Opinion
Civil Action 23-5093
06-14-2024
CHARLES RHOADS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE BERKS COUNTY JAIL SYSTEM, et al., Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION PAMELA A. CARLOS
PAMELA A. CARLOS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
While awaiting trial in state court on a variety of charges, Petitioner Charles Rhoads filed in federal court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking release from custody until his state cases were resolved. But in the intervening months since his habeas petition was filed, Mr. Rhoads has entered a nolo contendere to one of the charges and the remainder of the charges were dismissed. Consequently, he is no longer in pretrial custody, rendering his habeas petition is moot. For this reason, I respectfully recommend that the petition be dismissed without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 14, 2023, Mr. Rhoads was arrested on charges of robbery, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and harassment. See Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. Rhoads, CP-06-CR-0003724-2023 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.) (publicly accessed docket sheet). He was also charged in an indirect criminal contempt matter. Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. Rhoads, CP-06-MD-001492-2023 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.) (publicly accessed docket sheet). His bail was set at $20,000 for both the criminal case and the contempt case, but he could not post the required amount and so he remained in custody at Berks County Prison. See Docket Sheets, Commonwealth v. Rhoads, CP-06-CR-0003724-2023, CP-06-MD-001492-2023.
Based on Mr. Rhoads' pro se filings, it appears that this matter related to an alleged violation of a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order. See, e.g., Doc. No. 11, at 2.
While in prison and awaiting trial, Mr. Rhoads filed numerous pro se motions and letters in state court. See id. Among these are letters to the presiding judge requesting bail reductions, a speedy trial, a hearing, and emergency relief. See Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. Rhoads, CP-06-CR-0003724-2023. Many of these letters were later dismissed. See id.
Despite having legal representation from the Berks County Public Defender's Office, Mr. Rhoads still submitted these filings pro se.
Apparently unsatisfied with progression of his cases in state court, Mr. Rhoads then came to federal court, in December 2023, to pursue a pro se habeas petition. See Doc. No. 2. In his revised petition, Mr. Rhoads raised four grounds for relief: (1) the state court judges set an unlawful bail amount (and failed to respond to certain related motions); (2) the state court judges failed to respond to “medical necessities”; (3) his public defender failed to act in his best interests in violation of the Sixth Amendment; and (4) his “major motions” have “gone completely unanswered.” See Doc. No. 11, at 3-6. According to his petition, the only relief he sought was “[r]elease from custody from Berks County Jail pending [the] outcome” of his criminal and criminal contempt cases. See id. at 7.
Mr. Rhoads initially filed his petition with the Third Circuit; it was then properly transferred to the district court pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(a). See Doc. No. 1.
Since Mr. Rhoads is proceeding pro se, I have liberally interpreted his habeas petition throughout this report and recommendation. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”).
Not long after filing his revised habeas petition, on January 23, 2024, Mr. Rhoads entered a nolo contendere plea to one count of theft by unlawful taking. See Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. Rhoads, CP-06-CR-0003724-2023. The remainder of the charges were withdrawn, and he was sentenced to one-hundred and two days to twenty-three months' imprisonment. See id. About a month later, this matter was referred to me for a report and recommendation.
Although the revised pro se habeas petition was not docketed until February 23, 2024, the federal prisoner mailbox rule provides that the document is “deemed filed on the date it is given to prison officials for mailing.” Pearson v. Sec'y Dept. of Corrs., 775 F.3d 598, 600 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Pabon v. SCI Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 391 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011)). Here, Mr. Rhoads declared that he gave the petition to prison officials for mailing on January 12, 2024, see Doc. No. 11, at 7, and therefore I will consider it filed as of that date.
The charges from the indirect criminal contempt proceeding were also withdrawn. See Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. Rhoads, CP-06-MD-001492-2023.
After reviewing Mr. Rhoads' petition, I chose not to order the District Attorney of Berks County to respond. Instead, I am respectfully recommending that the instant habeas petition be summarily dismissed without prejudice. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (“If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner. If the petition is not dismissed, the judge must order the respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response within a fixed time, or to take other action the judge may order.”); Reels v. Carney, No. 18-5377, 2018 WL 7135521, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2018) (Rueter, M.J.) (noting that habeas petitions brought pursuant to § 2241 are subject to the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases).
II. DISCUSSION
Federal courts may grant writs for habeas corpus to petitioners in state custody if their custody is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Tyson v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 976 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)); see also Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). Although individuals typically wait until after they have been convicted in state court to petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts also have jurisdiction to review pretrial habeas petitions filed pursuant to § 2241. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 44142 (3d Cir. 1975). This jurisdiction remains only so long as the underlying state court matter is pending. See Jackson v. Clements, 796 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Once the state court proceedings resolve, the habeas petition becomes moot, and the federal habeas court loses jurisdiction over it. See id. (explaining that after conviction, there is no “actual, ongoing controversy” and the pretrial habeas claims are moot, thus “depriv[ing] the court of subject matter jurisdiction”).
