Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 96 Wn.2d 692, 696, 635 P.2d 441, 649 P.2d 827 (1982); In re Estate of Palucci, 61 Wn. App. 412, 416, 810 P.2d 970 (1991); Thayer v. Edmonds, 8 Wn. App. 36, 39, 503 P.2d 1110 (1972), review denied, 82 Wn.2d 1001 (1973).Martin v. Meier, supra at 479; Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58 Wn.2d 36, 38, 360 P.2d 744 (1961) (requiring strict compliance with prior version of RCW 46.64.040 specifying that notice of service on the Secretary of State actually be delivered to defendant and proved by a signed return receipt); Reynolds v. Richardson, 53 Wn.2d 82, 83, 330 P.2d 1014 (1958) (requiring plaintiffs to give notice to defendants of service on the Secretary of State).
When RCW 46.64.040 applies, therefore, its procedures must be strictly adhered to, otherwise jurisdiction is not obtained under the statute. E.g., Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., supra; Reynolds v. Richardson, 53 Wn.2d 82, 330 P.2d 1014 (1958). [3] In deciding the next question here, whether the statute applies, we heed the rule that in construing statutes our objective is to ascertain legislative intent as expressed in the statute.
The appellants having failed to comply with the statute, the service was not effective, and the trial court had no jurisdiction over the respondents. Cf. Reynolds v. Richardson, 53 Wn.2d 82, 330 P.2d 1014. The appellants contend that the service should be held to be sufficient because respondents willfully evaded process.
Martin v. Meier, 111 Wn.2d 471, 479, 760 P.2d 925 (1988). See also Reynolds v. Richardson, 53 Wn.2d 82, 330 P.2d 1014 (1958). [2] We also disagree with Omaits's second argument, that Raber waived any process or statute of limitations defenses when his attorney appeared and served interrogatories.
Because there is no evidence Meier ever departed from the state, the attempt to gain jurisdiction over him by means of RCW 46.64.040 failed. Reynolds v. Richardson, 53 Wn.2d 82, 330 P.2d 1014 (1958). [2] Martin argues that Meier is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because she was induced by Meier's insurer to delay filing her lawsuit until nearly the end of the 3-year limit.
The statute not having been explicitly complied with, we would ordinarily declare that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Reynolds v. Richardson, 53 Wn.2d 82, 330 P.2d 1014 (1958). If the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, she would ordinarily be entitled to immediate dismissal.