Opinion
1 CA-JV 21-0285
02-15-2022
REYNALDO M., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.S., Appellees.
Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix By Robert D. Rosanelli Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson By James William Rappaport Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. JD27527 The Honorable Lori Bustamante, Judge.
Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson
By James William Rappaport
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PERKINS, Judge.
¶1 Reynaldo M. ("Father") appeals the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to J.S., born March 2016. Mother is not a party to this appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2Father has a long history with the Department of Child Safety ("DCS"). In December 2016, DCS filed a dependency petition, alleging J.S. dependent as to Father and Mother for neglect and domestic violence. The juvenile court dismissed the dependency petition six months later and praised Mother's "exceptional" participation in DCS's services. The court acknowledged Father presented "evidence of some progress," but it remained concerned about Father's issues, as described by DCS. The court ordered J.S. to live with Mother and granted Father only supervised parenting time.
¶3 In November 2018, DCS took custody of J.S. after he was found alone outside a trailer park. Mother apparently left J.S. in Father's care, unsupervised, in violation of the juvenile court's orders. The court dismissed the dependency four months later, finding Father remedied any safety concerns. The court also made Father J.S.'s primary residential parent and gave Father sole legal decision-making.
¶4 In October 2019, seven months after Father received custody of J.S., J.S. reported that Father abused him. Father repeatedly spanked J.S. and hit him with a belt, which caused multiple bruises on his face, back, and legs. DCS removed J.S. from Father's care and filed a dependency petition, alleging Father's inability to parent due to abuse, mental health issues, neglect, and substance abuse. Because Father failed to appear at a pretrial conference in December 2019, the juvenile court found J.S. dependent and approved a family reunification case plan.
¶5 The juvenile court changed the case plan to termination and adoption in April 2021. DCS then petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights on the fifteen months' time in care ground. That August, the court held a one-day termination hearing.
¶6 DCS's case manager testified that DCS referred Father for several reunification services, including: transportation; substance abuse testing and treatment; anger management counseling; domestic violence counseling; a psychological evaluation; and multiple parent aides. Father completed substance abuse treatment, but he failed to consistently provide urinalysis samples. Father also completed a domestic violence course and partially completed anger management counseling.
¶7 The case manager also testified that Father participated in the intake session of his psychological evaluation but failed to attend future sessions. Father struggled to virtually participate in the first parent aide referral; he attended 7 of 23 visitations and 5 of 20 skill sessions. DCS referred Father for a second parent aide with in-person services. He showed some improvement, but the parent aide closed Father's referral because he failed to satisfy the parental-capacity enhancements. The parent aide determined Father needed additional time to satisfy those enhancements, but DCS chose not to provide a third referral.
¶8 The juvenile court terminated Father's parental rights on the fifteen months' time in care ground. Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶9 We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion. Titus S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 369, ¶ 15 (App. 2018). On appeal, due process requires us to assess whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude, based on the record, that the state has met its clear and convincing evidentiary burden to sustain the termination of parental rights. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 769 (1982). We will uphold the court's findings of fact "if supported by adequate evidence in the record." Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 452, ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (cleaned up).
¶10 To terminate the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must find parental unfitness based on at least one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). A court may terminate a parent-child relationship if a child remains in an out-of-home placement for a total period of fifteen months or longer and "there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future." A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The relevant circumstances are those "existing at the time of the severance that prevent a parent from being able to appropriately provide for his or her children." Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec, 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007) (cleaned up).
¶11 The juvenile court must also find DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family or that such efforts would have been futile. Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec, 193 Ariz. 185, 191-92, ¶¶ 31-34 (App. 1999). DCS must "undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success" and "provide a parent with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to improve the parent's ability to care for the child." Id. at 192, ¶¶ 34, 37.
¶12 Father only argues the juvenile court erroneously found he received appropriate reunification services because DCS did not refer him to a third parent aide, as suggested by the second parent aide.
¶13 The record includes reasonable evidence to support the juvenile court's reasonable efforts finding. Father attended less than one-third of scheduled skill sessions and visitations with the first parent aide and failed to successfully close out of the second parent aide. See id. at 192, ¶ 34 (DCS need not provide "every conceivable service" or futile services to fulfill its obligations).
¶14 Father showed a similar lack of engagement with other reunification services during the near two-year period that J.S. remained out of Father's care. Father often missed substance abuse tests and recommended counseling sessions. And he never completed anger management counseling. The record thus supports the juvenile court's finding that DCS provided sufficient reunification services, and Father has shown no abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
¶15 We affirm.