Opinion
May 8, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County, (Molloy, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
The Supreme Court properly concluded that the plaintiff was a special employee of the defendant and dismissed the complaint on the ground that it is barred by the Workers' Compensation Law (see, Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 553; Leone v Columbia Sussex House Corp., 203 A.D.2d 430; Carreras v Lawrence Aviation Indus., 201 A.D.2d 693; Cameli v Pace Univ., 131 A.D.2d 419; see also, Schulze v Associated Univs., 212 A.D.2d 588; Levine v Lee's Pontiac, 203 A.D.2d 259; cf., Matter of Reyes v Southern Blvd. Partners, 78 A.D.2d 746, 747). Sullivan, J.P., O'Brien, Thompson and Hart, JJ., concur.