Opinion
09 Civ. 00003 (RJD) (VMS)
2019-11-21
Catherine RIASCOS-HURTADO and Gladys Sanchez-Loqui, Plaintiffs, v. Theodore RAINES, Defendant.
Alan D. Levine, Law Offices of Alan D. Levine, Kew Gardens, NY, for Plaintiffs. Theodore Raines, Rosedale, NY, pro se.
Alan D. Levine, Law Offices of Alan D. Levine, Kew Gardens, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Theodore Raines, Rosedale, NY, pro se.
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: MEMORANDUM & ORDER
VERA M. SCANLON, United States Magistrate Judge:
This action arises out of allegations by Plaintiffs Catherine Riascos-Hurtado ("Ms. Riascos-Hurtado") and Gladys Sanchez-Loqui ("Ms. Sanchez-Loqui") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") – two former inmates at the Metropolitan Detention Center (the "MDC") in Brooklyn – that they were sexually assaulted while incarcerated by Theodore Raines ("Mr. Raines"), a former employee of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13-15, 19, 24-27. Plaintiffs brought claims against Mr. Raines for Eighth Amendment violations and battery. See generally Compl. Plaintiffs and Mr. Raines consented to this Court's jurisdiction for purposes of conducting and deciding a bench trial. ECF No. 117. This Court now finds, based on the testimony and evidence presented to the Court, that Mr. Raines is liable to each Plaintiff for $1,500,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages for violations of Plaintiffs' Constitutional and state law rights.
I. BACKGROUND
a. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants United States of America (the "United States") and Mr. Raines. See generally Compl. After motion practice, the United States and Plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement and entered a stipulation of dismissal as to Defendant United States. ECF Nos. 82-84. Simultaneously proceeding parallel to this civil litigation was a criminal action against Mr. Raines for his conduct with Ms. Riascos-Hurtado. Mr. Raines was indicted on three counts – two counts of sexual abuse of a ward in custody and one count of abusive sexual contact. See 8/9/2016 Tr. at 29:2-31:5; see also United States of America v. Raines, 11 CR 641 (KAM), ECF No. 1. Mr. Raines pleaded guilty to the first count of sexual abuse and received a sentence of sixteen months. See United States of America v. Raines, 11 CR 641.
In this civil action, Mr. Raines did not initially appear, and Plaintiffs moved for default judgment. ECF No. 11. On August 4, 2016, this Court held an inquest during which it took testimony from both Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' damages expert, Forensic Psychologist, Dr. Michele Galietta, Ph.D. See generally 8/4/2016 Tr., ECF No. 96. Mr. Raines appeared at the inquest and requested time to consult a lawyer. Id. The inquest was continued on August 9, 2016, at which time Mr. Raines returned to court unrepresented and provided his own testimony. See generally 8/9/2016 Tr., ECF No. 97. In light of Mr. Raines's appearance and participation, and other procedural and notice issues, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment. See ECF No. 111; 3/26/2018 Order. The Parties then agreed to a bench trial before this Court, resting on the testimony and submissions provided during the inquest. See ECF Nos. 117 & 119 at 9-20.
b. Factual Background
The following narrative, drawn from the inquest hearings, sets forth the relevant factual determinations as made by the Court. During the inquest, the Court heard testimony from Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, Ms. Sanchez-Loqui, Mr. Raines, and Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Michele Galietta. See generally 8/4/2016 Tr.; 8/9/2016 Tr. Where there was conflicting testimony, the Court generally found credible Plaintiffs' testimony, which was detailed, consistent internally and between themselves, and delivered with emotion reflecting the increasing severity of the circumstances they described, and did not find credible Mr. Raines's testimony, which was at times inconsistent with his prior testimony, lacking in clarity and without sincere remorse except as to the consequences he had suffered.
i. Mr. Raines's Background As A Correctional Counselor
Mr. Raines was employed by the BOP as a lieutenant and counselor. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 14:16-21. In or around 2007, at Mr. Raines's request, he was assigned as a counselor to an all-female unit in which Plaintiffs were incarcerated. Id. at 18:23-19:4, 31:8-17, 54:13-19; 8/9/2016 Tr. at 42:13-22. He resigned from his position with the BOP on October 13, 2007. 8/9/2016 Tr. at 30:4-7.
ii. Mr. Raines Sexually Assaulted Ms. Riascos-Hurtado
In early 2007, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, who was then incarcerated at the MDC, obtained an inmate job as head orderly – a position that required her to work with Mr. Raines. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 54:20-56:7. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado testified that she first began experiencing problems with Mr. Raines after she received a disciplinary "writeup." Id. at 57:1-16. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado wrote to an inmate located at another BOP facility and received a disciplinary form because she was not allowed to write to incarcerated individuals. Id. at 57:2-16. Mr. Raines informed Ms. Riascos-Hurtado that she had to see the Unit Manager, Mr. Fascie, who would decide her punishment, which could include losing her phone, commissary or visiting privileges. Id. at 57:1-58:25. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado approached Mr. Raines and expressed concern about losing her phone privileges, as it was the only way she could communicate with her son who was six years old at the time. Id. at 58:15-17. Mr. Raines told Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, "Don't worry. I'm going to help you." Id. at 58:18. When Ms. Riascos-Hurtado met with Mr. Fascie, Mr. Fascie dismissed the disciplinary charge and did not give her a punishment. Id. at 58:25-59:2. Later that day, Mr. Raines went to Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's unit and told her: "I told you that I'm going to do something for you and I did it, so now it's you [who is] going to do something for me." Id. at 59:5-10.
