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Revis v. California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION
Jan 29, 2018
No. CV 18-372-PSG (PLA) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018)

Opinion

No. CV 18-372-PSG (PLA)

01-29-2018

ANDRÉ L. REVIS, Petitioner, v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.


ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING HABEAS PETITION AS SUCCESSIVE

I.

BACKGROUND

André L. Revis ("petitioner") initiated this action on January 16, 2018, by filing two documents (collectively referred to as "2018 Petition" or "2018 Pet."): (1) five copies of a document captioned "Notice of Petition for Re-Sentencing Under Proposition 47 Recall Act," along with several exhibits ("Notice of Petition"); and (2) a "Petition for Recall of Sentence . . . Removal Order Requested: Under: Proposition 36, 47 & 57, Recall Act" ("Pet. for Recall"), along with what appears in large part to be the same exhibits submitted with the Notice of Petition. In the 2018 Petition, petitioner is asking this Court to impose a new sentence in accordance with California Propositions 36, 47, and 57, with respect to his March 14, 2005, conviction in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, case number YA 060244, for second degree robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. (See, e.g., 2018 Pet. & Attachs. (Abstract of Judgment)). Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years to life on September 7, 2005. (2018 Pet. Attachs. (Abstract of Judgment)).

The Attachments to the 2018 Petition reflect that petitioner has also recently sought relief in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court, all of which denied petitioner's request for relief. (2018 Pet. Attachs.). Because the 2018 Petition is challenging petitioner's conviction and sentence in Los Angeles County Superior Court case number YA 060244, and as petitioner is in custody at the California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility at Corcoran State Prison, the Court construes the 2018 Petition as a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Court observes that on September 8, 2017, petitioner filed an earlier federal habeas petition in case number CV 17-6642-PSG (PLA) ("CV 17-6642" or "2017 Petition") also challenging his 2005 conviction in case number YA060244. On September 14, 2017, the Court issued an Order dismissing the 2017 Petition without prejudice as successive. (CV 17-6642, ECF No. 4). Petitioner did not appeal the dismissal of that case.

On September 5, 2017, petitioner filed an Application for Leave to File Second or Successive Petition ("Application") in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (2017 Pet. Attach.; see also Ninth Circuit website for case number 17-72487). That Application is still pending in the Ninth Circuit. (Ninth Circuit website for case number 17-72487).

Petitioner's Application was docketed in case number CV 17-6642 as an attachment to the 2017 Petition.

On August 18, 2016, petitioner filed an earlier federal habeas petition in case number CV 16-6215-PSG (PLA) ("CV 16-6215" or "2016 Petition") also challenging his 2005 conviction in case number YA060244. The 2016 Petition was also dismissed without prejudice as successive pursuant to the Order issued on September 28, 2016. (CV 16-6215, ECF No. 14). Petitioner did not appeal the dismissal of that case.

On May 13, 2014, petitioner filed an even earlier federal habeas petition in case number CV 14-3665-PSG (RNB) ("CV 14-3665" or "2014 Petition") also challenging his 2005 conviction in case number YA060244. The 2014 Petition was dismissed with prejudice as time barred pursuant to the Judgment entered on July 18, 2014. (Case No. CV 14-3665, ECF Nos. 7, 9, 10). Petitioner's request for a certificate of appealability was denied on that same date by the Court. (Case No. CV 14-3665, ECF No. 11). His request for a certificate of appealability was denied by the Ninth Circuit on November 20, 2014. (Case No. CV 14-3665, ECF No. 16).

Petitioner also filed a federal habeas petition in 2008 in Case No. CV 08-827-PSG (RNB) that was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. (CV 08-827-PSG (RNB), ECF Nos. 4-6).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals website reflects that on May 26, 2017, that court denied plaintiff's application to file a second or successive habeas petition in the Eastern District of California because his habeas petition to the Eastern District raised the same three claims that had been raised in this Court in case number CV 14-3665, which had been dismissed as untimely, and the petition he sought to bring in the Eastern District, therefore, was a successive petition. (Ninth Circuit website for case number 16-73155).

II.

DISCUSSION

A federal habeas petition is successive if it raises claims that were or could have been adjudicated on the merits in a previous petition. Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). The AEDPA provides that a claim presented in a second or successive federal habeas petition that was not presented in a prior petition shall be dismissed unless:

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), (B). Furthermore, "[b]efore a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).

Petitioner's 2014 Petition raised the following grounds for relief: (1) the trial court improperly imposed a high term sentence; (2) petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel during sentencing; and (3) a request for a recall of the sentence. (2014 Pet. at 5). As mentioned above, that action was dismissed with prejudice as time barred. See McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissal for failure to comply with statute of limitations is a dismissal on the merits that renders subsequent petitions successive). In the 2016 Petition, petitioner again alleged that the trial court improperly imposed a high term sentence and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during sentencing. (2016 Pet. at 3, 4). In the 2017 Petition, petitioner again alleged that the trial court improperly imposed a high term sentence, and that resentencing is required to correct the errors. In the 2018 Petition, petitioner again contends that his sentence should be "recalled." (2018 Pet. at 3-4 (both documents)). However, even if petitioner were seeking to present new claims in the 2018 Petition -- which he is not -- he nevertheless is required to seek and obtain authorization from the Ninth Circuit before filing a successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153, 127 S. Ct. 793, 166 L. Ed. 2d 628 (2007) (AEDPA requires petitioner to receive authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing a second habeas petition). Although he has recently filed an application in the Ninth Circuit for leave to file a successive petition, petitioner has not obtained such permission from the Ninth Circuit. It therefore appears, as was the case with the 2016 and 2017 Petitions, that the Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the current 2018 Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). See Burton, 549 U.S. at 153; Cooper, 274 F.3d at 1274 ("'When the AEDPA is in play, the district court may not, in the absence of proper authorization from the court of appeals, consider a second or successive habeas application.'") (citation omitted). /

The 2018 Petition is subject to the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations period, as set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997). In most cases, the limitation period begins to run from "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner filed the 2018 Petition on January 16, 2018. (ECF No. 1). On its face, therefore, as was the case with respect to petitioner's 2014 Petition (and subsequent Petitions), the 2018 Petition, filed thirteen years after his conviction, also appears to be barred by the statute of limitations.

III.

CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the 2018 Petition is dismissed without prejudice as successive. DATED: 1/29/18

If petitioner obtains permission from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive petition, he should file a new petition for writ of habeas corpus. He should not file an amended petition in this action or use the case number from this action because the instant action is being closed today. If petitioner files a new petition, the Court will give that petition a new case number. --------

/s/_________

HONORABLE PHILIP S. GUTIERREZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


Summaries of

Revis v. California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION
Jan 29, 2018
No. CV 18-372-PSG (PLA) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018)
Case details for

Revis v. California

Case Details

Full title:ANDRÉ L. REVIS, Petitioner, v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION

Date published: Jan 29, 2018

Citations

No. CV 18-372-PSG (PLA) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018)