Opinion
1:99CV0374
August 1, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Ri Ra Holdings, LLC's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Reconsideration [Document #30]. Pursuant to its Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff seeks to have the Court reevaluate a May 16, 2002 Order [Document #29] in which Plaintiff's Motion to Show Cause [Document #10] was denied. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A detailed factual account of this case is contained in the Court's May 16, 2002 Memorandum Opinion [Document #28]. As a result, a complete factual history of this matter is not necessary. That notwithstanding, the Court notes that Plaintiff originally filed suit against Defendants Ri Ra, Madra Mor, Inc., Kevin Treanor, and Joseph McCabe (collectively "Defendants") for trademark infringement based on their admitted use of the "Ri Ra" mark. Sometime after securing a permanent injunction against Defendants' use of the "Ri Ra" mark, Plaintiff learned of the presence of three signs bearing the "Ri Ra" name that remained at Defendants' establishment in Boston. On September 21, 2001, then, Plaintiff filed its Motion to Show Cause, seeking to have Defendants held in civil contempt. With its Motion to Show Cause, Plaintiff also sought to recover substantial damages from Defendants to fund a corrective advertising campaign. On May 16, 2002, however, this Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Show Cause primarily because Plaintiff failed to show any harm that resulted from the presence of the three signs. Thereafter, on June 12, 2002, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration, hoping to convince the Court to reevaluate its decision and grant Plaintiff's Motion to Show Cause.
Defendants removed the three signs immediately after Plaintiff filed its Motion to Show Cause, claiming that they had previously been overlooked.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed its Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, that the Court may relive a party from a judgment or order on the basis of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) see United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that the term "mistake" as used in Rule 60(b) can apply, in appropriate circumstances, to a mistake made by the court). As noted by Plaintiff, when directed at the court, the purpose of such a motion is to provide "the district court [an opportunity] to correct an erroneous [order or] judgment and thereby avoid the necessity of an appeal." United States v. Jones, 42 F. Supp.2d 618, 620 (W.D.N.C. 1999). It is important to recognize, however, that Rule 60(b) provides for extraordinary relief that is only to be provided upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1979). With that in mind, the Court will now consider the merit of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
In support of its Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff essentially proffers three arguments. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that this Court erred because it:
1) required Plaintiff to demonstrate actual consumer confusion; 2) denied Plaintiff's Motion to Show Cause because of a failure to show harm; and 3) required Plaintiff to prove some level of quantifiable harm.
With respect to Plaintiff's first claim, that the Court required a showing of actual consumer confusion, Plaintiff quotes a portion of the Court's May 16, 2002 Memorandum Opinion as stating that "`Plaintiff has failed to indicate . . . how this alleged public confusion translates into any sort to compensable harm.'" (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Reconsideration, at 4 (quoting Mem. Op. [Document #28], at 14).) To the extent that Plaintiff reads the Court's Memorandum Opinion as requiring a showing of actual consumer confusion, Plaintiff's understanding of the Court's decision is somewhat misguided. The Court did not require any showing of confusion. Rather, the Court simply required Plaintiff to establish some level of harm, a key prerequisite to a finding of contempt. The only reason confusion was mentioned is because it was identified by Plaintiff as the basis for its showing of harm. (Mem. Op., at 14 ("Plaintiff claims that it was harmed by the three signs because they contributed to the enduring public confusion between Defendants' establishment on Beacon Street and Plaintiff's chain of Irish pubs.").) In referencing confusion, the Court was not requiring any showing of actual consumer confusion, but was, quite simply, indicating that Plaintiff's proof of harm was insufficient to support a finding of civil contempt. Therefore, Plaintiff's attempt to have this Court reconsider its prior decision on the basis of a purported confusion requirement is unpersuasive.
To support a finding of civil contempt, Plaintiff must establish the existence of the following four elements:
1) a valid decree of which Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge;
2) that the decree was in Plaintiff's favor;
3) that Defendants, by their conduct, violated the terms of the decree and had actual or constructive knowledge of such violations; and
4) that Plaintiff suffered harm as a result.
Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 301 (4th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff's second claim in support of its Motion for Reconsideration is that this Court erred in requiring Plaintiff to show harm as an element of civil contempt. Specifically, Plaintiff avers that the mere finding that an infringement has occurred is sufficient to satisfy the harm element of a claim for civil contempt. The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff's position regarding harm would essentially render the harm requirement of civil contempt superfluous, for the infringement element (the element which Plaintiff suggests should satisfy the harm requirement) is already incorporated into the elements of civil contempt. Nevertheless, Plaintiff proffers two cases, Christian Science Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ Scientist v. Robinson, 123 F. Supp.2d 965 (W.D.N.C. 2000), and Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Omega travel, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. Va. 1989), that allegedly support its contention that a showing of harm is not required for civil contempt. This Court is not convinced, though, by Plaintiff's reliance on these two cases.
The third element of civil contempt is that the defendant violated a court decree and had actual or constructive knowledge of such violation. See supra note 2.
Despite Plaintiff's assertions, neither Christian Science nor Omega hold, as a matter of law, that harm is not an element of civil contempt in the context of trademark infringement. The cases simply state that under the facts presented to the respective courts, no additional showing of harm outside of the actual infringement was required. See Christian Science, 123 F. Supp.2d at 978; Omega, 710 F. Supp. at 171. In both cases, though, the defendants virtually ignored the courts' orders.Christian Science at 977-78; Omega at 171-72. In not requiring an additional showing of harm, then, the respective courts recognized that the original harm that sewed as the basis for the imposition of the initial court-ordered injunction was still being perpetuated against the plaintiffs because the defendants had done little, if anything, to comply with the courts' orders. See generally Christian Science at 977-998;Omega at 171-72. In other words, because the same harm was still occurring, the courts did not require an additional showing of harm.
In the instant case, however, Plaintiff cannot rely on the harm that was previously established in connection with the initial injunction against Defendants' use of the "RiRa" mark because, for the most part, that harm is no longer a factor. Defendants followed the Court's injunction in all respects except for the three signs. Also, the information available to the Court suggested that Defendants had overlooked the signs, for they were removed immediately after they were brought to Defendants' attention. of course, good faith is not an automatic defense to a violation of a court order. Nevertheless, Plaintiff must show how he was harmed by the particular violation engaged in by Defendants. Because Defendants' violation was not related to its entire prior use of the "Ri Ra" mark, Plaintiff cannot simply rely on the fact that the injunction was technically violated as the basis for its alleged harm. Rather, Plaintiff must show some harm that resulted directly from the presence of the three signs. As previously indicated, to hold otherwise would render the harm element of civil contempt superfluous. Accordingly, Plaintiff's attempt to procure the Court's reconsideration of its decision on the basis of the harm element of civil contempt is not persuasive.
Plaintiff's third and final argument in support of its Motion for Reconsideration is its claim that the Court improperly required Plaintiff to prove some level of quantifiable harm. In making this argument, Plaintiff places far too much emphasis on the Court's use of the word "compensable." Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, by stating that Plaintiff failed to show any "compensable harm," the Court was not suggesting that Plaintiff must quantify its harm. The word "compensable" was used because any amount awarded in the Court's discretion must be compensatory; it cannot exceed the scope of the harm sustained lest it become punitive in nature. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 61 F.3d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 61, 139 L.Ed.2d24 (1997). Therefore, any harm suffered by plaintiff must be compensable in nature in order to support a fine, for any amount over and above a compensable level would exceed the bounds of civil contempt and reach into the realm of criminal contempt. In describing the harm as "compensable," then, the Court was properly noting that even if Plaintiff had carried its burden as to civil contempt, there was no compensable harm to serve as the basis for a discretionary, yet compensatory award. Accordingly, Plaintiff's attempt to have the Court reconsider its decision on the basis of the Court's use of the word "compensable" is wholly unpersuasive.
Notably, the fact that any amount awarded in a civil contempt proceeding must be commensurate with the harm sustained corroborates the Court's determination that harm remains an element of civil contempt.
III. CONCLUSION
As noted above, the Court is not persuaded by any of the three purported bases for reconsideration proffered by Plaintiff in support of its Motion for Reconsideration. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration [Document #30] is hereby DENIED.