Ms. Riascos-Hurtado pleaded guilty to certain drug related offenses in May 2007. See United States of America v. Riascos-Hurtado, 05 CR 923 (E.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 80.
Approximately a week and a half later, in or around July 2007, Mr. Raines began to make sexually suggestive comments and had physical contact with Ms. Riascos-Hurtado. Id. at 59:21--62:10, 66:3-19. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado testified that Mr. Raines called her to his office allegedly to have her clean the office, but he began rubbing Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's hands and back, and calling her "Baby." Id. at 60:10-13. From that point, Mr. Raines's conduct escalated, with each inappropriate encounter occurring a week to a week-and-a-half apart. Id. at 68:10-11. These encounters included an incident in which Mr. Raines took Ms. Riascos-Hurtado to Mr. Fascie's office to do some filing, during which time, Mr. Raines exposed his penis to Ms. Riascos-Hurtado and, when she tried to leave, Mr. Raines stated, "Why you running for? I just want to show you to see if you can handle it." Id. at 67:2-12. In another instance, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado testified that she was directed to assist in a suicide watch from 12:00 A.M. to 6:00 A.M. Id. at 60:22-24. During the watch, Mr. Raines came to where Ms. Riascos-Hurtado was stationed and, blocking the MDC camera with his body, instructed Ms. Riascos-Hurtado to unbutton her jumper. Id. at 60:25-61:11. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado testified that she resisted Mr. Raines's actions, but he stated that she owed him for helping her with her disciplinary writeup. Id. at 61:24-62:4. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado unbuttoned her jumper, and Mr. Raines digitally penetrated her. Id. at 62:4-6. Mr. Raines threatened to punish Ms. Riascos-Hurtado with solitary confinement if she reported his actions, stating that he would "make [her] life a living hell" if she did not "keep [her] mouth shut." Id. at 62:6-10. Despite these warnings, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado testified that she reported Mr. Raines's behavior to another MDC officer, Mr. Puzie, but he informed her that he did not want his "name involved in anything and [did not] want to get in trouble" or lose his job, and he took no action. Id. at 64:11-25. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado also told Ms. Sanchez-Loqui, who confided that Mr. Raines was doing similar things to her. Id. at 65:3-8.
Mr. Raines testified that he had "consensual" sexual intercourse with Ms. Riascos-Hurtado on one occasion, but he denies any other sexual encounters, such as digitally penetrating Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, engaging in intercourse with Ms. Riascos-Hurtado a second time, exposing himself to Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, and threatening Ms. Riascos-Hurtado. 8/9/2016 Tr. at 23:4-15. The Court notes that Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, as an incarcerated individual, lacked the ability to consent to sexual intercourse with Mr. Raines, who was a corrections officer. See Cash v. County of Erie, No. 04 Civ. 182 (JTC) (JJM), 2009 WL 3199558, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009).
It is unclear from the trial record whether Mr. Puzie and Mr. Fascie are different people. The transcript from the hearing indicates that the names are recorded phonetically, with Mr. Puzie's name spelled "Fusie" therein. See 9/4/2016 Tr. at 57:14, 64:12. The summary judgment record reflects that the individual to whom Ms. Riascos-Hurtado reported was an Officer Puzie, whom she referred to as "Mr. Fuzi." See ECF No. 64 at 34. For purposes of this decision, it is unnecessary to clarify this factual ambiguity.
On or about September 16, 2007, Mr. Raines raped Ms. Riascos-Hurtado. Id. at 68:10-70:13; 8/9/2016 Tr. at 30:14-17. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado testified that Mr. Raines came to her bed and awakened her by bumping her bed. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 68:15-19. He told her to get up to do "some cleaning and some paperwork." Id. at 68:20-21. Mr. Raines took Ms. Riascos-Hurtado to Mr. Fascie's office, locked the door behind him with his key, turned off the light, and closed the blinds. Id. at 68:21-69:13. Mr. Raines directed Ms. Riascos-Hurtado to a room located towards the back of the office and told Ms. Riascos-Hurtado to undress. Id. at 69:12-20. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado testified that she resisted Mr. Raines's demands, but he reminded her that she "had to do something for" him, and again threatened to make her "life a living hell" if she told anyone. Id. at 69:12-20. Mr. Raines proceeded to remove his belt, pulled his pants down, and attempted to remove Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's pants as well. Id. at 70:6-8. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado testified that she refused to let Mr. Raines pull her pants down and that she took them off herself. Id. at 70:9. Mr. Raines instructed Ms. Riascos-Hurtado to lay on the floor, and he forcibly raped her. Id. at 70:9-13. Mr. Raines ejaculated inside Ms. Riascos-Hurtado and prevented Ms. Riascos-Hurtado from cleaning the semen from her body for fear that she would try to use that as evidence against him. Id. at 70:13-25; 8/9/2016 Tr. at 38:20-39:25. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado testified that Mr. Raines again threatened to punish her with solitary confinement if she reported his actions. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 70:13-18. Mr. Raines admitted to having sex with Ms. Riascos-Hurtado on the date in question but contended that this sexual act was consensual. 8/9/2016 Tr. at 33:22-34:21. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado reported the incident to Mr. Puzie and Ms. Sanchez-Loqui. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 71:13-24.
