In the trial court, both parties had moved for summary judgment. This case was previously before this Court in Rice v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 897 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. App. 1995), where a prior summary judgment entered in favor of Defendant was reversed and remanded because the policy of insurance in question was not At issue is the interpretation of a homeowner's insurance policy (the policy) issued to Earl Longhibler by Defendant.
See e.g., Pace Props., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 918 S.W.2d 883, 886 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (distinguishing between categories of exclusionary clauses which apply to losses "caused directly or indirectly" by specified events, "regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss," which apply to losses "caused by or resulting from any of the following events," and which apply to "losses caused by or resulting from any of the following [events]"). As such, the court finds, as a matter of law, giving the Initial Policy its plain meaning and considering the Initial Policy in its entirety, that a windstorm, which is a Covered Cause of Loss, need not be the sole cause of the collapse of the Switzer Building for coverage to exist under the Initial Policy.See Rice by Rice v. Fire Ins. Exch., 897 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Mo.Ct.App. 1995) ("The policy is construed as a whole. [citation omitted].
Therefore, there is an ambiguity and we are compelled to construe that part of the policy against Northland. See Behr, 715 S.W.2d at 256[5]; Rice by Rice v. Fire Ins. Exch., 897 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Mo.App. 1995). Unless an insurance contract is so clear in its meaning that as a matter of law it precludes a plaintiff's recovery, a motion for summary judgment based on the contract should be denied.
In NationalMerchandising Corp. v. McAlpin, 440 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Mo.App. S.D. 1969) this court said that "unless the contract is so clear and unequivocal in its meaning that it necessarily, as a matter of law, precludes plaintiff's recovery, a motion for summary judgment based on an interpretation of the contract should be denied." See alsoRice ByRice v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 897 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Mo.App. S.D. 1995). In the instant case, Jason was living solely in the Brock household when the accident occurred.