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terminating mother's rights where mother had repeatedly, violently abused her children — including stabbing a child in the hand, dropping the child out of a second-story window, and hitting the child on the head with a radio — and often threatened to kill them
Summary of this case from In Interest of M.S.R.Opinion
No. 01-05-00985-CV.
Opinion issued April 27, 2006.
On Appeal from the 314th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2004-04798J.
Panel consists of Justices TAFT, HIGLEY, and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the parental rights of appellant, Norma Jean Reyna, to her minor child, A.E.R. Presenting four points of error, appellant (1) contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it "refused to accept the parties' agreement that [the Department of Family and Protective Services] would be appointed sole managing conservator" of A.E.R. without terminating appellant's parental rights; (2) challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a determination that appellant "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed [A.E.R] with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of [A.E.R.]"; (3) challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a determination that appellant "failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for [her] to obtain the return of [A.E.R.]"; and (4) asserts that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support a determination that termination was in A.E.R.'s best interest.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
See id. § 161.001(1)(O) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
See id. § 161.001(2) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
We affirm.
Background
Much of the information contained in the background section, particularly with regard to appellant's other children, is derived from the Department of Family and Protective Services case file, which was admitted at trial without objection.
In January of 1999, the Department of Family and Protective Services ("the Department") received a report that appellant was manifesting bizarre and hostile behaviors toward her three daughters, ages 13, 11, and 6. The oldest daughter, S.M., had left home asking for help. S.M. felt suicidal because appellant was verbally tormenting her. S.M. reported that, on January 7, 1999, appellant had been continually yelling at her for no reason. According to S.M., appellant frequently "heard voices" and was hearing voices on that day. S.M., who had been sexually molested by her father a couple of years earlier, reported that appellant blamed S.M. for the molestation and tormented her by saying, "At least I did not get molested by my dad."
S.M. also reported that in late December 1999, appellant had grabbed her by the hair, threw her to the floor, scratched her face, and left a mark on her arm. S.M. stated that appellant often threatened to kill her. In addition, it was reported at that time that appellant often went into "rages" and attacked her three daughters. Moreover, it was reported that, at some point in the past, appellant had stabbed her 11-year-old daughter in the hand, dropped her from a second story window, and hit her on the head with a radio.
After an investigation, child protective services ("CPS") concluded that (1) S.M. felt suicidal due to appellant's threats and hostility; (2) appellant exhibited bizarre behavior and often attacked her daughters; and (3) the children were at risk of serious injuries because appellant was violent and suffering from an untreated mental illness. Based on appellant's history of physical and emotional abuse, the Department took custody of the girls. Psychological testing of appellant at that time revealed a diagnosis of "paranoid personality disorder." Permanent managing conservatorship of appellant's three oldest daughters was ultimately given to relatives in 2001.
In February of 2003, appellant gave birth to another daughter, R.R. The Department received a referral that R.R. was at risk for abuse based on appellant's history with regard to her three older daughters. Appellant would not allow the Department caseworker to see R.R., and the police were called. Appellant assaulted the responding police officer and spent one week in jail.
R.R. was initially placed with her father, Ricardo Lerma. The Department then learned that, in 1985, Lerma had broken his step-son's arm and bruised his eye, resulting in Lerma's being convicted of injury to a child. The Department also learned that Lerma had several driving while intoxicated convictions and that R.R. was actually living with a babysitter, not Lerma. The Department took custody of R.R. and placed her in foster care when she was two months old.
In August 2003, the Department again referred appellant for a psychiatric evaluation. The evaluation found appellant to have "personality disorder NOS with borderline and passive aggressive traits."
On May 6, 2004, appellant gave birth to A.E.R. Lerma is also A.E.R.'s father. The Department received a referral that the hospital was concerned about releasing A.E.R. to appellant. Appellant had been observed by the hospital staff acting strangely with A.E.R. The hospital reported that A.E.R. had been born prematurely and required oxygen. Appellant had been observed attempting to remove A.E.R.'s oxygen mask and cuddling with the infant inappropriately. The Department confirmed that appellant had a CPS history and an open case pending with regard to R.R. The Department was given temporary managing conservatorship of A.E.R., and she was placed in foster care.
Following a bench trial on July 30, 2004, the Department was given sole managing conservatorship of R.R. without terminating appellant's parental rights.
