Opinion
Case No. 20-12454
2021-06-24
Andre REYNOLDS, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Deborah Reynolds, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FERNDALE, a Michigan municipal corporation, Brandon Szczesniak, Lauren Zyrowski, and Pawel Skomski, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.
Todd Russell Perkins, Joel B. Sklar, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff. T. Joseph Seward, Kali M. L. Henderson, Seward Peck & Henderson PLLC, Royal Oak, MI, for Defendants Brandon Szczesniak, Lauren Zyrowski, Pawel Skomski, City of Ferndale.
Todd Russell Perkins, Joel B. Sklar, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
T. Joseph Seward, Kali M. L. Henderson, Seward Peck & Henderson PLLC, Royal Oak, MI, for Defendants Brandon Szczesniak, Lauren Zyrowski, Pawel Skomski, City of Ferndale.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [21]
LAURIE J. MICHELSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The facts of this case are tragic. Early in the morning hours of August 3, 2018, police officers responded to a report of suspicious persons at a 7-Eleven in Ferndale, Michigan. There, the officers encountered Deborah Reynolds and DeAngelo Martin, who both appeared to be intoxicated. In time, the officers transported Reynolds and Martin to a gas station in Detroit and left them there. Reynolds was never seen alive again. Fourteen months later, Reynolds’ body was found in an abandoned house less than a mile away from the gas station. In September 2019, DeAngelo Martin was charged with the murder of four other women whose bodies were found in abandoned buildings in Detroit. Martin has not been charged with Reynolds’ murder, but Detroit police and others have suggested that Reynolds may be another victim of Martin.
Deborah Reynolds’ brother, Andre Reynolds, filed this civil suit as the personal representative of the estate of Deborah Reynolds. The case was originally brought against the City of Ferndale, three Ferndale police officers, and DeAngelo Martin, but the claims against Martin have been remanded to state court. The Ferndale defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the remaining due process, equal protection, and gross negligence claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons explained below, the motion to dismiss is granted, and the state-law gross negligence claim is remanded to state court.
I.
On August 3, 2018, around 1:00 a.m., three Ferndale police officers, Defendants Brandon Szczesniak, Lauren Zyrowski, and Pawel Skomski ("The Officers"), responded to a report of "suspicious individuals" at a 7-Eleven located at 805 E. Nine Mile Road in Ferndale. (ECF No. 16, PageID.158.) The Officers each arrived at the location in their own police car. (Id. ) Outside the 7-Eleven they found Deborah Reynolds seated in a lawn chair and drinking a beer, with DeAngelo Martin standing next to her. (Id. at PageID.159; ECF No. 10. ) Both Reynolds and Martin are Black. (ECF No. 16, PageID.166.) When the Officers first arrived, there were also two white people speaking to Reynolds and Martin, but they walked away when the officers approached. (ECF No. 10 (Szczesniak body cam 00:15–00:30).)
ECF No. 10 encompasses video from the three Officers’ dash, body, and passenger cameras.
The Officers took down Reynolds’ name and she gave them her home address in Warren. (ECF No. 16, PageID.159; ECF No. 10.) Reynolds stated that Martin did not live with her. (ECF No. 10 (Skomski body cam 03:36–03:45, 08:40–08:49).) Martin was agitated and very difficult to understand but was eventually able to write his name down on a piece of paper. (ECF No. 10.) Officer Zyrowski recognized Martin because she had previously transported Martin from Ferndale to Detroit. (ECF No. 16, PageID.159.)
The Officers attempted to administer breathalyzer tests. Reynolds was not able to follow the instructions for the breathalyzer, but the Officers issued her a citation for having an open intoxicant in public. (ECF No. 10; ECF No. 16-1.) Martin's breathalyzer test showed his blood-alcohol-content was .19, more than twice the legal limit for driving. (ECF No. 16, PageID.159; ECF No. 10.) Because the Officers did not see Martin with an open intoxicant or witness him commit any other crime, they did not issue him a citation. (Id. ) The Officers attempted to run Martin's name through their database system but were unable to locate any information about him. (ECF No. 16, PageID.160.)
Both Reynolds and Martin told the Officers they wanted to go home. (ECF No. 16, PageID.160; ECF No. 10 (Szczesniak body cam 01:05–01:15; Skomski body cam 11:49–11:55).) The Officers then told Reynolds and Martin that they were going to drive them to Detroit. (ECF No. 16, PageID.160; ECF No. 10.) Officer Skomski stated to the other officers, "Let's get them out of our city." (ECF No. 10 (Skomski body cam 13:20–13:25).) The Officers led Reynolds and Martin to separate police cars. (ECF No. 10.) After initially refusing to get in the car, Reynolds complied but spent the car ride yelling at Officer Zyrowski and threatening to sue her. (ECF No. 10 (Szczesniak body cam 13:20–13:38; Zyrowski passenger cam); ECF No. 16, PageID.161.)
