Opinion
NNHCV176071560S
10-15-2019
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Jon M. Alander, Judge of the Superior Court
The petitioner who was convicted of several criminal offenses following a jury trial has filed a petition for a new trial pursuant to Connecticut Statutes § 52-270(a) and Practice Book section 42-55. The petitioner asserts in his petition that he has discovered previously unknown evidence that would likely produce a different result at a new trial. Specifically, he contends that (1) evidence has come to light that establishes that a third party is responsible for the crimes of which he has been convicted and (2) the state failed to disclose evidence which would materially impeach the credibility of a significant witness who testified against him at trial. The state asserts that the evidence submitted by the petitioner at the hearing on his petition fails to establish third-party culpability and the impeachment evidence was known to the petitioner at the time of trial.
In his petition for a new trial, the petitioner lists a third item of claimed newly discovered evidence as a basis for a new trial, an invoice dated December 29, 2005 from East Haven Building Supply. The petitioner abandoned this claim at the hearing on the petition.
The petitioner was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of arson in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-112(a)(2), two counts of conspiracy to commit criminal mischief in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-115(a)(1) and 53a-48(a), and one count of conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-101(a)(1) and 53a-48(a). The facts underlying the petitioner’s convictions were succinctly detailed in the Supreme Court’s affirmance of those convictions. "At the time of the events in question, the defendant owned a Laundromat and several investment properties in the Fair Haven section of the city of New Haven. In October 2008, the defendant paid two employees, Osvaldo Segui, Sr., and Osvaldo Segui, Jr., to set fire to 95 Downing Street in New Haven, a single-family residence that the defendant had sold to Robert Lopez and his mother, Carmen Lopez, in 2002. The defendant was angry that Robert Lopez would not sell the property back to him and informed Segui, Sr., that, after the fire, he intended to purchase the lot of land on which the residence had stood before the fire. Segui, Sr., and Segui, Jr., both of whom lived rent free in one of the defendant’s properties, agreed to set the fire, and, in the early morning hours of October 9, 2008, they did so. In May 2009, the defendant enlisted Segui, Sr., and Segui, Jr., to set another fire, this time to a vehicle belonging to Madeline Vargas, a local businesswoman and employee of a nonprofit substance abuse services agency operating in Fair Haven. Although the defendant did not tell Segui, Sr., why he had had him set fire to Vargas’ car, the evidence adduced at trial indicated that the defendant was motivated by spite- the result of an ongoing dispute between him and Vargas over Vargas’ attempts, in 2008, to run an outreach program for local drug addicts in an empty parking lot near the defendant’s Laundromat. The defendant, Segui, Sr., and Segui, Jr., were subsequently charged with various offenses related to the 2008 and 2009 arsons. Prior to being tried in state court, the defendant was tried in federal court on unrelated arson charges. Segui, Sr., and Segui, Jr., also were charged in that federal case but agreed to testify against the defendant in exchange for reduced sentences. In the present case, Segui, Sr., and Segui, Jr., entered into plea agreements pursuant to which, in exchange for their testimony, they received a sentence that did not require them to serve any more time than they were required to serve in connection with the federal case." State v. Reyes, 325 Conn. 815, 818-19 (2017). The petitioner was acquitted after a jury trial in the federal case.
Pursuant to Connecticut Statutes § 52-270(a) and Practice Book section 42-55, a convicted criminal defendant may petition for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The consideration of a petition for a new trial is governed by the standard set forth in Asherman v. State, 202 Conn. 429 (1987). Shabazz v. State, 259 Conn. 811, 820 (2001). "[A] court is justified in granting a petition for a new trial when it is satisfied that the evidence offered in support thereof: (1) is newly discovered such that it could not have been discovered previously despite the exercise of due diligence; (2) would be material to the issues on a new trial; (3) is not cumulative; and (4) is likely to produce a different result in the event of a new trial. Id., 820-21. In addition to considering these four specific elements, "[a] court’s decision on the petition should be guided by the more general principle that a new trial will be warranted on the basis of newly discovered evidence only where an injustice was done and whether it is probable that on a new trial a different result would be reached." Id., 821.
Connecticut Statutes § 52-270(a) provides in pertinent part that "The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for ... the discovery of new evidence ..."
Practice Book section 42-55 provides that "A request for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence shall be called a petition for a new trial and shall be brought in accordance with General Statutes § 52-270. The judicial authority may grant the petition even though an appeal is pending."
The petitioner first asserts that after his conviction he discovered evidence that points to an individual named Saul Valentin as the person who employed Segui, Sr., and Segui, Jr. to burn the property at 95 Downing Street and Vargas’ automobile. The state argues that the evidence presented at the hearing on the petition falls far short of establishing Valentin’s culpability for the crimes and that it would not likely result in a different result at a new trial. I agree with the state.
At the hearing on the petition, the petitioner presented four witnesses in support of his claim of third-party culpability. Yeskol Leon testified that during 2008 and 2009 he was working for Valentin selling illegal drugs. Leon got into a dispute with Valentin because he refused to accede to Valentin’s request that Leon falsely admit to the police that drugs belonging to Valentin actually belonged to Leon. Subsequently, a motor vehicle belonging to Leon and a motor vehicle belonging to his mother were burned. Leon testified that he did not know who burned the vehicles but he did see Valentin walking in the vicinity shortly after the burning of his vehicle.