On or about October 7, 2007, Mr. Raines raped Ms. Riascos-Hurtado a second time. Id. at 73:17-75:1; 8/9/2016 Tr. at 30:14-23. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado testified that, similar to the previous incident, Mr. Raines went to Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's unit and instructed her to gather cleaning supplies. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 73:18-22. Mr. Raines took Ms. Riascos-Hurtado to the same room as the previous encounter, and again locked the door and turned off the lights. Id. at 74:13-22. According to Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, Mr. Raines disrobed completely, directed her to remove her clothing and lay on the floor, then had intercourse with her. Id. at 74:23-25. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado disclosed the encounter to Ms. Sanchez-Loqui and another inmate, Jesenia Hirachickee. Id. at 24:5-7, 76:1-25.
Ms. Sanchez-Loqui brought an MDC counselor, Mr. Neil, to speak with Ms. Riascos-Hurtado about Mr. Raines's conduct, and Ms. Riascos-Hurtado also reported to another officer, Ms. Jackson. Id. at 24:5-25:17, 77:6-22. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado was immediately transferred out of the MDC. Id. at 77:20-22. Ms. Sanchez-Loqui testified that she was put in solitary confinement for three days. Id. at 25:18-23.
iii. Mr. Raines Sexually Assaulted Ms. Sanchez-Loqui
In 2007, just prior to Mr. Raines becoming the female unit counselor, he took Ms. Sanchez-Loqui to a common area, got very close to her, told her that he was going to be the unit counselor and stated, "You do as ... I say." Id. at 19:4-24. According to Ms. Sanchez-Loqui, once Mr. Raines became the unit counselor, he began offensively touching Ms. Sanchez-Loqui by groping her breasts and buttocks. Id. at 20:2-11. Ms. Sanchez-Loqui described Mr. Raines taking her into an office to do some filing or cleaning, but once in the office, Mr. Raines locked the door, touched and scratched Ms. Sanchez-Loqui's breasts, and digitally penetrated her. Id. at 20:19-22:18. Ms. Sanchez-Loqui testified that she tried to run, but she was unable to get away because Mr. Raines had locked the door. Id. at 21:19-21. When she asked him to stop digitally penetrating her, he responded, "You like it. You like it," and told her, "Nobody [will] believe you with that uniform instead of believing me with this uniform." Id. at 22:12-22. Ms. Sanchez-Loqui testified that Mr. Raines sexually assaulted her in this manner three times over the span of approximately two months. Id. at 23:16-19, 34:19-23. Mr. Raines repeatedly told Ms. Sanchez-Loqui that she could not report his actions because no one would believe her since she was "a number" (an inmate). Id. at 22:12-22. Ms. Sanchez-Loqui did not report Mr. Raines's conduct with her, but after Ms. Riascos-Hurtado informed Ms. Sanchez-Loqui that she had been raped, as discussed above, Ms. Sanchez-Loqui, fearing that she, too, would be raped, reported Mr. Raines's conduct towards Ms. Riascos-Hurtado. Id. at 23:23-25:17.
Ms. Sanchez-Loqui pleaded guilty to certain drug and immigration related offenses in December 2005. See United States of America v. Sanchez, 04 CR 1078 (S.D.N.Y.), 12/16/2005 Minute Entry.
iv. Mr. Raines's Response To Plaintiffs' Claims
On October 13, 2007, after Ms. Sanchez-Loqui reported Mr. Raines's rape of Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, Mr. Raines resigned from the BOP. 8/9/2016 Tr. at 30:4-7. Although at trial Mr. Raines admitted to having consensual sex with Ms. Riascos-Hurtado on one occasion, he denied all other allegations of sexual contact with either Plaintiff. 8/9/2016 Tr. at 22:25-23:15. As stated above, the Court does not find Mr. Raines's testimony in this regard credible.
v. Dr. Galietta's Forensic Evaluations
At the inquest hearing, Forensic Psychologist, Dr. Michele Galietta, Ph.D., testified about the forensic evaluations she conducted of Plaintiffs, which assessed the presence of emotional distress related to the incidents with Mr. Raines, as well as the extent any damages were attributable to the incidents with Mr. Raines as opposed to other pre-existing traumas. See 8/4/2016 Tr. at 94:1-12; Galietta Riascos-Hurtado Report dated 5/1/2014 ("Galietta Riascos Report") at 1; Galietta Sanchez-Loqui Report dated 5/5/2014 ("Galietta Sanchez Report") at 1. To assist in conducting a full forensic evaluation, Dr. Galietta reviewed historical records, including court records, immigration records, prior mental health records and counseling notes from the MDC and other agencies. See 8/4/2016 Tr. at 94:1-12, 113:9-16; Galietta Riascos Report at 1; Galietta Sanchez Report at 1. In addition, Dr. Galietta administered three assessment instruments: a Personality Assessment Inventory ("PAI"); a Detailed Assessment of Post-Traumatic Stress ("DAPS"); and Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale for the DSM-IV ("CAPS"). 8/4/2016 Tr. at 95:10-22; Galietta Sanchez Report at 16; Galietta Riascos Report at 7. These instruments determine whether an individual meets the criteria for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") and compares the individual's level of symptomatology with that of other people who have experienced trauma. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 96:13-17.
The Court qualified Dr. Galietta as an expert based on her extensive education and professional experience. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 92:15-93:6.
Dr. Galietta's reports are admitted based on Dr. Galietta's confirmation during the trial that the reports accurately reflect her interviews and analysis. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 111:2-112:7; 125:18-127:18. Mr. Raines had an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Galietta and chose not to do so. Id. at 112:8-11; 130:5-7. The Court notes, however, that its conclusions would remain the same without consideration of the expert reports.
