Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2404.
June 25, 2003.
MEMORANDUM
Presently before this Court are Defendant Staar Surgical's ("Defendant" or "Staar") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Margaret Riba's ("Plaintiff" or "Riba") Punitive Damages Claim Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition thereto. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 26, 2001, Riba underwent surgery during which Dr. Jeffrey Katzman ("Dr. Katzman") of the Wills Eye Surgical Center in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, implanted a corrective lens ("lens") into her right eye. According to Plaintiff, the lens used in this surgery was manufactured, marketed, sold and distributed by Staar. Riba alleges that the lens, as implanted into her eye, was defective, because it contained a marked concentric circular pattern which is unacceptable for use in cataract treatment.
The lens referred to by Plaintiff in this action is intended to repair cataracts, and is Staar Surgical Model Number CQ2005V, SN #B108554 with Diopter +20 and length 13.0.
As a result of the defect, Riba claims to suffer from blurred, distorted and double vision in her right eye, as well as increased sensitivity, glare and light defraction at night in this eye. According to Riba, her doctor informed her that removing the lens could cause further damage to the eye, and the injuries she currently suffers are permanent in nature.
Plaintiff alleges that Staar had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect in the lens and of the harm this concentric circular pattern could have on an individual with a cataract condition like that suffered by Plaintiff when it sold and distributed this lens to Dr. Katzman. Riba claims that, despite this knowledge, Staar failed to notify Dr. Katzman and the necessary state and federal government agencies responsible for approving the use of such a lens, of the defect and potential harm this lens could cause if used in the surgical treatment of cataracts. Riba contends that this failure to notify the appropriate state and federal government agencies constituted grossly negligent, reckless and wanton conduct, and a total disregard for Plaintiff's rights. As such, Plaintiff filed the instant action making claims of negligence, product liability and breach of warranties, and claiming punitive damages.
Staar argues that, if Riba is able to prove her claims of negligence, product liability and breach of warranties, she may be entitled to collect compensatory damages, but she would not be entitled to collect punitive damages, because she does not allege facts sufficiently egregious to establish a proper award of such damages. Accordingly, Staar has filed the present Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Punitive Damages Claim Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is granted where the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This motion "may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2000). While the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, it "need not accept as true `unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences.'" Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2000), citing City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 n. 13 (3d Cir. 1997). In a 12(b)(6) motion, the defendant bears the burden of persuading the court that no claim has been stated. Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
An award of punitive damages is appropriate where the defendant's actions are so outrageous that they "demonstrate intentional, willful, wanton or reckless conduct." SHV Coal, Inc. v. Cont'l Grain Co., 526 Pa. 489, 493 (1991), citing Pittsburgh Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Virginia Manor Apartments, Inc., 436 Pa. 350, 353 (1970). Where a defendant acts with an evil motive or a reckless indifference to the rights of others, punitive damages may be awarded. Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 395 (1984), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2). A defendant acts with reckless indifference when he "knows, or has reason to know, . . . of facts which create a high degree of risk of physical harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk." SHV Coal, 526 Pa. at 494, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, cmt. a. "It should be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant's culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 1521 (2003).
In the instant matter, Plaintiff has alleged that Staar's failure to notify Dr. Katzman and the appropriate state and federal government agencies as to the potential harm the lens could cause, was grossly negligent, reckless and wanton conduct which totally disregarded Riba's rights. Given the early stage of this litigation, this Court is unable to determine whether Defendant's conduct constituted such outrageous behavior as to make an award of punitive damages appropriate. See SHV Coal, 526 Pa. at 493. If Riba is able to prove that Staar was aware of the harm the lens could inflict upon a cataract patient, and Staar intentionally failed to inform the appropriate agencies and purchasers of the lens as to this danger, Riba may be entitled to collect punitive damages. See id. at 494. Accepting the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint as true, as this Court is obligated to do for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, see Maio, 221 F.3d at 481, it is clear that Plaintiff may be able to establish such an intentional failure by Staar as this litigation proceeds. Accordingly, Plaintiff s claim for punitive damages is not dismissed at this time.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Punitive Damages Claim is denied. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of June, 2003, upon consideration of Defendant Staar Surgical's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Margaret Riba's Punitive Damages Claim (Docket No. 2) and Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition thereto (Docket No. 3), it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is DENIED.