See also Brian R. Means, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 1:81 (May 2023 update) (“A conviction typically moots a federal habeas action challenging only pretrial conduct, even if the action was filed while the petitioner was incarcerated pending trial and even if the incarceration continued after the conviction.”).
That is the case here. Though Mr. Rhoads was still awaiting trial when he initially filed his habeas petition, he subsequently entered a nolo contendere plea to one charge, had the rest of the charges withdrawn, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. As a result of these events, Mr. Rhoads is no longer in pretrial custody, and his habeas petition is now moot. See, e.g., Thorne v. Warden Brooklyn House of Detention of Men, 479 F.2d 297, 299 (2d Cir. 1973).
To avoid this conclusion, a habeas petitioner may point to collateral consequences from pretrial detention that continue to exist after conviction. See Weikert v. Pechishen, No. 22-3450, 2023 WL 3260556, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2023) (Strawbridge, M.J.) (“As other courts within our circuit have recognized, where a habeas petition did not challenge his conviction or sentence but only a period of pretrial incarceration that ceased upon his conviction, he does not retain standing to challenge that pretrial incarceration unless he can demonstrate continuing collateral consequences sufficient to meet Article III's ‘case or controversy' or ‘injury' requirement.”). However, Mr. Rhoads has not suggested, nor have I found, that any such consequences are present here, and therefore his petition remains moot. See DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is a petitioner's burden to demonstrate that collateral consequences exist to avoid having a case dismissed as moot.”)
See also Hill-Johnson v. Harper, No. 19-1165, 2023 WL 5835321, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2023) (finding petitioner's nolo contendere pleas mooted his pretrial habeas petition).
But even if the petition were not moot and the Court had jurisdiction to consider it, Mr. Rhoads would still not be entitled to relief. As in the post-conviction context, before a federal court can grant pretrial habeas relief, the petitioner must have first exhausted the available state court remedies. Id. at 442 (recognizing that “although there is a distinction in the statutory language of §§ 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned”). To satisfy this exhaustion requirement, petitioners must “fairly present” their claims in “one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerkel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Only in “extraordinary circumstances” will the exhaustion requirement be excused for a pretrial habeas petition. Moore, 515 F.2d at 443; see also Reese v. Warden Phila. FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 246 n.2 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that “extraordinary circumstances,” in this context, may exist “when there is a showing of ‘delay, harassment, bad faith or other intentional activity' on the part of the state” (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 447 n.12)).
The exhaustion requirement provides states with the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam)).
See also Evans v. Court of Common Pleas Delaware Cnty., 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992) (“It is an underlying principle of federal habeas corpus law ever since the decision in Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), that ‘federal habeas corpus does not lie, absent “special circumstance,” to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court.' Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973). The rule barring pretrial intervention into pending state criminal proceedings by way of federal habeas corpus or otherwise is premised on the notion of comity, a principle of deference and ‘proper respect' for state governmental functions in our federal system.”).
Here, Mr. Rhoads never exhausted his pretrial habeas claims through one complete round of the state's appellate review process. As such, his pretrial claims are unreviewable in federal court unless Mr. Rhoads can establish grounds warranting excusal of the exhaustion requirement. Having reviewed the habeas petition and related filings, I find that there are no circumstances that rise to the level of “extraordinary” warranting excusal. Accordingly, Mr. Rhoads' petition should be dismissed without prejudice to him raising any of these claims, if appropriate, in a Section 2254 habeas petition.
Mr. Rhoads has also filed an “Emergency Request for Relief” along with his habeas petition. See Doc. No. 4. There, he avers that the Berks County Jail has been denying him access to legal resources (such as the law library) and confiscating his legal documents, in violation of the First Amendment. See id. at 1. He also contends that he has been suffering from a neurological condition for which the jail has “done little to help.” See id. For example, he alleges that it “took over 70 days to get my proper meds and I still don't get them at the appropriate times or correct quantity.” Id. Lastly, he mentions that while in custody, he was assaulted by a guard, and he fears that he “may be in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.” See id. Based on these events, Mr. Rhoads seeks release from custody. See id. Construing the pro se motion liberally, it appears that Mr. Rhoads is attempting to raise additional habeas claims. For the same reasons discussed above, these additional claims should be dismissed, as they too are moot and unexhausted.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons explained above, I respectfully recommend that Mr. Rhoads' habeas petition be dismissed without prejudice as moot because his state court proceedings have concluded. This does not preclude Mr. Rhoads from returning to federal court and filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to section 2254, after exhausting his claims in state court. In addition, I recommend that his emergency motion be dismissed without prejudice and that no certificate of appealability issue because jurists of reason would not debate my recommendation to dismiss the petition. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
In the event he chooses to refile his habeas petition under Section 2254, Mr. Rhoads is cautioned that he must comply with the one-year filing requirement of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The parties may file objections to this report and recommendation within fourteen days of being served a copy of it. See Local R. Civ. P. 72.1. An opposing party may respond fourteen days after being served the objections. Id. Failure to timely file objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. See Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 2007).