1. Forensic Evaluation Of Ms. Riascos-Hurtado
Dr. Galietta found that Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's scores on the assessments demonstrated the "most severe range" of PTSD when compared to other people who had experienced at least one major trauma. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 96:18-21. She did not find evidence that Ms. Riascos-Hurtado was malingering. Id. at 96:9-11. Dr. Galietta also found that, despite earlier traumatic stressors in Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's life – including childhood molestation, exposure to Hurricane Katrina, and domestic violence – Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's status prior to the assaults by Mr. Raines did not meet the threshold criteria for PTSD. Id. at 97:5-98:5. Specifically, Dr. Galietta found that these prior traumatic events did not meet the threshold because Ms. Riascos-Hurtado did not previously exhibit fear, horror or helplessness, which are symptoms of PTSD. Id. at 97:20-98:5, 107:17-108:8. Dr. Galietta also did not find evidence that, prior to the encounters with Mr. Raines, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado experienced depression, anxiety or any severe negative sequelae, which Dr. Galietta attributed to Ms. Riascos-Hurtado feeling that she was largely in control of her prior circumstances and could leave or escape. Id. at 97:20-98:15, 109:3-14.
For example, the childhood molestation occurred one time, and Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's parents supported her and barred the abuser from her home. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 97:14-19.
Following the incident with Mr. Raines, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado began to show recurring symptoms of PTSD, including, inter alia, emotion dysregulation, irritability, anger and dissociation. Id. at 98:16-25. Dr. Galietta found evidence indicating that Ms. Riascos-Hurtado experienced increased depression, anxiety, irritability and fear after the abuse by Mr. Raines began, even before it escalated to rape. Id. at 108:9-17. Following the rape, Dr. Galietta found evidence that Ms. Riascos-Hurtado experienced terror and nightmares, which have continued to the present. Id. The day prior to Dr. Galietta's testimony before this Court, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado reported nightmares, irritability, anger, fear and hyper-vigilance. Id. at 99:17-24. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado also reported that certain common things, such as seeing a person in uniform, being in enclosed spaces or hearing keys can trigger an anxiety response, and she has not had any social relationships with a man since her 2012 release from incarceration because she now "can't stand a man close to" her. Id. at 84:19-85:6, 104:1-6. Dr. Galietta stated that the severity of Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's PTSD symptoms may result from the fact that Ms. Riascos-Hurtado felt Mr. Raines had unfettered access to her that was completely unpredictable, creating a constant state of terror and helplessness; the fact that Mr. Raines threatened her with another trauma – solitary confinement – if she refused to comply with his demands; and the sense of injustice and loss of faith in the system that was supposed to protect her. Id. at 105:9-107:10.
Ms. Riascos-Hurtado received crisis management and psychotherapy, both while incarcerated and through probation. Id. at 83:23-84:10, 100:2-15. Dr. Galietta testified that although this type of treatment may prevent Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's symptoms from regressing, it would not be expected to remediate Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's PTSD symptoms, although she acknowledged that the severity of Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's symptoms has waxed and waned with circumstances. Id. at 100:2-103:17, 110:8-111:1. Dr. Galietta recommends that Ms. Riascos-Hurtado receive between twelve and twenty sessions of exposure therapy, costing approximately $250.00 per hour. Id. at 104:8-105:7.
2. Forensic Evaluation Of Ms. Sanchez-Loqui
Dr. Galietta's forensic evaluation of Ms. Sanchez-Loqui proved that although Ms. Sanchez-Loqui experienced an extensive history of trauma – including a prior rape, domestic violence, and multiple accidents and home invasions – her PTSD symptomatology was not as severe prior to the incidents with Mr. Raines. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 115:1-117:25. Dr. Galietta reported that, prior to her experience with Mr. Raines, Ms. Sanchez-Loqui "functioned fairly well." Id. at 117:20-21. Ms. Sanchez-Loqui reported always experiencing a little bit of sleep disturbance, but Dr. Galietta testified that Ms. Sanchez-Loqui was previously largely able to compartmentalize her traumatic experiences. Id. at 117:22-25. Dr. Galietta testified that Ms. Sanchez-Loqui's "symptoms got significantly worse after the incident with Mr. Raines despite the fact that she had already been raped before," describing Ms. Sanchez-Loqui as having "severe, severe trauma" as a result of her experience with Mr. Raines. Id. at 120:9-121:10.
Prior to her encounters with Mr. Raines, Ms. Sanchez-Loqui "described being able to feel joy and experience pleasure," but following the incidents she could not. Id. at 121:6-10. Dr. Galietta reported that Ms. Sanchez-Loqui now experienced depression, anxiety and feelings of being overwhelmed. Id. at 121:7-122:17. Dr. Galietta described Ms. Sanchez-Loqui's PTSD symptoms as profound, and stated that Ms. Sanchez-Loqui requested to sit on the side of the table facing the door when they met, now never travels alone, will not shower without her clothes on unless someone is in the room with her, and has on multiple occasions jumped out of taxis because she believed someone was trying to attack her. Id. at 121:11-20, 123:2-6. Currently, Ms. Sanchez-Loqui largely does not leave her house in Ecuador. Id. at 123:7-13. Ms. Sanchez-Loqui also informed Dr. Galietta that her boyfriend left her because he could not cope with her severe symptoms – screaming in the middle of the night during nightmares and her dependency. Id. at 124:4-9. Dr. Galietta postulated that, similar to Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, the sexual assault by Mr. Raines became Ms. Sanchez-Loqui's breaking point because of the inescapable nature of the experience and her sense of powerlessness because her abuser had unfettered, longer-term access to her, exacerbated by Mr. Raines's repeated assertions that Ms. Sanchez-Loqui would not be believed by officials. Id. at 124:11-24.
