Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court No. BC338253 of Los Angeles County, Ralph W. Dau, Judge. Affirmed.
Lynda Sheridan Hinds for Defendant and Appellant.
Irell & Manella, Bruce A. Wessel and Sandy S. Chung for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KLEIN, P. J.
Guadalupa Rhaburn instituted this action to set aside a quit claim deed she executed in favor of Devindra Somadhi. The trial court found Rhaburn had shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that Somadhi obtained title to the property through fraud. The trial court declared the quitclaim deed recorded by Somadhi null and void. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Rhaburn’s testimony.
Rhaburn testified that in 2001 and 2002 she and her three children lived in a duplex on Denker Avenue. In 2002, the owner of the duplex advised Rhaburn he was going to sell it. Rhaburn was interested in purchasing the duplex but she was unable to qualify for the loan. A few months later, Somadhi offered to allow Rhaburn and her children to live in his home. Rhaburn, a widow, had known Somadhi for 18 years. They became close friends after he divorced his wife in 1997. Rhaburn paid $200 per month rent until August of 2002 when Rhaburn and Somadhi commenced a romantic relationship.
In 2003, Rhaburn saw a for sale sign on the duplex and called the broker. Rhaburn later went to the broker’s office and completed an offer on the property in the amount of $265,000. Rhaburn paid a $2,000 deposit and $7,634.44 in closing costs. Rhaburn received approximately $1,200 out of escrow and estimates she paid $8,000 to acquire the property. Rhaburn obtained two loans to pay the purchase price, one in the amount of $212,000 and the other in the amount of $53,000. There were no cosigners. Rhaburn purchased the Denker Avenue duplex on July 1, 2003. Rhaburn moved from Somadhi’s home to the duplex in August of 2003. Somadhi paid nothing toward acquisition of the property, made no mortgage payments and did not pay for any repairs to the property.
In August of 2003, Somadhi told Rhaburn the duplex had to be in his name in order for Rhaburn to rent under Section 8 because Somadhi previously had rented to Section 8 tenants. Rhaburn thought Somadhi was doing her a favor and trusted Somadhi because he was her boyfriend at the time. Rhaburn was satisfied with Somadhi’s explanation that he would thereafter transfer title back to her. Rhaburn signed a quit claim deed Somadhi prepared. Somadhi recorded the quit claim deed on August 4, 2003.
Somadhi handled the renting of the property, telling Rhaburn her English was not good enough. Somadhi rented the large apartment of the building to Jean Wright and obtained a deposit of $3,000, which he gave to Rhaburn. Wright tried to get out of the deal and Somadhi had to go to court with her but won.
Somadhi then rented to a Section 8 tenant, Freda Harold, in March of 2004. Rhaburn lived in the other unit of the duplex and had difficulty with Harold until Harold moved out in November of 2004.
In 2004, Rhaburn attended a Section 8 meeting and learned it was not necessary for Rhaburn to transfer title to Somadhi in order to rent to Section 8 tenants. Rhaburn asked Somadhi to return the title and he gave her a copy of a quit claim deed. Rhaburn took the copy to the Hall of Records but was unable to record it because it was a copy and it lacked a fingerprint. When Rhaburn asked Somadhi for the correct document, he told her to leave. After many requests, Somadhi gave Rhaburn an original quit claim deed but, before Rhaburn could record it, Somadhi entered her home and took it from her personal papers. Thereafter, Somadhi refused to give Rhaburn another quit claim deed. Somadhi later invited Rhaburn to his home to discuss the situation. While she was there, Rhaburn saw a copy of the second quit claim deed Somadhi gave her sitting on the coffee table and took it.
Rhaburn now rents the smaller unit of the duplex to Karen Gray for $800 per month and lives in the large unit with her four children. Somadhi is the father of Rhaburn’s youngest child, who was born in October of 2004. After Rhaburn gave birth, Somadhi said that if he gave Rhaburn a quit claim deed to the property, she would seek child support. After Rhaburn applied for Medi-Cal for the child, the County obtained an order requiring Somadhi to pay $300 per month child support.
2. Somadhi’s testimony.
Somadhi testified he earns approximately $50,000 per year as a heavy truck operator for the City of Los Angeles. Somadhi owns a home on West 30th Street and a triplex on Vernon Avenue. Somadhi visited Rhaburn when she was renting one of the units of the Denker Avenue duplex. Rhaburn told Somadhi the owner wanted her to move and she had no place to go. Rhaburn asked if she and her three sons could live with Somadhi and his two children. Somadhi agreed and, after about two months, Rhaburn and Somadhi became romantically involved. Rhaburn did not mention to Somadhi that she had any money. In fact, Somadhi thought Rhaburn was barely surviving.
In 2003, Somadhi saw a for sale sign on the duplex and told Rhaburn he was interested in buying the duplex where she used to live. Somadhi planned to purchase the property using Rhaburn’s credit and his cash. After the purchase was completed, Rhaburn would transfer title to Somadhi’s name. When the trial court inquired whether Somadhi was deceiving the lender or conspiring with another to deceive the lender, Somadhi indicated he was merely doing business.
Although Rhaburn submitted the paperwork for the purchase, Somadhi provided $10,000 in cash for the down payment. Rhaburn signed the property over to Somadhi about one month after the purchase. Rhaburn lived in the property at the time.
