Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. SQ002198, Bobbi Tillmon, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Nemecek & Cole, Michael McCarthy and Susan S. Baker for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
VOGEL, J.
The trial court issued a restraining order to keep a woman from harassing her former domestic partner. We affirm.
FACTS
A.
Angela Kim and John M. Ribarich (both lawyers) were romantically involved for about three years and were living together in March 2006. The couple, joined by Kim’s sister (Anna, who was staying with them) fought on March 29, and the women moved out. On April 10, in the East District of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Kim filed an application for a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), and Anna separately applied for a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 527.6, 527.9). On May 2, over Ribarich’s opposition, the trial court granted both applications and ordered Ribarich not to harass, assault, or contact Kim, Anna, or their parents.
Subsequent undesignated section references are to the Family Code.
B.
Meanwhile, on April 18, in the West District of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Ribarich had applied for a restraining order against Kim. (§ 6200.) According to Ribarich’s supporting declaration, he “broke up” with Kim on March 29 and asked her to move out of his house. Kim refused, and along with Anna became physically and verbally abusive, stole his property, and later called and harassed his mother and sister. He said Kim continued to call and to threaten him both at home and at work, and that he was in “constant fear” for his own safety and the safety of his two young sons. Kim filed written opposition.
The trial court conducted a four-day hearing over a period of 10 weeks, during the latter part of which Kim was represented by counsel. Ribarich testified for himself and called several witnesses (Kim’s father, Kim, and Anna). Kim also testified for herself and offered testimony by her father, Anna, and Ribarich’s mother and sister.
On August 3, the trial court found “many inconsistencies” in Kim’s evidence and “some inconsistencies” in Ribarich’s evidence, but concluded there was “more than enough evidence for the restraining order to be issued” against Kim. The order, signed the same day, restrains Kim from harassing, assaulting or contacting Ribarich or his sons, and orders her to stay 200 yards away from their home, work, vehicles and schools.
DISCUSSION
I.
Kim contends the trial court erred in excluding declarations she presented at the hearing. We disagree.
While cross-examining Ribarich, Kim’s lawyer asked about declarations Ribarich had filed in the East District case (one from his mother, one from his sister). Ribarich’s objections (relevancy and lack of foundation) were sustained, correctly so in light of the manner in which the questions were framed. (Evid. Code, § 352; Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1685.) More to the point, these evidentiary rulings could not possibly have affected the outcome of this case -- because Ribarich’s mother and sister both testified, and both denied signing the declarations, thereby making Kim’s point about Ribarich’s credibility. Assuming error, it was harmless by any standard.
II.
Kim contends the restraining order is based solely on Ribarich’s uncorroborated testimony and thus is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, a restraining order may issue to prevent a recurrence of domestic violence if the applicant “shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300.) “Abuse” includes intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury; sexual assault; an act causing reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury; and acts such as molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, battering, telephoning, destroying personal property, and disturbing the peace. (§§ 6203, 6320.)
First, Kim’s argument is nothing more than an impermissible request for us to second-guess the trial court’s credibility calls, and that we will not do. (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479; Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 622-623.) The testimony of a single credible witness, even a party, may constitute substantial evidence, notwithstanding that several witnesses may testify to the contrary. (Evid. Code, §§ 411, 780; In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614; Kearl v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1986) 189 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1052; Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.)
Second, in a case in which the sole issue was credibility, the trial court rejected Kim’s testimony and accepted Ribarich’s version of past events. Accordingly, there is evidence that, during their relationship, Kim drank excessively and sometimes became violent, so much so that on three occasions he took his sons to a hotel to get them away from Kim. On the night before Kim moved out, she drank excessively, bothered Ribarich while he was trying to work, and responded with threats when he asked her and her sister to leave: “They threatened me. They threatened my kids . . . . They called me a Jew lover. They called my kids Jews.” Kim jumped on Ribarich’s back and was “very violent.” Kim and Anna finally left, but Kim called him continuously thereafter, screaming and making more threats directed at him and his family.
There is nothing physically impossible or inherently improbable or implausible about this evidence, and nothing more was required. (§§ 6203, 6320; Evje v. City Title Ins. Co. (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 488, 492.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Kim is to pay her own costs of appeal.
We concur: MALLANO, Acting P.J., ROTHSCHILD, J.