Because Ms. Sanchez-Loqui lacks access to psychotherapy in Ecuador, her PTSD symptom severity is unremittent. Id. at 122:18-23. Dr. Galietta has suggested Ms. Sanchez-Loqui receive cognitive behavioral therapy, but it is unclear whether Ms. Sanchez-Loqui would be able to access such resources. Id. at 127:11-128:11. Without therapy, Dr. Galietta suggests that Ms. Sanchez-Loqui's symptoms will not remit, although they may wax and wane with circumstances. Id. at 128:9-11, 129:18-130:2. If Ms. Sanchez-Loqui were able to obtain some form of therapy, Dr. Galietta estimated that she would require approximately sixteen to twenty sessions. Id. at 128:20-25. Mr. Raines did not offer any evidence to refute Dr. Galietta's reports and testimony.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
a. Eight Amendment Claims
"The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment by prison officials." Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1991) ). The Second Circuit has found that "sexual abuse of a prisoner by a corrections officer may in some circumstances violate the prisoner's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment." Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1997). Almost twenty years later, the Court of Appeals confirmed that a "corrections officer's intentional contact with an inmate's genitalia or other intimate area, which serves no penological purpose and is undertaken with the intent to gratify the officer's sexual desire or to humiliate the inmate, violates the Eighth Amendment." Crawford, 796 F.3d at 254. "[T]he principal inquiry is whether the contact is incidental to legitimate official duties ... or by contrast whether it is undertaken to arouse or gratify the officer or humiliate the inmate." Crawford, 796 F.3d at 257-58.
Two requirements must be met to find an officer violated the Eighth Amendment. See Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861. The first element requires an inmate to "allege that the defendant acted with a subjectively ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’ " Crawford, 796 F.3d at 256 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) ). The abuse inflicted by a corrections officer against an inmate may itself be sufficient evidence of a culpable state of mind "[w]here no legitimate law enforcement or penological purpose can be inferred from the defendant's alleged conduct." Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861. The second element requires an inmate to "allege that the conduct was objectively ‘harmful enough’ or ‘sufficiently serious’ to reach constitutional dimensions." Crawford, 796 F.3d at 256 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. 995 ). "[T]here can be no doubt that severe or repetitive sexual abuse of an inmate by a prison officer can be ‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ enough to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation." Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861.
Mr. Raines's conduct here unquestionably rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Crawford, 796 F.3d at 257-58 (holding that plaintiff successfully alleged an Eighth Amendment claim based on a corrections officer fondling and squeezing his penis to check whether Plaintiff had an erection); see also Cash, 2009 WL 3199558, at *2 (finding that where a plaintiff was incarcerated, she lacked the ability to consent to engage in sexual intercourse with a guard, so even if the sexual intercourse was physically consensual, it could constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment). Sexually motivated touching of an inmate's genitals is not permitted under the Constitution. See Crawford, 796 F.3d at 258. Here, Mr. Raines's contact with his hands and genitalia with Plaintiffs' genitalia and other intimate areas was for his own sexual gratification and served no possible penological purpose. Under Boddie (and consistent with Crawford ), his conduct violates the Eighth Amendment.
b. Battery
"Under New York law, the intentional tort of battery is committed when a ‘person intentionally touches another, without that person's consent, and causes an offensive bodily contact.’ " Bryant v. Berkowitz, No. 13 Civ. 3962 (LDW), 2016 WL 1258830, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2016) (citing New York Pattern Jury Instructions 2d (" NY PJI") 3:3 ). "The intent must be to cause bodily contact that a reasonable person would find offensive." Id. Here, Mr. Raines engaged in "an intentional wrongful physical contact with [Plaintiffs] without consent." Noonan v. Becker, No. 14 Civ. 4084 (LTS) (JLC), 2017 WL 3638201, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2017) (" Noonan I"). Accordingly, his conduct constitutes a battery under New York law. See id. at *7 (finding a police officer liable for assault and battery under New York law where plaintiff alleged she "was placed in fear of imminent harmful or offensive contact, and was the target of [d]efendant's sexual misconduct, sexually assaulted and battered, harassed, and raped by [d]efendant").
The Court holds that Mr. Raines violated the Eighth Amendment and committed multiple instances of battery as to each Plaintiff such that he is liable to them for the damages caused, as discussed, infra.
III. DAMAGES
a. Compensatory Damages
"Compensatory damages may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such injuries as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering." Noonan v. Becker, No. 14 Civ. 4084 (LTS) (JLC), 2018 WL 1738746, at *4 (Apr. 10, 2018) (" Noonan II") (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) ), R & R adopted, 2018 WL 2088279 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2018) ; see Doe v. HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, Saudi Oger Ltd., No 13 Civ. 571 (RWS), 2017 WL 4541426, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2017) ("Compensatory damages recoverable for sexual assault ... include compensation for the injury itself, conscious pain and suffering including mental and emotional anxiety which can be based on the plaintiff's subjective testimony plus special damages, which need not be pleaded." (quotation marks & citation omitted)). "The Supreme Court has acknowledged and this Court similarly recognizes that ‘[s]hort of homicide, [sexual assault] is the ultimate violation of self." HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426, at *4 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) ). Although there is no precise formula by which emotional distress claims can be reduced to a monetary value, " ‘[c]ourts in this Circuit and State have upheld large compensatory damage awards for sexual assault and rape victims, yet interestingly, such awards vary drastically—even where cases share similar facts.’ " Noonan II, 2018 WL 1738746, at *5 (quoting HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426 (canvassing cases)). Prior awards involving similar torts or similar injuries may provide useful guidance or a frame of reference, although damage awards in analogous cases do not control the court's assessment of the specific circumstances in an individual case. See HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426, at *4.