At around 1:30 a.m., the officers dropped Reynolds and Martin outside a Sunoco gas station at the corner of Woodward Avenue and State Fair Avenue in Detroit, just over the Ferndale-Detroit border. (ECF No. 16, PageID.161.)
Reynolds never came home, and her family filed a missing person report. (ECF No. 16, PageID.162.) On October 21, 2019, over 14 months later, Reynolds’ decomposed body was found in an abandoned home on Annin Street in Detroit, a few blocks from the Sunoco gas station where the officers dropped her off with Martin. (Id. )
In September 2019, DeAngelo Martin was charged with the murder of four women in Detroit. See Frank Witsil, "Man who police called a serial killer charged in slayings of 4 Detroit women," Detroit Free Press (Sept. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/PL5T-ZJLK. The victims were all women over 50 years old whose bodies were found in abandoned buildings in Detroit. Id. Martin is awaiting trial. No one has been charged in the death of Deborah Reynolds, although police have stated they are investigating whether Martin was involved in her disappearance and death. See "Woman's remains linked to Detroit serial killer investigation, ID'd by medical examiner," WXYZ Detroit (Oct. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/BK29-WQPY.
Deborah's brother Andre Reynolds filed this suit against the City of Ferndale, the three Officers, and DeAngelo Martin in September 2020. (ECF No. 1.) The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim for wrongful death against Martin and remanded that count back to state court. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 16.) The Ferndale defendants filed a motion to dismiss the remaining counts for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II.
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court "construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, and determines whether the complaint ‘contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Servs., Inc. , 668 F.3d 393, 403 (6th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). Under the plausibility framework of Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Sixth Circuit continues to recognize the "viability of the short and plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8." HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor , 675 F.3d 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, detailed factual allegations are not required to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc. , 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) ). But they must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
The Court notes that both parties urge it to consider the dash and bodycam videos filed by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 21, PageID.369; ECF No. 24, PageID.443.) And Plaintiff refers to the videos throughout the complaint. (See ECF No. 16.) Although evaluation of a motion to dismiss is typically confined to the pleadings, the Court "may consider materials in addition to the complaint if such materials are public records or are otherwise appropriate for the taking of judicial notice." Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor , 860 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting New Eng. Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP , 336 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 2003) ). The Sixth Circuit has approved of consideration of video evidence where it covers the entire incident at issue. Id. And such a video can be used to show a plaintiff's claims are implausible where the video "utterly discredits" the plaintiff's pleadings. Id. (quoting Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380–81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ). So the Court will consider the video evidence where appropriate.
III.
Andre Reynolds, on behalf of his sister's estate, brings three claims against the Officers: violation of substantive due process, violation of equal protection, and gross negligence. (ECF No. 16.) The complaint also includes a Monell claim against the City of Ferndale. (Id. )
A.
The Court first turns to Plaintiff's substantive due process claim. Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that the Officers violated Reynolds’ substantive due process rights because dropping her off at a remote and unfamiliar gas station in Detroit put her in greater danger than before her encounter with the police and deprived her of her safety and her life.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the government cannot "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "The right to life and safety through personal security is [ ] a fundamental interest, and therefore is protected by the substantive portion of the Due Process Clause." Lipman v. Budish , 974 F.3d 726, 741 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo , 457 U.S. 307, 315–16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) ). So the government cannot infringe on this fundamental right without a compelling state interest. See Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). But because the Constitution protects against state action, government officials are generally not obligated to protect against harm from private actors. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services , a child-abuse case in which an abusive father ultimately killed his son, the Supreme Court held that "[a]s a general matter, ... a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989).
But the Sixth Circuit recognizes two exceptions to DeShaney ’s general rule. As alluded to in DeShaney , an officer can be liable where "the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular individuals." Id. at 198, 109 S.Ct. 998. The first exception, referred to as the custody exception, applies "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." Lipman v. Budish , 974 F.3d 726, 741 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting DeShaney , 489 U.S. at 199–200, 109 S.Ct. 998 ). The second exception, referred to as the state-created danger exception, applies "where the state acts to create or increase the danger of private harm." Lipman , 974 F.3d at 732 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that the Officers’ conduct fits both exceptions because, after placing her in their custody, they put Reynolds into a more dangerous situation than where they found her. (ECF No. 24, PageID.445.) More specifically, says Plaintiff, the officers removed Reynolds from a well-lit, fairly populous area of a safe city to a dark, less populous area of a much more dangerous city.
