Implicit in Tennessee ademption cases is the notion that the two parts of this definition each respectively correspond to the two types of ademption recognized in Tennessee, ademption by satisfaction and ademption by extinction. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Kebke, 179 Tenn. 480, 167 S.W.2d 345 (1943) (ademption by satisfaction case). The present case involves the issue of ademption by extinction.

However, in cases of ademption by extinction the rule prevails without regard to the intention of the testator or the hardship of the case, and is predicated upon the principle that the subject of the gift is annihilated or its condition so altered that nothing remains to which the terms of the bequest can apply." Phillip's Pritchard on Wills and Estates. Sec. 426, pp. 403-04; Rhodes v. Kebke, 179 Tenn. 480, 167 S.W.2d 345; Wiggins v. Cheatham, 143 Tenn. 406, 225 S.W. 1040, 1041, 13 A.L.R. 169. There is no presumption of implied revocation of a devise where, as in this case, the testator conveys the property to the devisee and reacquires possession and title to the same property, or part of it.

The doctrine of ademption by satisfaction "refers to the situation in which the testator gives in his lifetime to a legatee what he had left him in his will." In re Estate of Hume, 984 S.W.2d at 604 (citing Rhodes v. Kebke, 179 Tenn. 480, 167 S.W.2d 345, 348 (1943)). It is a general rule that ademption by extinction is not a matter of intent and therefore evidence of a testator's purpose in effecting an extinction of a legacy is irrelevant.

8 Leigh 614, 617; 170 N.Y. 388, 58 L.R.A. 719; 57 Am. Jur. 1086. Messrs. Blackwell, Sullivan Wilson, of Laurens, and Willard D. Campbell, of Columbus, Ohio, for Respondents cite: As to the rules applicable to construction of wills andas to the bequests of personal property by instant will notbeing specific legacies: 57 Am. Jur.; 139 Wise 301 (N.Y.) 248; N.Y. Supp. 472; 145 Ga. 140; 210 S.C. 319; 210 S.C. 391; 173 S.C. 365; 193 S.C. 108; 67 S.C. 168; Speer's Equity 48; 167 S.W.2d 345; 247 N.Y.S. 386, 388, 139 Misc. 513; 170 N.E. 20, 21, 201 Ind. 593; 183 N.E. 717, 282 Mass. 25, 88 A.L.R. 551; 300 N.Y.S. 826, 165 Misc. 165; 171 N.W. 747, 749, 186 Iowa 649; 268 S.W. 32, 34, 167 Ark. 622; 146 A. 439, 440, 128 Me. 191; 184 A. 400, 14 N.J. Misc. 260; 105 P.2d 31, 32, 5 Wn.2d 254; 44 S.E.2d 659, 665; 92 Col. 1, 17 P.2d 311; Alexander on Wills, Vol. 2, 979, Sec. 653; 37 Fed. 750; 149 Fla.; 6 So.2d 274; 73 W. Va. 96, 102; (N.J.) 42 A. 1049; 57 Am. Jur., General Legacies, Sec. 1402. The following is the opinion of Judge Griffith in the Court below:

Tennessee's ademption landscape is rich with rulings based upon the well recognized protocol of "distinguishing the facts" of each case. See Rhodes v. Kebke, 179 Tenn. 480, 167 S.W.2d 345, 349-50 (1943) (holding an ademption had not occurred based upon a finding that although the testator no longer had a legal interest in specifically bequeathed shares of stock at his death, he had an equitable interest therein which "ought to pass to the beneficiary under the terms of the will"); Wiggins v. Cheatham, 143 Tenn. 406, 225 S.W. 1040, 1042 (1920) (holding the bequest of a liquor business had not been adeemed, stating: "the fact that the testator was not actually engaged in business at the time of his death did not destroy the specific character of the property intended to be bequeathed in his will . . ." because it "was subject to identification.

In such a situation, the testator's intent is critical. Rhodes v. Kebke, 179 Tenn. 480, 167 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tenn. 1943). Ademption by extinction occurs, however, when the disposition of property bequeathed in the will during the testator's lifetime interferes with the ability to carry out the terms of the will; it occurs without regard to the intent of the testator.

By comparison, the doctrine of ademption by satisfaction "refers to the situation in which the testator `gives in his lifetime to a legatee what he had left him in his will.'" Id. (citing Rhodes v. Kebke, 167 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tenn. 1943)). The main difference between these two doctrines is that under the doctrine of ademption by satisfaction, the intent of the testator is "relevant to determine whether the testator's action regarding the legatee `amounts to a withdrawal of the gift from the operation of the will.'"

The University insists that the devise to Ms. Klank was adeemed by the foreclosure and sale. The most recent opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court on ademption is Rhodes v. Kebke, 179 Tenn. 480, 167 S.W.2d 345 (1943). In that case, the will, executed on July 3, 1935, contained the following provision:

This mechanistic form-substance test ignores the intention of the parties and is the majority rule. See, generally: In re Moore's Estate (1955), 135 Cal.App.2d 122, 286 P.2d 939; Alexander v. House (1947), 133 Conn. 725, 54 A.2d 510; In re Keeler (1938), 225 Iowa 1349, 282 N.W. 362; Wyckoff v. Perrine (1883), 37 N.J. Eq. 118; Grogan v. Ashe (1911), 156 N.C. 286, 72 S.E. 372; Hoke v. Herman (1853), 21 Pa. 301; Rhodes v. Kebke (1943), 179 Tenn. 480, 167 S.W.2d 345; In re Barrows (1931), 103 Vt. 501, 156 A. 408; Hill v. Hill (1920), 127 Va. 341, 103 S.E. 605; Eddington v. Turner (1944 Del.), 38 A.2d 738; Eisenschenk v. Fowler (1955 Fla.), 82 So.2d 876 Thompson v. Long (1947), 202 Ga. 718, 44 S.E.2d 651; In re Wright's Will (1960), 7 N.Y.2d 365, 165 N.E.2d 561; In re Kamba's Estate (1938), 230 Wis. 246, 282 N.W. 570; Seifert v. Kepner (1962), 227 Md. 517, 177 A.2d 859; Warren v. Shoemaker (1965 Ohio), 207 N.E.2d 419; Walsh v. Gillespie (1959), 338 Mass. 278, 154 N.E.2d 906; Lenzen v. Miller (1941), 309 Ill. App. 617, 33 N.E.2d 765; 6 Page on Wills § 54.15 (Bowe and Parker ed. 1962); 6 Powell, Law of Real Property 548; Note, Ademption by Extinction: The Form and Substance Test, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1085 (1953). An enlightening discussion of the Modern Rule can be found in In re Wright's Will, supra.