In a recent case concerning sexual violence by an officer, Noonan II, the court conducted a thorough canvas of damages awarded in sexual assault cases in this Circuit. See Noonan II, 2018 WL 1738746, at *5-7. In Noonan II, the court assessed damages for a plaintiff who had been pulled over by the defendant police officer. She was subjected to harassment and invasive behavior by the defendant at the police precinct, including defendant making inappropriate comments regarding her appearance, making a video recording of her body while she changed and requiring her to use the restroom with the door open. See Noonan II, 2018 WL 1738746, at *1. The defendant provided the plaintiff with his personal cellphone number and directed her to call him, indicating that he could help resolve her case and implicitly threatening to harm her case if she did not comply with his request. Id. The plaintiff agreed to meet the defendant at a restaurant and began to feel groggy after consuming a drink. Id. The defendant took the plaintiff to his home and sexually assaulted her, leaving bruising and lacerations on the plaintiff's body. Id. at *1-2. The plaintiff suffered serious emotional harm after the assault, describing feeling scared, vulnerable, anxious and depressed. Id. at *3. She described feeling nervous around men in general and police officers in particular, and she was diagnosed with depression, anxiety and PTSD. Id.
In conducting its canvas of sexual assault cases, the Noonan II Court found that many assault or rape cases involving law enforcement defendants awarded compensatory damages in the range of $250,000-$500,000, but that several cases in this Circuit awarded significantly more in compensatory damages when the sexual assault was committed by a private individual. Id. at *6-7 (collecting cases). The Noonan II Court found that comparison of these cases suggested "that some of the recent awards in sexual assault cases involving law enforcement defendants may be unduly low," and awarded the plaintiff $1,000,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at *7.
Here, the Court finds Mr. Raines liable to each Plaintiff for $1,500,000 in compensatory damages. Although the underlying acts committed by Mr. Raines with respect to each Plaintiff were different in character, based on Plaintiffs' and Dr. Galietta's testimony, the impact and resulting damage of the conduct was equally severe. This compensatory damage amount takes into consideration Plaintiffs' and Dr. Galietta's testimony regarding the psychological and emotional harm suffered by Plaintiffs, which has persisted for years after the abuse.
"When a plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983 and also brings state law claims seeking damages for the same injuries, where the plaintiff will be sufficiently compensated by a damage award on the § 1983 claims, a court conducting an inquest need not separately award damages on the state claims." Noonan II, 2018 WL 1738746, at *4. Here, the Court awards damages to Plaintiffs for Mr. Raines's violation of the Eighth Amendment and does not separately award duplicate damages for battery.
With respect to Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, Dr. Galietta testified that, as a result of Mr. Raines's multiple sexual assaults and rapes, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado experienced PTSD in the "most severe range" compared to other people who experienced at least one major life trauma. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 96:18-21. She further testified that Ms. Riascos-Hurtado has shown recurring symptoms of PTSD, including emotion dysregulation, irritability, anger and disassociation, and that following the rape, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado experienced terror, nightmares and hyper-vigilance. Id. at 98:16-25, 99:17-24, 108:9-17. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado reported that her anxiety response is triggered by common things – seeing a person in uniform, being in enclosed spaces or hearing keys – and that she has not been able to have social relationships with men since her 2012 release from incarceration because she is not comfortable being close to a man. Id. at 84:19-85:6, 104:1-6. In one notable instance, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado described a male co-worker cornering her in a freezer, at which time she described to Dr. Galietta "depersonalization and seeing his face ‘morph into evil.’ " Galietta Riascos Report at 8. Ms. Riascos-Hurtado indicated that she became confused about where she was and felt terrified. Id. She was later told that she screamed and ran away. Id. During her evaluation, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado "endorsed a number of [assessment] items related to episodic thoughts of suicide and wishes to die, although she denied suicidal intent and plan when asked." Id. Dr. Galietta concluded that, in addition to being in the most severe range of symptomology for PTSD, Ms. Riascos-Hurtado's functional impairment could also be classified as severe. Id.; see also 8/4/2016 Tr. at 96:18-21. Dr. Galietta concluded that Ms. Riascos-Hurtado "has experienced a significant decrease in quality of life" as a result of her experiences with Mr. Raines. Galietta Riascos Report at 8-9.
