Opinion
No. 14-03-00519-CR
Opinion filed May 25, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 183rd District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 906,315. Affirmed.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, ANDERSON, and HUDSON.
OPINION
Appellant, Nelson Ariel Reyes, was charged by indictment with aggravated robbery. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 29.03 (Vernon 2003). Appellant pled "guilty" to the offense, and the jury subsequently assessed his punishment at twenty years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In appellant's sole point of error, he complains the trial court allowed the State's attorney to engage in improper jury argument during her closing argument. We affirm. Appellant and two others planned to steal jewelry from Magdalena Rubio. On the night of October 9, 2001, appellant and his two accomplices kicked in the front door of the Rubios' apartment. Brandishing a gun, appellant demanded the jewelry. Mrs. Rubio complied. However, Mrs. Rubio's son recognized appellant from school. In his only point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's objections to the prosecutor's alleged improper jury argument. Specifically, appellant complains that the State's attorney urged jurors to "meet community expectations when assessing punishment," urged jurors to meet the personal expectations of the prosecutor, and asked jurors to abandon their objectivity by putting themselves in the shoes of the victims. Appellant directs us to seven different parts of the record in illustrating the alleged improper jury argument. We find that appellant has preserved nothing for review on appeal. In order to complain on appeal about improper jury argument, appellant must "show that he objected and pursued his objection to an adverse ruling." Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). A review of the record reveals that in five of the seven instances where appellant alleges error, no objection was made by appellant. Accordingly, without a proper objection, error is waived on appeal. Id. Likewise, we cannot consider the remaining two instances where objections were raised because of appellant's failure to make timely and/or specific objections. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. For example, appellant contends the prosecutor acted improperly when she stated: "Today, you are the only people who can do that role. The Judge can't do it. I can't do it. Society is depending upon you-all to protect us." However, by the time appellant objected, the State attorney had already moved on and was discussing a different issue related to the identity of a coconspirator. Moreover, appellant merely stated, "Objection, Your Honor, improper argument." The same situation arises later in the record. On appeal, appellant claims improper argument through the following statement: "[D]on't think for a second that you-all don't have the obligation to protect the rest of us." Just as before, appellant did not object when these statements were made, but made his objection later, when State's counsel began discussing sentence length. Again, appellant's objection was merely, "Your Honor, this is improper jury argument." Although appellant argues that he was objecting to the statements mentioned above, this assertion is not apparent from the record. Even if we were to find the objections were timely made, they were not specific enough to indicate which statements appellant deemed improper. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Accordingly, nothing has been preserved for our review. Appellant's point of error is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.