It is against this standard that the Appellant, Gregory Lynn McMillan argues that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to find him guilty of driving after forfeiture of license, 3rd or subsequent offense within 10 years, in violation of §18.2-272 of the Code of Virginia. Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 153, 515 S.E.2d 808 (1999). Appellant argues that there was no evidence before the Court that he drove on the highway with his vehicle.
I. We addressed the requirements of Code § 18.2-268.9 inReynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 153, 515 S.E.2d 808 (1999). There, we held that an officer who had received forty hours of training on the Breathalyzer 900-A instrument and an additional eight hours of training on the Intoxilyzer 5000 met the requirements of the statute.
"The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict." Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165, 174 (2003) (quoting Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 153, 163 (1999)). ANALYSIS
; Hughes v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 448, 461, 573 S.E.2d 324, 328 (2002) ("If the legislature had intended to exclude the factual scenario presented in the instant case from the complete jurisdictional divestiture provisions it could have done so."); Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 153, 160, 515 S.E.2d 808, 811-12 (1999) ("If the legislature had intended that operators undergo a forty-hour training program for each individual type of breath test equipment, then it would have said so in the statute.").
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 153, 160, 515 S.E.2d 808, 811-12 (1999) ("If the legislature had intended that operators undergo a forty-hour training program for each individual type of breath test equipment, then it would have said so in the statute."). That is not to say the Board is without authority to take evidence on the issue of damages and make independent findings of fact when the exact nature of the damage award recited in the unsatisfied judgment cannot be determined on the record from the circuit court.
We also note that Bergaust's broad interpretation of the statute would, contrary to its plain wording, create a mere residency requirement in the long arm statute. Had the legislature intended that result, it could have done so quite easily and specifically. See, e.g., Barnes v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 619, 628, 535 S.E.2d 706, 710 (2000) ("[I]f the legislature had intended to limit Code § 18.2-32 to abduction in violation of Code § 18.2-48, it would have done so."); Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 153, 160, 515 S.E.2d 808, 811-12 (1999) ("If the legislature had intended that operators undergo a forty-hour training program for each individual type of breath test equipment, then it would have said so in the statute."). This is not to say that Bergaust's argument is entirely without merit.
"We will not reverse the judgment of the trial court, sitting as the finder of fact in a bench trial, unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 153, 163, 515 S.E.2d 808, 813 (1999) (citingMartin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)). Viewed in this light, the evidence established that on February 1, 2008, Richard Campbell (Campbell) was at home when he heard a "loud bang."
"We will not reverse the judgment of the trial court, sitting as the finder of fact in a bench trial, unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 153, 163, 515 S.E.2d 808, 813 (1999). In order to be guilty of violating Code § 46.2-894, "'the driver must be aware that harm has been done; it must be present in his mind that there has been an injury; and then, with that in his mind, he must deliberately go away without making himself known.'"Johnson v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 769, 772, 418 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1992) (quoting Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 220, 38 S.E.2d 328, 329 (1946)). Code § 46.2-894 imposes an affirmative duty on a driver involved in an accident to stop and provide identification information.
Indeed, "`[t]he judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 153, 163, 515 S.E.2d 808, 813 (1999)). A. Reckless Driving
"We will not reverse the judgment of the trial court, sitting as the finder of fact in a bench trial, unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 153, 163, 515 S.E.2d 808, 813 (1999).