With respect to Ms. Sanchez-Loqui, Dr. Galietta testified that Mr. Raines's conduct severely exacerbated her pre-existing PTSD symptomology. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 115:1-117:25, 120:9-121:10. Ms. Sanchez-Loqui, who previously functioned fairly well, id. at 117:20-21, developed severe and profound PTSD symptoms, and reported experiencing depression, anxiety, and feelings of being overwhelmed, id. at 120:9-121:10, 121:7-123:6. The emotional and psychological harm was so significant that Ms. Sanchez-Loqui is no longer able to travel alone, is largely home-bound, at times showers in her clothing, and was unable to maintain a romantic relationship because of the severity of her symptomology. Id. at 121:11-20, 123:2-13, 124:4-9. Dr. Galietta stated in her report that the "clinical assessment indicated a woman living a very limited existence." Galietta Sanchez Report at 17. The day-to-day impact of Ms. Sanchez-Loqui's experiences with Mr. Raines is evident from Dr. Galietta's report, which states that Ms. Sanchez-Loqui experiences "considerable daily emotional distress" and makes "considerable efforts to avoid things that would make her fearful, so much so that she felt like a prisoner in her own home." Id. at 18; see also 8/4/2016 Tr. at 121:11-122:18. This avoidance of situations that evoke fear has left Ms. Sanchez-Loqui essentially trapped in her own home and has prevented her from leaving Ecuador to be with her children, adversely affecting her familial relationships, particularly those with her children. Galietta Sanchez Report at 16, 20; see also 8/4/2016 Tr. at 121:21-25. Dr. Galietta further noted that Ms. Sanchez-Loqui's answers to questions about her sexual relationships "indicated marked interference by her PTSD symptoms," including frequent freezing during sexual intercourse and distrust of men. Galietta Sanchez Report at 17-18; see also 8/4/2016 Tr. at 124:5-9. The record as a whole supports a finding that Mr. Raines's conduct profoundly harmed Ms. Sanchez-Loqui and damaged Ms. Sanchez-Loqui's most basic ability to function in day-to-day life.
In cases involving comparably severe conduct and harms, including Noonan II and cases involving non-law enforcement defendants, courts in this Circuit have in some instances awarded compensatory damages between $1,000,000 and $3,000,000. See Ortiz v. NYC Housing Auth., No. 98 Civ. 9543, 198 F.3d 234, at *1, 4 (2d Cir Sept. 2, 1999) (summary order) (upholding jury award of $3,000,000 in compensatory damages against NYCHA and for plaintiff who was raped in a NYCHA low-income housing project); Noonan II, 2018 WL 1738746, at *7 (awarding on default judgment $1,000,000 in compensatory damages against defendant officer who sexually assaulted arrestee); HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426, at *1 (granting summary judgment and awarding $1,250,000 in compensatory damages where layperson defendant raped plaintiff); Kukla v. Syfus Leasing Corp., 928 F. Supp. 1328, 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding jury award of $1,350,000 for past and future pain and suffering in negligence action brought against a hotel where plaintiff was raped). Here, a significant award is appropriate because each Plaintiff suffered multiple attacks (as compared to each of the previously cited cases in which the plaintiffs each experienced a single or temporally discrete sexual assault), with inappropriate touching, digital penetration and/or forcible intercourse, as well as threats of future harm for failing to maintain silence. In addition, Mr. Raines's position as a corrections officer was an exacerbating factor with respect to compensatory damages. It resulted in Plaintiffs' loss of trust in an institution that was supposed to protect them and exacerbated the resulting PTSD by creating feelings of extreme helplessness due to Mr. Raines's unfettered and unpredictable access to Plaintiffs at the MDC and, with respect to Ms. Riascos-Hurtado, his threats to punish her with solitary confinement if she did not comply with his demands. 8/4/2016 Tr. at 62:6-10, 70:13-18, 105:9-107:10, 124:11-24. The harms suffered by Plaintiffs are convincingly established both through their testimony and through the detailed professional analysis conducted by their expert, Dr. Galietta.
In reaching an amount of compensatory damages, the Court has been careful not to compensate Plaintiffs for distress they may experience as a result of other non-related events. Although both Plaintiffs experienced some traumatic incidents previous to the events discussed herein, including periods of incarceration other than those in which Mr. Raines was present, the Court is satisfied, based on Dr. Galietta's reasoned and thorough testimony, that the severe PTSD symptoms that both Plaintiffs have experienced since their encounters with Mr. Raines are primarily a result of his sexually abusive conduct. Their emotional trauma here was greatly heightened because they suffered the assaults themselves (of which there were several), and, as discussed above, the unremitting fear of being assaulted again and the powerlessness of being unable to protect themselves in the face of Mr. Raines's position of authority and his "unfettered access" to Plaintiffs. Id. at 105:9-107:10, 124:11-24; see Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 814 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The emotional distress of the sexual abuse inflicted in this case is inevitably aggravated by the fact that the acts were committed by a jailor upon an inmate in his custody.").
For the foregoing reasons, each Plaintiff is awarded $1,500,000 in compensatory damages against Mr. Raines. The Court notes that in determining this amount, the Court considers that Plaintiffs have already received some compensation by way of their settlement with the United States. ECF No. 83.
Although Mr. Raines may not have the resources to make full payment to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs are still entitled to judgment and the possibility of enforcement. See HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426, at *6 n.1 (awarding plaintiff $1,250,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages based on a sexual assault despite the defendant's assertion that he had "no personal fortune, real estate or any worth mentioning property").
b. Punitive Damages
"Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 case ‘when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’ " Mathie, 121 F.3d at 815 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) ). The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter others. Id. at 817. Here, the "egregious, wanton and malicious nature of the acts committed ... warrant the award of punitive damages" for both Plaintiffs. See Mathie v. Fries, 935 F. Supp. 1284, 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding punitive damages appropriate where an officer defendant sexually assaulted and anally raped an inmate), rev'd in part, 121 F.3d at 818 ; see Noonan II, 2018 WL 1738746, at *8 (awarding punitive damages where an officer defendant harassed and sexually assaulted a woman he had arrested); HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426, at *6-7 (awarding punitive damages where a layperson raped the plaintiff in a hotel room).
