The State, however, urges this court to only require substantial compliance with the statutory language in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(e). To support its position, the State relies on Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984), in which this court allowed substantial compliance with a different portion of an earlier version of the section 5-4-309 — Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1208 (Repl. 1977).

Counsel had received the information about the petition for revocation on October 22, 1986, and had passed it on to the appellant within two weeks of receiving it. The hearing was not held until February 24, 1987. [3-5] In Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984), we held that the trial court did not lack jurisdiction of a revocation proceeding where there had been no formal arrest of the appellant. We noted that actual notice of the time and place of the hearing was sufficient.

The arrest here referred to is the arrest for violation of the conditions of suspension of sentence. See Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984). Appellant argues that there was no revocation hearing within sixty days after his arrest for violation of the conditions of his suspended sentence. He maintains the sixty-day requirement is mandatory because of the use of the word "shall" in the statute.

For his first point on appeal, Seals argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his suspended sentences because the State's petition alleged that his sentences should be revoked pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-309 rather than section 16-93-308. Irregularities in a petition to revoke do not deprive a circuit court of jurisdiction to revoke a suspended sentence. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 100, 666 S.W.2d 396, 397 (1984). And, to the extent that Seals now argues that the petition to revoke provided inadequate notice, he made no such argument below.

In addition, although Miller argues that the State [Ark. App. 6]failed to strictly comply with section 5–4–309(a) as well, he cites no authority for the proposition that this alleged failure prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over his revocation. In fact, this same argument was previously rejected in Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984), wherein our supreme court held that the fact that the statute was not strictly complied with, in that the defendant was never arrested for a violation of his suspension and a summons was never issued, did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the petition to revoke or void the trial court's action. See also Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 371, 742 S.W.2d 925, 926 (1988) (finding that the language in the statute does not require that one accused of a violation of probation or suspension be summoned or arrested, but says only that he may be summoned or arrested) (emphasis added).

In addition, although Miller argues that the State failed to strictly comply with section 5-4-309(a) as well, he cites no authority for the proposition that this alleged failure prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over his revocation. In fact, this same argument was previously rejected in Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984), wherein our supreme court held that the fact that the statute was not strictly complied with, in that the defendant was never arrested for a violation of his suspension and a summons was never issued, did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the petition to revoke or void the trial court's action. See also Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 371, 742 S.W.2d 925, 926 (1988) (finding that the language in the statute does not require that one accused of a violation of probation or suspension be summoned or arrested, but says only that he may be summoned or arrested) (emphasis added).

2006) (stating that "the defendant has the right to: (A) Hear and controvert evidence against him or her; (B) Offer evidence in his or her own defense; and (C) Be represented by counsel")). See Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984) (holding that in light of the fact that Reynolds received actual notice of the time and place of the hearing and did not ask for a continuance, there was no error in the lack of written notice of the time and place of the revocation hearing). Moreover, appellant has failed to demonstrate that any due process protecting fundamental fairness was not provided to him.

Appellant admits that he received notice from Judge Fogleman on June 2, 2000, that the revocation hearing had been rescheduled from July 5, 2000, to June 13, 2000. If a defendant is given actual notice of the time and place of a hearing, the lack of written notice of the time and place of the hearing is not reversible error. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 100, 666 S.W.2d 396, 397 (1984). [5, 6] Finally, appellant argues that the circuit court violated Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-310 (a)(1) (Repl.

The trial court denied the request and proceeded with the revocation hearing. In Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984), the Supreme Court found no error in the failure to provide statutory written notice of the time and place of a revocation hearing where the appellant had received actual notice and did not move for a continuance. We think that the evidence in the case at bar is sufficient to show that the appellant had actual notice.

Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that appellant had violated conditions of her suspended imposition of sentence is purely a question which requires resolution of witnesses' credibility and is one within the sound discretion of the trial court. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984). Our study of the record reveals the trial court's decision is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.