Before addressing whether Plaintiff has pled facts supporting either exception, the Court briefly addresses Defendants’ assertion that there are no exceptions to DeShaney ’s general rule. Defendants spend an excessive number of pages arguing that the Court should ignore binding Sixth Circuit precedent and reject the existence of the exceptions. (ECF No. 21, PageID.378–386.) This the Court will not do. The two exceptions are firmly rooted in Sixth Circuit caselaw and the proper inquiry is instead whether the exceptions apply to the facts of this case. The application of both exceptions turns on the issue of the Officers’ state of mind. For the custody exception to apply, the state actors must be "sufficiently culpable to be liable under a substantive due process theory." Stemler v. City of Florence , 126 F.3d 856, 867 (6th Cir. 1997). And under the state-created danger exception, a plaintiff must show that in exacerbating the risk of private acts of violence, the Officers acted "with a sufficiently culpable mental state." Jane Doe v. Jackson Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 954 F.3d 925, 932 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Jackson Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 895, 208 L.Ed.2d 452 (2020) (internal citations omitted). In Jackson , the court makes clear the "requisite culpability" is a "high bar" which "only extreme misconduct will violate." Id. at 932–33. Here, Reynolds was in custody or, if not, the Officers had the opportunity to "reflect[ ]" and make an "unhurried judgment[ ]." Id. at 933 (quoting Bukowski v. City of Akron , 326 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2003) ). In either case, the law says that the Officers needed to act with "deliberate indifference" to be sufficiently culpable for liability to attach under the DeShaney exceptions. Id.
Deliberate indifference has two parts: (1) "An official must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference," and (2) "[h]aving drawn the inference, the official next must act or fail to act in a manner demonstrating reckless or callous indifference toward the individual's rights." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Importantly, the awareness of a risk of serious harm must be knowledge of "the specific risk that later develops," not just "a general risk of harm." Id. at 934.
Plaintiff does not, and cannot reasonably plead that the Officers knew of the specific risk that Plaintiff alleges befell Reynolds—being sexually assaulted and murdered by DeAngelo Martin. One key missing link in the causal chain of establishing culpability is that no one knows what happened to Reynolds after she was last seen at the Detroit gas station. Plaintiff pleads that Martin led her from the gas station to a nearby abandoned house and murdered her. But Martin has not even been charged with Reynolds’ murder.
And even if the Court assumed Plaintiff's allegation that Martin killed Reynolds to be true, Plaintiff would still not be able to establish the required deliberate indifference. The second key missing link is that the Officers did not know, and had no reason to know or even suspect, that Martin would later be arrested for the murders of multiple women in a similar demographic to Reynolds. In fact, they did not even have reason to believe he posed any danger to Reynolds. When the Officers first encountered Reynolds she was already with Martin and the pair seemed, at a minimum, to be friendly with each other. (See generally ECF No. 10.) As just one example, the Officers witnessed Martin put his arm around Reynolds without her protesting or moving away. (ECF No. 10) (Skomski body cam 11:05–11:30.) The Officers did not witness Martin commit any violence that night or during their previous encounter with him. (ECF No. 10.) And the Officers ran Martin's name through their database and did not find any concerning information about him. (ECF No. 16, PageID.160; ECF No. 10 (Szczesniak body cam 10:15–12:10).)
The Court certainly does not condone the Officers’ decision-making as pled in this case and as reflected in the videos. But because Plaintiff has not plausibly pled that the Officers knew of the specific risk to Reynolds that would later develop from dropping her at the Detroit gas station with Martin—or even the general risk that Martin might try to harm Reynolds in any way—Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that the Officers were deliberately indifferent. And because deliberate indifference is required to meet the culpability element of both the custody and state-created-danger exceptions, Plaintiff's substantive due process claim fails and must be dismissed.
B.
Next the Court will address Plaintiff's equal protection claim. Plaintiff claims that the Officers treated Reynolds differently than they would have treated a white person when they transported her out of Ferndale and dropped her in the majority-black city of Detroit even though she lived in Warren. (ECF No. 16, PageID.166.)
