Rhodes v. Tatum

6 Citing cases

  1. Davis v. O'Hara

    266 U.S. 314 (1924)   Cited 29 times
    Ruling by state supreme court that its decision was law of case does not preclude U.S. Supreme Court from re-examining the question

    Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444; Grays Harbor Co. v. Coats-Fordney Co., 243 U.S. 251, 257; Georgia Ry. Co. v. Decatur, supra, 437. General Orders Nos. 18 and 18-A were held invalid in Friesen v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. (U.S.D.C. Neb., Dec. 27, 1918), 254 F. 875; Haubert v. Baltimore O.R. Co. (U.S.D.C. Ohio, Sept. 3, 1919), 259 F. 361; El Paso S.W.R.R. Co. v. Lovick (Feb. 11, 1920), 110 Tex. 244, affirming Tex. Civ. App. (March 6, 1919), 210 S.W. 283, and overruling Rhodes v. Tatum (Tex.Civ.App. Oct. 16, 1918), 206 S.W. 114. See Benjamin Moore Co. v. Atchison, etc. Ry. Co. (N.Y.S.C., January, 1919), 174 N.Y.S. 60. And they were held valid in Wainwright v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (U.S.D.C. Mo., Oct. 22, 1918), 253 F. 459; Cocker v. New York, O. W. Ry. Co. (U.S.D.C.N.Y., June 15, 1918), 253 F. 676; Johnson v. McAdoo (U.S.D.C. La., May 8, 1919), 257 F. 757; Klein v. Director General (N.Y.S.C., February 20, 1920), 180 N.Y.S. 618.

  2. CRIM v. LOUISVILLE N. R. R. CO

    206 Ala. 110 (Ala. 1921)   Cited 18 times

    "Subject to the provisions of General Orders Nos. 18, 18-A and 26 [declaring venue of certain actions to be where the plaintiff resides at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, or in the county or district where the cause of action arose, and for the staying of the action during federal control on proper application therefor. Rhodes v. Tatum (Tex.Civ.App.) 206 S.W. 114; Wainwright v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (D.C.) 253 Fed. 459], heretofore issued by the Director General of Railroads, service of process in any such action, suit or proceeding may be made upon operating officials operating for the Director General of Railroads, the railroad or other carrier in respect of which the cause of action arises in the same way as service was heretofore made upon like operating officials for such railroad or other carrier company. "The pleadings in all such actions at law, suits in equity, or proceedings in admiralty, now pending against any carrier company for a cause of action arising since December 31, 1917, based upon a cause of action arising from or out of the operation of any railroad or other carrier, may on application be amended by substituting the Director General of Railroads for the carrier company as party defendant and dismissing the company therefrom."

  3. El Paso & Southwestern Railroad v. Lovick

    218 S.W. 489 (Tex. 1920)   Cited 6 times

    rders Nos. 18 and 26) by appellant are inconsistent with and contrary to that portion of the Act of March 21, 1918, which provides: "Actions at law or suits in equity may be brought by and against such carriers and judgment rendered as now provided by law." Act Congress Aug. 29, 1916, Fed. Stat. Ann. Pam. Supp., Oct., 1916, p. 24; Act Congress approved March 21, 1918, Fed. Stat. Ann. Pam. Supp., January, April, 1918, page 10; Sec. 1, Act of Congress, Apr. 22, 1908, 8 Fed. Stat. Ann., 1208; Order No. 18, Official Bulletin, April 9, 1918, p. 1; Proclamation of President, Official Bulletin, Dec. 27, 1917, page 1; Proclamation of President, Official Bulletin, April 2, 1918 page 3; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316; Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268; Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 495-506-507; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470; Inter Mountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476; First National Bank v. Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416; Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366; Rhodes v. Tatum, 206 S.W. 114. The Court of Civil Appeals erred in overruling plaintiff in error's motion for continuance based upon General Order No. 26. Same authorities.

  4. Acme Refining Co. v. State

    86 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)   Cited 2 times

    Gulf, C. S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 56 Tex.Civ.App. 353, 120 S.W. 1028; Atlas Pipe Line Co. v. Sterling (D.C.) 4 F. Supp. 441; Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062, 86 A. L. R. 403; Bandini Pet. Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 284 U.S. 8, 52 S.Ct. 103, 76 L.Ed. 136, 78 A. L. R. 826; Railroad Commission v. H. T. C. Ry. Co., 90 Tex. 340, 38 S.W. 750; State v. Blue Diamond Oil Corporation (Tex.Civ.App.) 76 S.W.2d 852; Railroad Commission v. Tyler Texas Oil Refining Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 80 S.W.2d 500; Railroad Commission v. D.C. D. Archer (Tex.Civ.App.) 80 S.W.2d 506; Rhodes v. Tatum (Tex.Civ.App.) 206 S.W. 114; Plymouth Company v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 34 S.Ct. 359, 58 L.Ed. 713; Danciger Oil Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 49 S.W.2d 837. The case is affirmed.

  5. Baker v. Bell

    219 S.W. 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)   Cited 9 times

    Certainly there was no coordinate operation or dual authority established by the evidence. Muir v. Railway Co. (D.C.) 247 F. 888; Wainwright v. Railway Co. (D.C.) 253 F. 459; Cocker v. Railroad Co. (D.C.) 253 F. 676; Harnick v. Railroad Co. (D.C.) 254 F. 748; Rutherford v. Railroad Co. (D.C.) 254 F. 880; Dahn v. Director General et al. (D.C.) 256 F. 549; Jensen v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co. (D.C.) 255 F. 795; Rhodes v. Tatum, 206 S.W. 114; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. N. D. 250 U.S. 135, 39 Sup.Ct. 502, 63 L.Ed. 897; Brady v. C. G. W. R. R. Co., 114 F. 100-107, 52 C.C.A. 48, 57 L.R.A. 712; Mardis v. Director General (D.C.) 258 F. 945; Haubert v. Baltimore O. R. Co. (D.C.) 259 F. 361; El Paso S.W. Ry. Co. v. Lovick, 210 S.W. 285; Jensen v. Lehigh Ry. Co. (D.C.) 255 F. 795; Dantzler Lum. Co. v. T. P., 119 Miss. 328, 80 So. 770, 4 A.L.R. 1669; Lavalle v. Railway (Minn.) 172 N.W. 918, 4 A.L.R. 1659; McGregor v. Railway (N.D.) 172 N.W. 841, 4 A.L.R. 1635; Gowan v. McAdoo (Minn.)

  6. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ryan

    214 S.W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919)   Cited 8 times

    This last book cited is not before us, but seems entirely in point as copied in appellee's brief. We do not think the case of Rhodes v. Tatum, 206 S.W. 115 and Wainwright v. Penn. Ry. (D.C.) 253 F. 459, and other cases cited by appellant, are to the contrary of what we hold. We overrule the above-named assignments.