quinn's remarks Rice was terminated for "the precise reasons given by Pontolillo" in his report and testimony "but it did so under the guise of terminating Rice because of the DUI conviction." Rice's termination was therefore, "the result of" the defendant's actions.

All that assumes Attorney Quinn's remarks were ignored by the board and everyone felt like Turley. Besides dissatisfaction with Rice's action or inaction in dealing with MHA financial problems predated Pontolillo's report, see evidence that when Danby took over the agency he said one of his two top priorities was to get rid of Danby.

In any event the court will grant the motion to set aside the verdict rendered against Pontolillo.

The court would have probably had no difficulty in granting pretrial discovery by way of deposition of these board members. It has done so when the actions of zoning boards and their reasons for acting have been questioned, Acorn Technology Campus LLC v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 50 Conn.Sup. 407 (2007).


Summaries of

Rice v. Meriden Housing Authority

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
Mar 27, 2009
2009 Conn. Super. Ct. 5924 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009)
Case details for

Rice v. Meriden Housing Authority

Case Details

Full title:W. JAMES RICE v. MERIDEN HOUSING AUTHORITY ET AL

Court:Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven

Date published: Mar 27, 2009

Citations

2009 Conn. Super. Ct. 5924 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009)