Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-3062, SECTION "J" (2)
May 7, 2003
MINUTE ENTRY
Oral argument was conducted today concerning Defendant's Motion to File Third-Party Complaint. Record Doc. No. 49. Participating were Jean Ouellet and Gerald deLaunay, representing plaintiffs; Jed S. Malish, representing defendant; and Charles Lanier, representing the prospective intervenor, Liberty Mutual. Having considered the complaint, the record, the exhibits submitted and the arguments of counsel, and for the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
Motions for leave to file third-party complaints are governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a), and "[t]he district court is accorded `wide discretion in determining whether to permit such third party procedure.'"McDonald v. Union Carbide Corp., 734 F.2d 182, 183 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Southern Ry. Co. v. Fox, 339 F.2d 560, 563 (5th Cir. 1964)). In exercising this wide discretion, courts have considered a number of factors, including effectuating the purposes of Rule 14 (avoiding circuity of action and eliminating duplication of suits on closely related matters); whether other parties will be prejudiced; the unreasonableness of delay by the party asserting the third-party complaint; and lack of substance to the third-party claim. 6 Charles A. Wright, Arthur Miller Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1443 at 300-11 (West 1990). Rule 14(a) provides: "At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff." Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a) (emphasis added).
In this case, Eveready Marine seeks to implead the third-party defendants pursuant to Rule 14(c), which provides in relevant part:
When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h), the defendant . . ., as a third-party plaintiff, may bring in a third-party defendant who may be wholly or partly liable, either to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff, by way of remedy over, contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. In such a case the third-party plaintiff may also demand judgment against the third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff, in which event the third-party defendant shall make any defenses to the claim of the plaintiff as well as to that of the third-party plaintiff in the manner provided in Rule 12 and the action shall proceed as if the plaintiff had commenced it against the third-party defendant as well as the third-party plaintiff.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(c). Thus, "in an admiralty suit, once a defendant impleads a third party in an effort to shift the burden of liability in whole or part from its own shoulders, and demands judgment in favor of the original plaintiff against that third party, the suit proceeds as if the original plaintiff had sued the third party." Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. National Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(c), and Note of the Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendment thereto; Home Ins. Co. v. Puerto RICO Maritime Shipping Auth., 524 F. Supp. 541, 546 (D.P.R. 1981)).
Rule 14(c) was designed to expedite and consolidate admiralty actions by permitting a third-party plaintiff to demand judgment against a third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff. As a consequence, the plaintiff is then required to assert his claims directly against the third-party defendant. This unique liberal joinder policy served to reduce the possibility of inconsistent results in separate actions, eliminate redundant litigation, and prevent a third party's disappearing if jurisdiction and control over the party and his assets were not immediately established.Texaco Expl. Prod. Co. v. AmClyde Eng'd Prods. Co., 243 F.3d 906, 910 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 6 Charles Alan Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1465, at 481 (2d ed. 1990)).
Therefore, a third-party complaint relates to secondary or derivative liability only, whether brought under Rule 14(a) or 14(c). It may be asserted only against a non-party to the lawsuit who may be liable to the defendant/third-party plaintiff or the plaintiff himself for the original plaintiff's claim.
In this case, permitting Eveready Marine to assert third-party claims against Rehabilitation Hospital of Acadiana, L.L.C. and Theodore Allen Pappas will not serve the purposes of Rule 14(a). First, it will increase the circuity of the action. If impleaded, Pappas and the Hospital will undoubtedly (as stated in plaintiff's opposition memorandum and attached letter from counsel for the third parties) move to dismiss on grounds that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because they are qualified health-care providers under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act and the claims against them must first be presented to a medical review panel, and/or because the claims against them do not sound in this court's admiralty jurisdiction. These arguments also implicate the possibility of a lack of substance to the third-party claims. Resolution of a motion to dismiss and the likely need for additional discovery involving the third-party defendants may necessitate a delay in the trial date, which is only nine weeks away, to the prejudice of plaintiff.
Second, if the third-party defendants' motion to dismiss is denied, the trial will involve essentially separate "mini-trials," one over the circumstances of the accident that allegedly occurred on February 7, 2002 and the negligence, if any, of Eveready Marine, in causing plaintiffs alleged personal injuries; and another over the circumstances of and negligence or intentional torts, if any, allegedly committed by the Hospital and Pappas on July 11, 2002 during their functional capacity evaluation of plaintiff. These two "mini-trials" in one larger trial will involve different standards of care and proof, and their factual relationship is tangential at best. This will cause both plaintiff and the proposed third parties to be prejudiced and make the court's task more difficult.
In addition, the factors underlying Rule 14(c) will not be served by allowing the third-party complaint. Unlike many Rule 9 cases involving a vessel and its crew members plying international waters, there is no real prospect in this case that the third parties will disappear if jurisdiction and control over them and their assets are not immediately established. Moreover, Eveready Marine has not established that the third-party complaint will reduce the possibility of inconsistent results in separate actions or eliminate redundant litigation.
Accordingly, the motion is denied.