No. 05-01-01886-CR.
Opinion Filed February 24, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 199-81216-00. AFFIRM.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, RICHTER, and FRANCIS.
Opinion By Justice RICHTER.
A jury convicted Jason Patrick Rexroad of retaliation, and the trial court assessed punishment at eight years confinement and a $1500 fine. On appeal, appellant raises two points of error, contending the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.
Background
Alice Mervicker was working in the Collin County jail on the afternoon of October 3, 1999, when she overheard a conversation between two inmates whose cells abutted her office. The two inmates, appellant and Daniel Vick, were in "administrative segregation" because of disciplinary reasons and "were not happy." Appellant's conversation with Vick caught Mervicker's attention because it concerned handguns. Appellant told Vick that he had used handguns before and could get his hands on some if he wanted. Appellant then stated that when he got out of jail, he intended to kill Collin County Sheriff Terry Box "in a manner where he could watch [Box] slowly bleed to death as he begged for his life." Appellant also stated he wanted to learn what car Box drove because he wanted to place a golf ball in the gas tank "that would eventually cause an explosion." Appellant believed that if Box were killed, "Collin County would fall." Although Mervicker had heard many conversations between inmates, she had not heard a conversation as "descriptive" as this one. She became frightened by his tone of voice and immediately started taking notes. The following day, Mervicker submitted a report to her superiors. Subsequently, a grand jury indicted appellant for retaliation. The State's witnesses at trial included Mervicker, Box, and Vick. Mervicker recounted appellant's conversations with Vick. Box testified his responsibilities as sheriff were operating the jail and housing inmates. He learned of appellant's threats against him from his staff. Although Box did not know appellant personally, the threats concerned him because of their nature. Vick testified he met appellant while the two of them were in administrative segregation. According to Vick, prison officers constantly harassed the inmates and had taunted both appellant and him. On October 3, 1999, he was talking to appellant when appellant stated that "in order to do something about this mess, he [should] get out and hunt [Box] and kill him." Appellant also stated "something about . . . a ping-pong ball and . . . blowing up a car." In Vick's opinion, appellant was simply "running his mouth." Appellant did not testify and did not call any witnesses. Discussion
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). In conducting a factual sufficiency challenge, we determine whether a neutral review of all the evidence viewed by the fact finder establishes the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the fact finder's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). In both sufficiency reviews, the trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence before it and is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and of the weight to give their testimony. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647, 648 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Bruno v.State, 922 S.W.2d 292, 293 (Tex . App.-Amarillo 1996, no pet.). To obtain a conviction in this case, the State needed to prove appellant intentionally or knowingly threatened to murder Box in retaliation for or on account of his service or status as a public servant. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 36.06(a)(1)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2003). Peace officers and elected governmental officials are considered public servants. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(41)(A) (Vernon 1994); Bryson v. State, 807 S.W.2d 742, 745-46 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); McCoy v. State, 932 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd). The parties do not dispute Box is a public servant. In challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, appellant acknowledges that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports a finding that he threatened to kill Box. However, he maintains the evidence does not support the threat was "in retaliation for or on account of" Box's service as a public servant (italics added). In challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence, appellant notes Vick believed appellant was merely "running his mouth" and speaking foolishly when he stated to him that he wanted to kill Box. Appellant also reasserts his argument that the evidence fails to establish appellant's animosity towards Box resulted from his performance of any act in the capacity of sheriff. We reject appellant's contentions. Viewing the evidence under the appropriate standard, the record reflects Box was responsible for operating the jail and housing the inmates. The record further reflects appellant was unhappy about his treatment in jail, had been taunted by some of the correctional officers, and wanted to kill Box "in order to do something about this mess." Nothing in the record suggests appellant's threats towards Box were based on any other reason. In fact, appellant and Box had never even met. Given this evidence, we conclude the jury could reasonably infer appellant directed his threats at Box because, as sheriff, Box was ultimately responsible for appellant's treatment in jail. See Bruno, 922 S.W.2d at 293. In reaching this conclusion, we also conclude the jury was free to disregard Vick's testimony — that appellant was merely "running his mouth" when he made the threats — in favor of Mervicker's testimony that she considered appellant's "statements" threats as opposed to jailhouse banter because of their descriptive nature and appellant's tone. See Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 647, 648. Accordingly, we conclude the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show appellant intentionally or knowingly threatened to murder Box in retaliation for or on account of his service or status as a public servant. We overrule appellant's first and second points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.