Reynolds v. Kenney

6 Citing cases

  1. Abbott v. Watson

    105 N.H. 474 (N.H. 1964)

    I Christy, Transfer of Stock (3d ed. 1962) s. 75; Rogers, Joint Ownership of Corporate Stock, 13 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 498, 506 (1952). See Reynolds v. Kenney, 87 N.H. 313; Anderson v. Lord, 87 N.H. 474. The fact that the decedent retained the dividends from the stock did not convert it into a gift in contemplation of death.

  2. Broderick v. Blaisdell

    88 A.2d 174 (N.H. 1952)   Cited 2 times

    R.L., c. 392, s. 25; Berry v. McArdle, 62 N.H. 354. There was no evidence that the defendant's interest in the estate as an individual was such that his interest as administrator was nominal rather than real. Cf. Muir v. Bartlett, 78 N.H. 313. So far as appears, he here "defends in the right of the deceased." Reynolds v. Kenney, 87 N.H. 313, 314. Anno. 172 A.L.R. 714, 719.

  3. Scamman v. Sondheim

    97 N.H. 280 (N.H. 1952)   Cited 10 times
    Noting general rule that "an executor or administrator is the only proper party to bring or defend actions relating to the personal estate of the deceased" and that, by "contrast, heirs and legatees are not parties in interest, in the legal sense of the term, in a proceeding by or against the representative of the estate, any more than creditors"

    In the absence of special circumstances, it is the general rule that an executor or administrator is the only proper party to bring or defend actions relating to the personal estate of the deceased. Reynolds v. Kenney, 87 N.H. 313, 314; Mitchell v. Smith, 90 N.H. 36, 41; Champollion v. Corbin, 71 N.H. 78. "In contrast, heirs and legatees are not parties in interest, in the legal sense of the term, in a proceeding by or against the representative of the estate, any more than creditors. The representative's authority is regulated by statute, and in general he is under judicial control instead of being under the direction of the heirs and legatees.

  4. Anderson v. Ruberg

    160 P.2d 456 (Idaho 1945)   Cited 8 times

    Declarations of deceased person to be received with caution and are open to suspicion. (20 Am. Jur. 521-522.) Declaration of donor, since deceased, indicative of a gift of personality found in her possession at the time of her death, inadmissible on issue of completed gift to one claiming as donee. (1 Jones Evidence, 464; Reynolds v. Kenney, (N.H.), 179 A. 16, 98 A.L.R. 751; Anno. 98 A.L.R. 755.) BUDGE, J.

  5. Bolles v. Trust Co.

    132 Ohio St. 21 (Ohio 1936)   Cited 131 times
    In Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., Exr., 132 Ohio St. 21, 4 N.E.2d 917, the court had under consideration the question of a gift inter vivos of securities which were not assigned or indorsed.

    "We believe the better rule, the one sustained by reasons of public policy and the greater weight of the authorities is that the fact of delivery must be shown by other evidence than the mere declaration of the donor, when the declaration can go no further than to express a gift, and it does not either distinctly state a delivery or facts from which actual delivery may be inferred. * * * The law looks upon the repetition of statements of this sort with very great care and caution in any kind of a case, and, when the statements are depended upon to carry conclusions of law, as well [as] of fact, as in a case of this kind, the statements attributed to the donor must include statements of all the facts necessary to constitute the conclusion." And in Reynolds v. Kenney, Admr., 87 N.H. 313, 179 A. 16, 18, 98 A. L. R., 751, 754, the court states: "To say that a declaration, 'She has some bonds which I gave her,' unsupported by any other evidence of a delivery, includes the statement, 'I delivered them to her as a gift,' seems to us to assume a declaration of the fact of delivery which is not in evidence.

  6. In re Estate of Copeland

    58 N.E.2d 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943)   Cited 5 times

    The exclusion of this testimony by the trial court was not prejudicial for it added nothing to the essential element of delivery. As to the insufficiency of these statements of Copeland to prove delivery, see Atchley, Exr., v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn. 303, 323, 255 S.W. 366, 372, 30 A.L.R., 1481, 1491; and Reynolds v. Kenney, Admr., 87 N.H. 313, 179 A. 16, 18, 98 A.L.R., 751, 754, quoted from with approval in Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., Exr., 132 Ohio St. 21, 4 N.E.2d 917. Since it is strongly urged by counsel for exceptor that this case is governed by the decided cases in Ohio relative to joint bank accounts, with the attendant incident of survivorship, we should look to those cases to determine whether Copeland, by his contract with the bank, either vested Gusta Norris with a present interest in the currency sufficient for her to take as the survivor or whether by this contract he completed the gift of the currency to her.