Somadhi handled the renting of the duplex. He placed an ad in the newspaper and responded to the inquiries. Most of the applicants were not Section 8 tenants. Somadhi gave Wright’s $3,000 deposit to Rhaburn to pay the mortgage. Their agreement was that Rhaburn would make the payments because she did not want her credit to be as bad as Somadhi’s.
With respect to the copy of the quitclaim deed Somadhi gave Rhaburn, Somadhi testified he executed that quit claim deed in 2004 so Rhaburn would know the duplex would be hers if Somadhi died. Rhaburn never complained that Somadhi only gave her a copy of the deed. Somadhi changed his mind about giving Rhaburn the property and defaced the original deed so it could not be recorded and placed it in his home safe. Somadhi believes Rhaburn took the safe from his home because she produced a copy of the defaced deed in discovery.
3. The trial court’s ruling.
On June 30, 2006, the trial court filed a tentative decision which recited the facts related to the purchase of the duplex, the relationship of the parties, the quitclaim deed from Rhaburn to Somadhi and Somadhi’s refusal to provide a valid quitclaim deed in Rhaburn’s favor. The trial court found Rhaburn used her own funds to pay the closing costs, borrowed the purchase price, made all mortgage and tax payments on the property and made all repairs. Further, Somadhi convinced Rhaburn to quitclaim the property to him because she could not qualify to rent to Section 8 tenants but Somadhi could because he already had Section 8 properties. Somadhi promised to deed the property back to Rhaburn at her request. When Rhaburn learned Somadhi’s statement was false, she asked for a deed to the property but Somadhi gave her an unrecordable photocopy of a deed and thereafter “turned her away.”
The trial court found Somadhi’s “testimony was not credible. He said it was his idea to buy the property for himself but to have [Rhaburn] take title to make use of her good credit. He never explained how it was that his credit rating would have prevented him from obtaining the necessary financing and taking title in its own name. Indeed, he owned other rental properties and he made between $49,000 and $52,000 per year as a truck driver for the City of Los Angeles. [Somadhi] testified that his purpose was to deceive the lender and that this was ‘just business.’ The court observed [Somadhi’s] demeanor while testifying, . . . and the court finds that [Somadhi] was not truthful. [¶] In reaching these conclusions, the court has applied to [Rhaburn] the burden to show [Somadhi’s] fraud in obtaining legal title in his name by clear and convincing evidence. [Citations.] [Rhaburn] has made the necessary showing by clear and convincing evidence, and she is entitled to judgment declaring that [Somadhi] has no interest in the Denker Avenue property and that the quitclaim deed, dated August 13, 2003, which [Somadhi] recorded is null and void.”
The trial court thereafter entered judgment conforming to the tentative decision.
CONTENTION
Somadhi contends the evidence does not support the trial court’s cancellation of the quitclaim deed in his favor.
DISCUSSION
Somadhi contends the trial court should have given the quitclaim deed signed by Rhaburn in August of 2003 greater weight because Rhaburn admitted she signed it of her own free will. Somadhi asserts allegations that legal title does not represent beneficial ownership are disfavored. (In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 294.) Somadhi claims the trial court failed to apply Evidence Code section 662, which requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of ownership, noting the trial court indicated during the trial that Rhaburn only had to show a preponderance of the evidence to establish her claim. Somadhi argues Rhaburn offered only her own testimony to rebut Somadhi’s claim she understood the effect of the transaction. Somadhi also claims the trial court misinterpreted his physical characteristics as evidence of lying. Somadhi noted early in his testimony that he stutters and the trial court apparently viewed his credibility as suspect as a result of this speech impediment.
Somadhi’s claims amount to no more than a request to reweigh the evidence on appeal. This is not the function of an appellate court. Indeed, it is well settled that “ ‘ “[w]here findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, we are bound by the ‘elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that . . . the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the standard of review so long adhered to by this court.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)
Applying these principles to Somadhi’s contentions, it is apparent they are meritless. With respect to Somadhi’s claim only Rhaburn’s testimony was offered to rebut the presumption Somadhi held legal title, the testimony of a single witness, unless physically impossible or inherently improbable, is sufficient to prove a disputed fact. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181; Evid. Code, § 411 [“Except where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact.”].) Regarding the burden of proof, the tentative decision expressly states the trial court required Rhaburn to establish her claim by clear and convincing evidence. With respect to the trial court’s observation of Somadhi’s demeanor, the trial court made no mention of Somadhi’s stutter but referred instead to the fact Somadhi appeared to be under stress at the time of his testimony. It is not our role to interfere with the trial court’s assessment of the demeanor and credibility of a witness. (In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 824.)
Finally, Somadhi argues Rhaburn improperly attempted to rely on the quit claim deed Somadhi executed in 2004 as evidence the initial deed was given on condition Somadhi would transfer title back to Rhaburn. Somadhi argues this quitclaim deed was never delivered and was not intended to transfer title. (Civil Code, § 1054.) However, the trial court found the initial quitclaim deed to Somadhi was fraudulently obtained. Based on that finding, the trial court had no occasion to consider the legal effect of the quitclaim deed executed by Somadhi in favor of Rhaburn. Consequently, no error appears.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Rhaburn is awarded costs on appeal.
We concur: CROSKEY, J., ALDRICH, J.