This case was tried to the bench on September 8, 2005. At the end of trial, the trial court orally found that appellant's parental rights to A.E.R. should be terminated pursuant to Family Code sections 161.001(1)(E) and 161.001(1)(O) and that such termination was in A.E.R.'s best interest. The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law at appellant's request. The trial court made "findings" that clear and convincing evidence was presented that (1) appellant had "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed [A.E.R] with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of [A.E.R.]"; (2) appellant "failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the mother to obtain the return of [A.E.R.]," and (3) "it is in the best interest of [A.E.R.] that she be placed in the sole managing conservatorship of [the Department]" because "appointment of the parents as managing conservator would not be in the best interest of the child because appointment would significantly impair [A.E.R.'s] physical or emotional development and it would not be in the interest of the child to appoint a relative or another person as managing conservator." The trial court concluded that appellant's parental rights to A.E.R. should be terminated.
The parental rights of A.E.R.'s father, Ricardo Lerma, were also terminated. Lerma is not a party to this appeal.
The Agreement
In her first point of error, appellant contends, "The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to accept the parties' agreement that [the Department] would be appointed sole managing conservator of [A.E.R.] without termination of parental rights."
Rule 38.1(h) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that an appellant's brief "must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). Here, appellant does not provide cogent legal analysis, properly discuss governing legal authority, or reference the record in support of her specific contention. See McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 682 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). Appellant appears to presume, without basis in the record, that the trial court refused to accept the agreement based on Family Code section 263.404 and then asserts that section 263.404's provisions do not apply. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.404 (Vernon 2002) (providing that court may render final order appointing the Department as managing conservator of child without terminating rights of parent of child if court finds that appointment of parent as managing conservator would not be in best interest of child, and it would not be in best interest of child to appoint relative of child or another person as managing conservator).
Appellant makes a single assertion that the trial court overruled what was "essentially . . . an agreement under Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure." Appellant does not, however, identify any document in the record constituting a Rule 11 agreement nor provide citation to the record to support her contention that a Rule 11 agreement existed. See Padilla v. La France, 907 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995) ("A settlement agreement must comply with rule 11 to be enforceable."). Moreover, appellant does not identify the location in the record where the trial court's ruling of which she complains may be found.
Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting what was "essentially . . . an agreement under Rule 11." See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 871, 881 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet.) ("A trial court's ruling regarding a Rule 11 agreement is reviewed for abuse of discretion."). It is elemental that an appellant has the burden to show that a trial court abused its discretion. See Williams v. Moers, 240 S.W.2d 336, 342 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("It is not enough that we cannot see how the court's exercise of discretion can be justified. We must be able to see that it cannot be justified."). Here, appellant does not refer to any case authority to support her contention that the trial court abused its discretion. Appellant also does not describe how the trial court's alleged rejection of a claimed "Rule 11" agreement, implicitly dismissing the Department's termination claim and determining conservatorship, constituted an abuse of discretion, other than to suggest that the trial court failed to consider properly the best interests of A.E.R. Yet, she does not show where the record supports such a suggestion, nor does she demonstrate how the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Rather, as we address in our sufficiency-of-the-evidence review, the trial court found that termination was in the best interest of A.E.R.
Moreover, as pointed out by the Department, Family Code section 161.203 provides that a suit to terminate "may not be dismissed nor may a nonsuit be taken unless the dismissal or nonsuit is approved by the court." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.203 (Vernon 2002). The agreement claimed by appellant effectively served to dismiss or nonsuit the Department's suit to terminate appellant's parental rights. Appellant does not address why section 161.203 did not vest the trial court with authority to disapprove of the agreement.
We overrule appellant's first point of error.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In her second point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a determination by the trial court, under Family Code section 161.001(1)(E), that appellant "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed [A.E.R] with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of [A.E.R.]." See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
A. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
The burden of proof at trial in parental-termination cases is by clear and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp. 2005); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code provides the method by which a court may involuntarily terminate the parent — child relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001. Under this section, a court may order the termination of the parent — child relationship if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) one or more of the acts enumerated in section 161.001(1) was committed and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. "Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 101.007 (Vernon 2002); J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264. This heightened burden of proof results in a heightened standard of review.
When determining legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding "to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true." J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. To give appropriate deference to the factfinder's conclusions, we must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. Id. This does not mean that we must disregard all evidence that does not support the finding. Id. Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence. Id. Therefore, in conducting a legal-sufficiency review in a parental-termination case, we must consider all of the evidence, not only that which favors the verdict. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 817 (Tex. 2005).
In determining a factual-sufficiency point, the higher burden of proof in termination cases also alters the appellate standard of review. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). "[A] finding that must be based on clear and convincing evidence cannot be viewed on appeal the same as one that may be sustained on a mere preponderance." Id. at 25. In considering whether evidence rises to the level of being clear and convincing, we must consider whether the evidence is sufficient to produce in the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegation sought to be established. Id. We consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." Id.