In evaluating a punitive damages award, a court considers three guideposts: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the tortious conduct; (2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages; and (3) the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 120 (2d Cir. 2006). In addition, no matter how egregious the underlying conduct, the court is required to consider the defendant's financial circumstances in determining an award of punitive damages. See id. at 121. Because "one purpose of punitive damages is deterrence, and ... deterrence is directly related to what people can afford to pay," the court should not impose a punitive damages award that would "result in the financial ruin of the defendant or constitute a disproportionately large percentage of the defendant's net worth." Id. at 122.
Mr. Raines's conduct was not only personally reprehensible, but as an officer, it was an egregious breach of the public trust. See Noonan II, 2018 WL 1738746, at *8 (finding an officer defendant's sexual assault of a woman he had arrested "egregious misconduct" and "in breach of the public trust"). His conduct was made more offensive based on his apparent belief that his position of authority would protect him from accountability, as evidenced by his statements that Plaintiffs would not be believed over him because of his position as an officer and their position as inmates. See, e.g., 8/4/2016 Tr. at 22:12-22 (Ms. Sanchez-Loqui testified that Mr. Raines repeatedly told her that no one would believe her if she reported him because she was an inmate and he was an officer); Galietta Riascos Report at 4 (Ms. Riascos-Hurtado informed Dr. Galietta that Mr. Raines told her she would not be believed because he was "the one with the uniform"). See HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426, at *7 ("The Defendant's conduct is made even more objectionable based on his belief that his relationship to the Prince of Saudi Arabia would keep him out of the reach of the law, as evidenced by his remark that the Plaintiff ‘Go ahead, call the police.’ "). "The purpose of punitive damages is to deter and punish exactly this attitude and conduct." Id. Mr. Raines's conduct described above merits an award of punitive damages.
The burden to show that financial circumstances warrant a limitation of an award for punitive damages is on the defendant, here Mr. Raines. Patterson, 440 F.3d at 122. Mr. Raines did not provide testimony or evidence during the inquest hearing regarding his financial circumstances. In light of Mr. Raines's pro se status and the unusual process by which this case reached a bench trial (namely, retroactively converting a damages inquest on a motion for default judgment into a bench trial), the Court considers financial information provided to the Court by Mr. Raines in a subsequent conference held on September 14, 2018 (the "September Conference"). Mr. Raines stated during the September Conference that he receives $2,600 per month, or approximately $31,200 per year, in tax-free income from the Veterans Administration and Social Security. 9/14/2018 Tr., ECF No. 118 at 5:19-24, 8:15-25. He further stated that he does not have any savings or assets, but he would "be willing" to pay one hundred dollars a month. Id. at 6:2-6, 10:25-11:1, 12:22-23.
This information mirrors that which Mr. Raines provided in a sworn statement in connection with his request for appointment of counsel. ECF No. 116. Mr. Raines's financial limitations are also evident from the transcript of Mr. Raines's sentencing in his criminal case, in which the Court stated that Mr. Raines would likely be unable to pay both a fine and restitution. United State of America v. Raines, 11 CR 641, ECF No. 50 at 23:15-24.
In light of Mr. Raines's financial circumstances, the Court is constrained in its award of punitive damages. Taking into account the seriousness of Mr. Raines's misconduct and his financial circumstances, a punitive damages award of $30,000 for each Plaintiff is appropriate in this case. This amount is only two percent of the total compensatory damages awarded to Plaintiffs, but it represents almost two years of Mr. Raines's total income such that it should sufficiently deter Mr. Raines from engaging in any similar conduct. It is also in line with other punitive damages awards that consider a defendant's limited financial abilities. See Patterson, 440 F.3d at 122 (finding that, where a defendant earned an annual salary of approximately $37,632 at the time of verdict, an earlier W-2 showed $45,821.57 in wages, defendant held a mortgage, had debt in excess of $5,000, and was married with two children, no more than $10,000 was appropriate for punitive damages for a single, racially motivated assault); CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 706 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming a punitive damages award constituting 55% of the defendants net worth in light of the defendants "willful misconduct" in destroying property, despite acknowledging that the award would cause "financial hardship" to the defendant); Menghi v. Hart, 745 F. Supp. 2d 89, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (reducing a $2,000,000 jury award of punitive damages to $100,000 where the defendant – accused of using a police database to obtain contact information and make harassing phone calls to the plaintiff – testified that he made $10 per hour, and the court extrapolated from that a $20,800 annual salary); Henderson, 2008 WL 11454792, at *7 (finding punitive damages beyond $35,000 against defendant officers who assaulted an inmate excessive where defendants were "not wealthy men," but one earned a substantial salary and the other likely had some equity in his house).
Courts often incorporate the three guideposts, including the reprehensibility of the tortious conduct, into the analysis of whether, in light of the defendant's financial circumstances, a punitive damages award is grossly excessive. See Henderson v. Young, No. 05 Civ. 0234 (VRW) (WAF), 2008 WL 11454792, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2008).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Raines is liable to Ms. Riascos-Hurtado for damages in the amount of $1,530,000, of which $1,500,000 are compensatory damages and $30,000 are punitive damages. Mr. Raines is liable to Ms. Sanchez-Loqui for damages in the amount of $1,530,000, of which $1,500,000 are compensatory damages and $30,000 are punitive damages. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment for Plaintiffs. The Clerk of Court is to provide Mr. Raines with information as to his appellate rights. The Court will mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to Mr. Raines at 259-61 148th Road, Rosedale, New York 11422.
Plaintiffs' counsel may apply for attorneys' fees within fourteen (14) days of this Order. Any application should not request duplicate payment for work already compensated for by the settlement with the United States.
SO ORDERED.