Opinion
Nos. 05-08-01326-CR, 05-08-01327-CR, 05-08-01328-CR
Opinion Filed July 27, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F08-72248-NU, F08-72268-NU, F08-72269-NU.
Before Justices MOSELEY, O'NEILL, and MURPHY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Derrick Dewayne Reynolds waived a jury and pleaded guilty to two robbery offenses and one aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon offense. The trial court assessed punishment, enhanced by a prior felony conviction, at forty years' imprisonment in each case. Appellant now complains the trial court violated his due-process rights and abused its discretion by sentencing him to prison. We affirm the trial court's judgments. The background of these cases and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. In his first point of error, appellant contends the trial court did not consider all the punishment options available, thereby violating his due-process rights. Appellant asserts that because he explained that he committed the offenses due to using crack cocaine, and because he sought intensive drug treatment to deal with his longstanding addiction, the trial court should have given him probation and treatment instead of sentencing him to prison in each case. In his second point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to prison, rather than placing him on probation, because the sentences were not necessary to prevent the recurrence of any criminal behavior. Appellant asserts the evidence shows he only committed the offenses because he had used crack cocaine before committing them. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaints for appellate review and, alternatively, the record does not support his claims. Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in motions for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Even constitutional rights may be waived. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Castaneda, 135 S.W.3d at 723. Moreover, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offenses in light of prior felony convictions. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.32 (Vernon 2003); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). There is nothing in the record that shows the trial court did not consider the full range of punishment before imposing the sentences. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the forty-year sentences. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). We overrule appellant's first and second points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.