The natural rights that exist between parents and their children are of constitutional dimension. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Therefore, termination proceedings should be strictly scrutinized, and the involuntary termination statutes should be strictly construed in favor of the parent. Id. at 20-21. However, "[j]ust as it is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right." C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.
B. Endangerment Through Course of Conduct: Section 161.001(1)(E)
One of the grounds pled by the Department for terminating appellant's parental rights was Family Code section 161.001(1)(E). The trial court made a finding of fact tracking the language of section 161.001(1)(E). This subsection provides that a court may terminate the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E).
Within the context of section 161.001(1)(E), "endanger" means to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child's emotional or physical health. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). The danger to a child must arise solely from the parent's conduct as established by the parent's actions or by the parent's failure to act. See Robinson v. Tex. Dep't of Protective Regulatory Servs., 89 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 2002, no pet.). Although "endanger" means more than a "threat of metaphysical injury or the ill effects of a dysfunctional family," it does not require that the conduct be actually directed at a child or that a child suffer an actual injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. That is, the conduct does not have to constitute a concrete threat of injury to the child. In re M.J.M.L., 31 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). The conduct does not have to occur in the presence of the child. Director of Dallas County Child Protective Servs. v. Bowling, 833 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no writ). And the conduct may occur before the child's birth and both before and after the child has been removed by the Department. In re S.M.L.D., 150 S.W.3d 754, 757-58 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet.).
Termination under section 161.001(1)(E) typically requires evidence of more than a single act or omission. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). Endangerment may be satisfied by showing that a parent engaged in a "course of conduct" that endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being. In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 233 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2003, pet. denied).
A parent's past endangering conduct may create an inference that the parent's past conduct may recur and further jeopardize a child's present or future physical or emotional well-being. See In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). Particularly relevant to this case, the manner in which a parent treats other children in the family can be considered in deciding whether that parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of a child. See, e.g., In re D.L.N., 958 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Tex.App.-Waco 1997, pet. denied) (concluding that jurors could consider evidence showing how parent treated child's two sisters in deciding if parent engaged in course of conduct that endangered physical or emotional well-being of subject child), disapproved on other grounds by J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 267 and C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26. This is true even though the cited conduct occurred before the birth of the subject child. See, e.g., Navarrette v. Tex. Dep't of Human Resources, 669 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1984, no writ) (upholding termination of parental rights over child taken into custody from hospital after birth, even though child was not subjected to deplorable living conditions of six siblings).
The Department's case file regarding appellant's four older children and A.E.R. was admitted into evidence at trial without objection. The file demonstrated appellant had engaged in past violent and abusive conduct. As discussed, the Department received a report in 1999 that appellant's oldest daughter, S.M., was contemplating suicide because of appellant's verbal abuse, which included tormenting S.M. regarding S.M.'s earlier sexual abuse by her father. Appellant had also physically assaulted S.M. and had threatened to kill her on many occasions.
The Department's intake report from January 1999 indicates that appellant had in the past attacked her three daughters on a regular basis. The case file also revealed that, at some point before the January 1999 report was made, appellant had stabbed her 11-year-old daughter in the hand, dropped her from a second story window, and hit her on the head with a radio.
Appellant points out that the record does not reflect that she was ever charged with a criminal offense for her treatment of her three oldest daughters and that her parental rights were not terminated with regard to those children. Appellant is correct; however, the record does indicate that the Department concluded in 1999 that appellant's three oldest daughters were at risk of serious injuries because appellant was violent. This was not only the conclusion of the Department but also of a doctor at Intracare Hospital who attempted to work with the family at that time. The doctor reported that appellant was uncooperative with services and "acted out" at the hospital. The doctor and a unit supervisor at the hospital informed the Department that the children were at immediate risk of harm by appellant.
The record shows that appellant's three oldest daughters were removed from appellant's custody at that time and placed with an aunt and uncle. In 2001, relatives were given permanent managing conservatorship of the girls.
Moreover, appellant again exhibited violent behavior in 2003, following R.R.'s birth, when she assaulted the police officer who was called to assist the Department's caseworker to check on R.R.'s well-being. The record indicates that appellant hit and bit the officer.
These were all facts for the trial court, as factfinder, to have weighed and considered. From appellant's abuse of her three oldest daughters and her subsequent assault on a police officer, the trial court could have inferred that (1) appellant had engaged in course of conduct that endangered physical or emotional well-being of A.E.R., (2) appellant would continue her pattern of abusive behavior, and (3) A.E.R. would face abuse if placed in appellant's care. See D.L.N., 958 S.W.2d at 939 ("From Bowden's neglect of her other two children who lived with her, the jury could infer that D.L.N. was similarly treated before she came to live with the Dotsons, while visiting with Bowden, and that D.L.N. would face this type of treatment in the future if returned to Bowden's care."); see also In re T.L.S., 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.) (recognizing that "[d]uring the last decade, a principle has emerged in parental termination and child custody cases which recognizes that evidence that a parent has engaged in abusive or neglectful conduct in the past permits an inference that the parent will continue this behavior in the future").
