Opinion
No. CV 04 0093318S
May 16, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendant, Katharine Fox Uhry, filed a motion for protective order on February 14, 2005 to protest the fact that the plaintiff, Russell Boon Rhea, is both a pro se litigant and represented by counsel. The defendant argues that, just as a criminal defendant has no right to hybrid representation, a civil plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed as a pro se litigant that is represented by counsel. The plaintiff argues that barring time from representing himself pro se while being represented by counsel would be an abuse of discretion. He states that the mere possibility of the hybrid representation causing a disruption is not a sufficient reason to deny the right to self-representation.
The issue of hybrid representation typically arises in the criminal context. "It is well settled that neither the federal constitution, nor the state constitution, guarantees a defendant the right to hybrid representation. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (federal constitution); State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 393-94, 497 A.2d 408 (1985) (state constitution). In other words, a defendant either may exercise his right to be represented by counsel; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); or his right to represent himself; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); but he has no constitutional right to do both at the same time. As we concluded in State v. Gethers, supra, 391, `a hybrid representation arrangement [is not] in any way consistent with or of assistance to the framer's original intent [in providing for the right to counsel].'" (Emphasis in original.) State v. Gibbs, 254 Conn. 578, 610, 758 A.2d 327 (2000). See also State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 322, 864 A.2d 666 (2004).
Only one Connecticut case has addressed hybrid representation in the civil context. In Cersosimo v. Cersosimo, 188 Conn. 385, CT Page 8499 449 A.2d 1026 (1982), the court briefly stated: "It is a well-settled principle of law that a party to a civil action may appear either pro se or through counsel." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 393. While there is no right to hybrid representation, the plaintiff argues that he does have a right to self-representation and it is within the trial court's discretion to allow a pro se litigant to proceed while represented by counsel. To support this proposition, the plaintiff cites O'Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856, 109 S.Ct. 145, 102 L.Ed.2d 117 (1988). The main issue in O'Reilly, however, was whether a judge could refuse to allow a litigant to remove his attorney and proceed pro se, not whether there is a right to hybrid representation. The court did briefly address the issue of hybrid representation, stating that "the rights of self-representation and representation by counsel cannot be both exercised at the same time . . . Although a trial judge may in his discretion permit a party to enjoy both halves of the statutory right . . . Section 1654 does not itself confer any right to hybrid representation . . . Thus, a party seeking to assert his statutory right of self-representation must clearly and unequivocally discharge any lawyer previously retained." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 868.
Although allowing hybrid representation is within the discretion of the trial court, there exists no constitutional or statutory right to such representation. The weight of authority in Connecticut, as well as in federal court, suggests that a litigant may either represent himself or be represented by an attorney unless the trial court, in its discretion, deems that hybrid representation would serve the interests of justice.
This court cannot find that hybrid representation in the instant action serves the interests of justice and accordingly the court grants the plaintiff's protective order.
BY THE COURT,
Bozzuto, J.