The Equal Protection Clause requires that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause is "essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr. , 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) ; see also Jolivette v. Husted , 694 F.3d 760, 771 (6th Cir. 2012). To state an equal protection claim, Plaintiff must adequately plead that "the government treated [Reynolds] disparately as compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis." Courser v. Allard , 969 F.3d 604, 617 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ctr. for Bio–Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano , 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) ); see also Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The threshold element of an equal protection claim is disparate treatment[.]"); Foster v. Michigan , 573 F. App'x 377, 396 (6th Cir. 2014) ("A prima facie case of discrimination requires a plaintiff to show that she was treated differently than others outside of the protected class.").
Although Reynolds is a member of a protected class on account of her race, Plaintiff fails to meet this first requirement because he does not plausibly allege that Reynolds was treated differently than a similarly situated person of another race: i.e. a person found with an open intoxicant in public in the early hours of the morning and about whom the police received citizen complaints. Plaintiff's claim of disparate treatment is based purely on the speculation that "had Ms. Reynolds been [white], Defendant Officers would not have treated her" in the same manner. (ECF No. 16, PageID.166.) Plaintiff has not pled any facts or identified any other comparable cases to support this conclusory allegation. Although the disparate impact of certain police practices on Black people is a documented problem in some communities, the Court cannot infer discriminatory treatment without more facts to support that allegation. "Judicial experience and common sense" alone do not make it plausible that the Officers would treat a similarly situated white person differently than they treated Reynolds. Without alleging specific facts beyond the fact of the parties’ racial identities, Plaintiff cannot plead a plausible claim of disparate treatment.
The Court appreciates that Plaintiff has not yet had the benefit of discovery, but "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss’ and thus entitles a counter-plaintiff to ‘unlock the doors of discovery.’ " Detroit Will Breathe v. City of Detroit , No. 20-12363, 2021 WL 915513, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 10, 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). Because Plaintiff has not pled any facts to support the allegation that Reynolds was treated differently than a white person in her situation would have been treated, the equal protection claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Daniels v. City of Wyoming , No. 17-3133, 2017 WL 7661477, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 5, 2017) ("Because [plaintiff] does not plead sufficient facts regarding more favorable treatment accorded to white individuals to support his conclusory assertion, he fails to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause."); Perry v. Knapp , No. 20-1917, 2021 WL 1102298, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 2021) (affirming district court's dismissal of equal protection claim because plaintiff "failed to allege that he was treated differently than similarly situated inmates"); Raymond v. O'Connor , 526 F. App'x 526, 530 (6th Cir. 2013) ("Without specific factual allegations of disparate treatment, the district court properly dismissed Raymond's equal protection claim.").
C.
The final federal claim is Plaintiff's municipal liability claim against the City of Ferndale. Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The Supreme Court ruled in Monell that "[a] municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory—in other words, ‘solely because it employs a tortfeasor.’ " D'Ambrosio v. Marino , 747 F.3d 378, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Monell , 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ). "Instead, a plaintiff must ‘demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the injury alleged.’ " Jackson v. City of Cleveland , 925 F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Alman v. Reed , 703 F.3d 887, 903 (6th Cir. 2013) ).
The Sixth Circuit recently made clear in a published opinion that "[a] municipality ‘can only be held liable if there is a showing of an underlying constitutional violation by’ its officials." M.J. by & through S.J. v. Akron City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 1 F.4th 436, 452 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Andrews v. Wayne County , 957 F.3d 714, 725 (6th Cir. 2020) ). Because all of Plaintiff's claims against the Officers are dismissed, so too is the Monell claim against the City.
D.
Plaintiff's final claim is a state-law claims for gross negligence. The Court's only basis for jurisdiction over this claim is supplemental jurisdiction. Now that Plaintiff's federal claims have been dismissed, the calculus for exercising supplemental jurisdiction has changed. "[A] federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff's federal-law claims should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff's state-law claims." Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply , 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006). Instead, "the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state court if the action was removed." Bell-Kachelski v. Michigan Prot. & Advoc. Serv., Inc. , No. 17-2508, 2018 WL 6823769, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 2018) (quoting Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp. , 89 F.3d 1244, 1254–55 (6th Cir. 1996) ). As this case is still in the pleading stage, the Court sees no reason to "needlessly decid[e] state law issues." Moon , 465 F.3d at 728 (quoting Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc. , 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993) ). So the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's gross negligence claim (Count IV of the amended complaint) and remands it to state court.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, but in no way minimizing the tragedy suffered by Plaintiff, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff's case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's gross negligence claim (Count IV) is remanded to state court.
SO ORDERED.