The petitioner also called Adrian Sosa as a witness. Sosa testified that he knew the petitioner, Valentin, Segui, Sr., and Segui, Jr. He further testified that he spoke to Segui, Sr. about Segui, Sr. testifying against the petitioner in his criminal trial and that Segui, Sr. said "he had to do what he had to do." Sosa denied that Segui, Sr. told him that Valentin pressured him to testify against the petitioner. He also stated that he did not know whether Valentin, Segui, Sr., and Segui, Jr. were involved in a drug operation in New Haven and he denied that he sold drugs at the behest of Valentin. Sosa further denied that he saw Segui, Sr. burn cars, that Segui, Sr. told him that he burned cars, or that Segui, Sr. told that him that he burned cars at the behest of Valentin. The petitioner impeached Sosa’s testimony with regard to each of these statements through the admission of inconsistent statements that Sosa made in an interview with the petitioner’s investigator on May 13, 2015.
A prior inconsistent statement of a nonparty witness is admissible only for impeachment purposes and is inadmissible to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein. State v. Villafane, 171 Conn. 644, 672 (1976). The petitioner did not seek to admit the contradictory statements as substantive evidence pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 (1986).
Nulbert Sullivan also testified on behalf of the petitioner. Sullivan testified that in 2012 he spoke with Valentin when they were both incarcerated in federal prison in New Jersey. They discussed the federal criminal charges pending against the petitioner in New Haven. Valentin expressed concern that he not "fall into the mix" and have it affect his release date. Valentin said he was concerned that the burning of a black BMW may come back to haunt him. Valentin did not say that he was involved in the burning of the car and he did not say that Segui, Sr. was involved in burning the car. Sullivan also denied that Valentin said that he sent Segui, Sr. to set fire to the vehicle. Again, the petitioner impeached Sullivan’s testimony regarding the involvement of Valentin and Segui, Sr. in setting fire to the black BMW through the admission of inconsistent statements that Sullivan made in an interview with the petitioner’s investigator on September 30, 2015.
See fn 2, supra.
James Salvana testified that he knew both Valentin and Segui, Sr. and that Segui, Sr. sold drugs for Valentin. In 2007 or 2008, Valentin and Segui, Sr. picked Salvana up in Segui, Sr.’s Jeep, drove him to a location in New Haven, supplied him with a container of gasoline and told him to burn a white truck. Salvana did so. He was told that the truck was burned because of an unpaid drug transaction.
The sum total of the testimony of the petitioner’s four witnesses is that on one occasion in 2007 or 2008 Valentin and Segui, Sr. were involved in the burning of a white truck in New Haven and Valentin may have been involved in the arson of a black BMW. No evidence was submitted that connected Valentin, directly or indirectly, to the burning of the property at 95 Downing Street or the green BMW owned by Vargas. In order to offer evidence pointing to a third party’s culpability, the defendant must establish a direct connection between the third party and the charged offense, rather than merely raising a bare suspicion that another could have committed the crime. State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 610 (2007). The fact that Valentin during the relevant time period burned a separate motor vehicle with the assistance of Segui, Sr. and may have burned a second motor vehicle fail to connect him in any way to the arson of Vargas’ vehicle or Lopez’ property. The petitioner presented no evidence that Valentin knew Vargas or Lopez, had any motive to burn their property or was present at the scene of the fires. The evidence offered by the petitioner was not material to the issues at petitioner’s trial and certainly not likely to produce a different result in the event of a new trial.
At the hearing on his petition for a new trial, the petitioner also offered evidence through the admission of a press release issued by the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection that, on May 24, 2007, approximately sixteen months prior to the arson of 95 Downing Street, a search warrant was executed at three addresses, including 95 Downing Street, which resulted in twelve arrests and the seizure of drugs and a rifle. The press release did not identify which arrestees and which contraband was found at which location. The petitioner asserts that information concerning the presence of contraband at 95 Downing Street was material evidence which he could have used to impeach Lopez, the owner and manager of the property. The state contends that the existence of a prior search and seizure at the property was known to the petitioner prior to his trial. I agree with the state.
Introduced into evidence at the hearing for a new trial was an FBI 302 report dated October 17, 2008 which stated that approximately ten months previously a search and seizure warrant had been executed on the property at 95 Downing Street and a cache of weapons was seized. The petitioner conceded that the FBI 302 report was provided prior to the federal trial to his attorney, Attorney John Williams. Attorney Williams also represented the petitioner at the state trial. The FBI 302 report gave notice to the petitioner that a search was conducted and contraband seized by law enforcement personnel at 95 Downing Street. Accordingly, the existence of the search is not newly discovered evidence. In addition, by the petitioner’s own admission, the primary witnesses against him at trial were Segui, Sr., and Segui, Jr. The impeachment of Lopez through the existence of contraband at his property sixteen months earlier is not likely to change the result at a new trial.
For the aforementioned reasons, the petitioner’s petition for a new trial is hereby denied.