Opinion
No. 16-35776
05-29-2018
JOHN KELLY REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 3:16-cv-05126-RBL MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 17, 2018 Seattle, Washington Before: BERZON and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and DEARIE, District Judge.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The Honorable Raymond J. Dearie, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
John Reynolds, a Washington state prisoner, contends that medical personnel of the Washington Department of Corrections ("DOC") are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law for failing to diagnose and treat his chronic back pain. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge's recommendation, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We have jurisdiction over Reynolds' appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. The district court correctly concluded that Reynolds had failed to proffer evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether DOC personnel were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Reynolds was regularly seen by medical personnel, received various tests (including an x-ray diagnosed as normal), was prescribed pain medication, and was counseled to "continue with conservative management" of his condition after his chart was reviewed by a physician. Reynolds argues that he should instead have been referred to a neurologist and received an MRI, but provided no evidence that such a course of action could have given rise to a more favorable result. See Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (holding that "a difference of opinion between a prisoner patient and prison medical authorities as to what treatment is proper and necessary does not give rise to" a § 1983 claim).
2. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Reynolds' medical negligence claim, because Reynolds failed to proffer any supporting expert testimony. See Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 851 P.2d 689, 693 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) ("In a medical malpractice case, expert testimony is generally required to establish the standard of care and to prove causation.").
AFFIRMED.