Opinion
NUMBER 13-14-00577-CR
02-04-2016
JUAN REYNA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 28th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garza, Perkes, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant Juan Reyna pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance (heroin), a second-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). In a single issue on appeal, Reyna argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 20, 2013, Agent Roberto Montalvo of the Texas Department of Public Safety—Criminal Investigations Division received a tip from a woman that lives in the neighborhood who identified herself by name that a male subject was regularly distributing narcotics on Harold Street near the intersection with Carol Street in Corpus Christi. That same day, Montalvo drove to Harold Street to investigate; at the time, he was in an unmarked car and wearing regular civilian clothing. As Montalvo was driving westbound on Harold Street, he noticed a man, later identified as Reyna, standing in the middle of the road next to a female. Montalvo testified at the suppression hearing that both Reyna and the female were acting extremely suspiciously because they were constantly looking around as if to see if they were being watched. Montalvo stated that he saw Reyna lean in close to the woman and hand her something very small. Believing this activity to be consistent with narcotics trafficking, Montalvo made a U-turn, and exited his vehicle with his weapon drawn for "safety since [he] was out there alone." Montalvo identified himself and the female subject fled. Montalvo testified that because he had received a tip about a male subject distributing drugs, he focused on Reyna instead of the woman. According to Montalvo, he told Reyna the reason why he was being detained by stating, "I saw you give dope to that female," to which Reyna replied, "well, I already gave it to her." Montalvo patted down Reyna and found four "20s" of heroin in his front right coin pocket.
Montalvo testified that a "20" is a small amount of any substance worth $20. According to Montalvo, this is a common amount of a substance to be carrying around when dealing drugs. --------
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Reyna entered an open plea of guilty to the charged offense and a plea of true to the enhancement paragraphs before the trial court on September 15, 2014. Based on the plea, the trial court sentenced Reyna to twenty-five years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division. This appeal ensued.
II. PROBABLE CAUSE
In a single issue on appeal, Reyna argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the drugs and his statements to Montalvo. Reyna contends that: (1) Montalvo did not have probable cause to arrest Reyna; (2) his statements are inadmissible because he was never read his Miranda rights before being questioned; and (3) Montalvo unreasonably conducted a warrantless search that resulted in discovering the heroin.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed under a bifurcated standard of review. See Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. See Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor; and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673. We review de novo the trial court's pure legal rulings and application-of-law-to-fact questions that do turn on credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
A police officer may temporarily detain an individual when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual "actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable suspicion exists when the officer has specific and articulable facts that, when combined with the inferences from those facts, lead the officer to reasonably believe that the individual is or will soon be engaged in crime. Id. Even though an informant's tip by itself will seldom provide reasonable suspicion, a tip can support reasonable suspicion when coupled with the officer's personal observations. See Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). "An inverse relationship exists between the reliability of the informant and the amount of corroborated information required to justify the police intrusion; the less reliable the tip, the more information is needed." Id. A tip is considered significantly more reliable if the informant provides self-identifying information that makes himself accountable for the intervention. See id.
A police officer may arrest an individual without a warrant only if (1) there is probable cause with respect to that individual and (2) the arrest falls within one of the statutory exceptions. Beverly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 103, 104-105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). One of those exceptions provides that "[a] peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The test for probable cause for a warrantless arrest is whether "at that moment the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed or was committing an offense." Beverly, 792 S.W.2d at 105. In other words, probable cause requires "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). Police officers may search an arrestee and everything within his immediate control incident to a lawful arrest. State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
"The Miranda rule generally prohibits the admission into evidence of statements made in response to custodial interrogation when the suspect has not been advised of certain warnings." State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). "In the Miranda context, interrogation means any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). Thus, interrogation includes express questions and its functional equivalents. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. However, not "all statements obtained by the police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of interrogation." Id. Interrogation reflects a "measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." Id. Statements made voluntarily by a defendant in custody are fully admissible. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
B. Discussion
Reyna argues that Montalvo did not have probable cause to arrest Reyna, meaning that the pat-down search of Reyna was unreasonable. However, we give great deference to the trial court's determinations on these mixed questions of law and fact since they rely on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. See Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673. We find that the trial court did not err in ruling that Officer Montalvo had reasonable suspicion to detain Reyna and then developed probable cause to arrest and search Reyna. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 488.
Montalvo had received a tip from a self-identified woman in the area that a man was dealing drugs near a certain street corner. Because the tip came from a self-identified woman, the tip is considered reliable; accordingly, less information is required to support Montalvo's development of reasonable suspicion. See Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923. Only two blocks from that location, Montalvo witnessed a man meeting that description interacting with a woman in the middle of the road. According to Montalvo's own observations, both the man and the woman were acting suspiciously, standing in the middle of the road and constantly looking around as if afraid of being watched, and they exchanged something small. Based on the totality of the circumstances at that point in the encounter, including the tip that described the general location of the drug-trafficking along with Montalvo's observations, the evidence established a reasonable suspicion to detain Reyna. See Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923; Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 488. Immediately in response to Montalvo explaining why he was detaining Reyna, Reyna replied, "well, I already gave it to her." Under the facts and circumstances known to Montalvo at the time, he had probable cause to believe Reyna had engaged in criminal conduct. See Beverly, 792 S.W.2d at 105. Having probable cause to arrest Reyna, Montalvo could lawfully conduct a warrantless search incident to the arrest. See Granville, 423 S.W.3d at 410. The search was contemporaneous with the arrest and was limited to Reyna's personal area of control; therefore, Montalvo conducted a valid search of Reyna incident to his arrest. See id.
Reyna also argues that because he was in custody and was not read his Miranda warnings, any statements he made are inadmissible. Assuming without deciding that Reyna was in custody for purposes of Miranda, his statements to Montalvo were not the result of police interrogation or compulsion. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Montalvo testified that it is common to tell individuals why they are being detained. There is no evidence that this was a preconceived strategy to induce Reyna to incriminate himself or that Montalvo should have known that his comment would elicit an incriminating response. See Cruz, 461 S.W.3d at 536. Reyna's statement that he had already dealt the drugs was a voluntary response of his own volition and thus fully admissible. See id.; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. We cannot say that Montalvo should have known that his statement to Reyna was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. See Cruz, 461 S.W.3d at 536.
The trial court committed no error in denying Reyna's motion to suppress. Therefore, we overrule Reyna's sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Nora L. Longoria
Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 4th day of February, 2016.