Appellant also points out that the record does not show any injury to either R.R. or A.E.R. as a result of appellant's conduct. Nevertheless, for parental conduct to constitute endangerment of a child's well-being, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury; rather, it is sufficient that the child's well-being be jeopardized or exposed to loss or injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. The specific danger to the child's well-being need not be established as an independent proposition, but may instead be inferred from parental misconduct. Id. A showing of a causal connection between the parent's conduct and any resultant injury or adverse effect to the child is not required. Id.; see In re W.A.B., 979 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 1998, pet. denied) (concluding that section 161.001(1)(E) does not require causal connection between parent's misconduct and actual harm to child resulting from that misconduct; noting that "endanger" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Texas to mean to expose to loss or injury or to jeopardize); In re R.D., 955 S.W.2d 364, 368 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (recognizing that section 161.001(1)(E) does not require showing that parental conduct caused actual injury to child). Thus, even though no causal connection was established between appellant's actions and an actual injury to A.E.R., the trial court could have inferred that appellant's conduct exposed A.E.R. to injury and placed her in jeopardy, i.e., endangered A.E.R.'s physical well-being. The trial court could have further reasoned that, if she was placed in appellant's care, A.E.R.'s physical and emotional welfare would be at risk, given appellant's past conduct.
Such inference was also supported by the testimony of Nicole Newsome, the Department caseworker assigned to A.E.R.'s case. Newsome testified that she had been informed by the hospital following A.E.R.'s birth that appellant was acting strangely with A.E.R. It was reported that appellant had attempted to remove an oxygen mask from prematurely born A.E.R. and was cuddling inappropriately with her. With regard to her conduct at the hospital, appellant contends that "[t]here is nothing to suggest that Appellant wasn't just nervous, just trying to soothe the baby or adjust the oxygen cap to fit better." However, given appellant's history of abuse, it would have been reasonable for the trial court to have inferred that appellant's actions in the hospital were part of a continuing course of conduct of endangerment.
The trial court also heard evidence that appellant continued a relationship with Lerma despite the fact that he had assaulted her when she was pregnant with A.E.R. and had a criminal history, including a conviction for injury to a child.
Appellant testified that, when she was pregnant with A.E.R., Lerma had slammed the car door on her stomach. Appellant testified that this occurred when she was attempting to prevent Lerma from leaving with his daughter because Lerma was drunk. According to appellant, Lerma had also kicked and hit her in the stomach while she was pregnant and then had laughed. Appellant also testified that Lerma at one time had gotten drunk and destroyed her property.
In her brief, appellant asserts, "Appellant exercised poor judgment when she stayed with [Lerma] for one month due to his admitted violent nature, but the record shows that she presently does not live with him or associate with him to any degree which would expose herself or her children to danger." Despite her assertion, appellant testified that she had seen Lerma two weeks before trial. Prior to that, Lerma had been living with appellant and her mother for three weeks. The record also reflects that, at the time of trial, appellant was three weeks from delivering her sixth child. Appellant testified that Lerma was also the father of that baby. Appellant admitted that the sexual relations between her and Lerma resulting in that pregnancy had been consensual. The trial court also could have considered appellant's continued relationship with Lerma in concluding that the placement of A.E.R. with appellant would endanger her well-being. See Sylvia M. v. Dallas County Welfare Unit, 771 S.W.2d 198, 204 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, no writ) (considering "volatile and chaotic" marriage, altercation during pregnancy, and mother's repeated reconciliation with abusive spouse in upholding termination of parental rights).
Additionally, the trial court could have considered appellant's mental state. In cases in which a parent's mental state allows her to engage in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child, that conduct has bearing on the advisability of terminating the parent's rights. In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2003, no pet.); In re C.D., 664 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ). The intake report found in the Department's case file for the 1999 incident indicated that appellant's daughters reported that appellant would "hear voices" on a regular basis and "would talk to people who were not present." The Department stated in its 1999 conclusion that the children were at risk for serious injuries because appellant was violent and had "an untreated mental illness." Appellant's 1999 psychological evaluation included a diagnosis of "paranoid personality disorder." A 2003 evaluation revealed a diagnosis of "personality disorder NOS with borderline and passive aggressive traits."
At trial, caseworker Newsome told the trial court that appellant exhibited "a lot of paranoia," particularly during her scheduled visitations with A.E.R. After changing A.E.R.'s diaper, appellant had claimed that she believed that A.E.R. had been sexually abused because A.E.R.'s bottom was red and irritated. Newsome testified that she had checked A.E.R. and found no indication that A.E.R. had been abused. Appellant also claimed that A.E.R. had ant bites, sores, and lumps. Newsome stated that she never saw any of the marks on A.E.R. that appellant claimed.
We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to a finding of endangerment, was sufficiently clear and convincing that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered A.E.R.'s physical or emotional welfare. We further conclude that, viewed in light of the entire record, any disputed evidence could have been reconciled in favor of the trial court's endangerment determination or was not so significant that the trial court could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the children's physical or emotional welfare. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the endangerment finding.
We overrule appellant's second point of error. C. Best Interest of A.E.R.
Because there is sufficient evidence of endangerment, we need not address the appellant's third issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that appellant did not comply with a court order in violation of section 161.001(1)(O).
In her fourth issue, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's required finding that termination would be in the children's best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(2) (Vernon Supp. 2005). Some of the factors that an appellate court may consider in ascertaining the best interest of a child include the non-exhaustive list set forth in Holley v. Adams. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). Those factors include the following: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.
These factors are not exhaustive. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The absence of evidence about some of these factors does not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child's best interest. Id. "Best interest" does not require proof of any unique set of factors, nor does it limit proof to any specific factors. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72. With the foregoing legal precepts in mind, we review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination was in the children's best interest.
We agree with the Department that the evidence discussed above that supports the endangerment determination is also probative of whether termination of appellant's parental rights is in A.E.R.'s best interest. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. That is, the evidence showing appellant's history of violent conduct, her continued relationship with Lerma, and her untreated mental health disorders that manifested as abusive and violent behaviors also support the trial court's best-interest finding.
At trial, the evidence showed that A.E.R. was living in a foster home with her sister, R.R. The guardian ad litem informed the trial court that she believed it was in A.E.R.'s best interest that appellant's parental rights be terminated because appellant was not able to provide A.E.R. with a safe and stable home. The guardian ad litem informed the trial court that A.E.R. should remain in her current foster placement because the home was meeting all of her physical and emotional needs and allowed her to be placed with her sister, R.R.
Evidence was also presented that, though born prematurely, A.E.R. was developmentally on target and had no special needs. At the time of trial, A.E.R. was 16 months old. Newsome testified that A.E.R. had been in her current foster home since she was a newborn. Newsome also told the court that A.E.R. was "very bonded" with her foster mother and that the foster mother wanted to adopt A.E.R. No evidence was presented regarding the degree of bonding between appellant and A.E.R.
The record shows that appellant was living with her mother. The Department's case file indicated that appellant's mother had a history of mental illness and had reportedly abused appellant as a child. Appellant testified that she plans to move out of her mother's house but had not applied for housing.
According to appellant, she was not able to work because of her pregnancy and had been placed on "bed rest." Appellant stated that she had last worked at a temporary, seasonal job the previous Christmas at a department store. Appellant testified that she was receiving food stamps and WIC. She stated that she received $238 in spousal support from her ex-husband and anticipated that in one month she would begin receiving $2,500 a month from her ex-husband's retirement account. Appellant testified that she was entitled to the retirement and needed to hire an attorney to assist her in getting her share. Appellant told the trial court that, if A.E.R. were returned to her, she planned to hire a nanny. Appellant stated that "work force" told her that they would help her pay for a nanny.
Evidence was presented that, under her service plan, appellant was required to participate in psychological testing. The evidence showed that appellant did not undergo the testing; however, Newsome testified that the Department was unable to get funding for appellant's testing. Evidence was also presented that appellant missed six scheduled visits with A.E.R. The caseworker testified that she assumed that it was because appellant was pregnant with her sixth child but also stated that appellant had never provided an explanation for the missed visits.
In sum, given the evidence, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that A.E.R. was at risk for neglect and abuse should she be placed with appellant and that appellant could not provide her with a stable home. We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the best-interest finding, was sufficiently clear and convincing that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of the parent-child relationship between appellant and A.E.R. was in A.E.R.'s best interest. We further conclude that, viewed in light of the entire record, any disputed evidence could have been reconciled in favor of the trial court's finding that termination of the parent-child relationship between appellant and A.E.R. was in A.E.R.'s best interest or was not so significant that the trial court could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination was in A.E.R.'s best interest. Thus, we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support such finding.
We overrule appellant's fourth point of error.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.