Opinion
Case No. 09-11851.
May 18, 2009
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff initiated this pro se action against Defendants on May 14, 2009, challenging foreclosure and eviction proceedings related to real property located at 2640 Hummer Lake Road in Ortonville, Michigan ("property"). With her Complaint, Plaintiff has filed an "Emergency Ex-Parte Motion for Stay of Eviction Proceedings." For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
Factual and Procedural Background
According to the documents attached to Plaintiff's Complaint, on November 23, 2005, Plaintiff signed a mortgage on the property in connection with a loan in the amount of $282,000 from Defendant Wilmington Finance, a division of AIG Federal Savings Bank. (Compl. Ex. 3 at 2.) The mortgage identified Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as the mortgagee. (Id.) On October 4, 2007, Plaintiff was notified that foreclosure proceedings were being instituted against the property as a result of outstanding mortgage debt totaling $294,018.05. (Id., Ex. 7 at 3.) A foreclosure sale occurred on November 6, 2007. (Id. at 4-5.) According to the Sheriff's Deed, MERS was the highest bidder at the sale and the property was conveyed to it for $297,089.70. (Id. at 7.) On November 16, 2007, MERS quit claimed the property to Defendant Bank of New York "as Trustee for the Certificateholder [sic] S Cwabs, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-BC2" ("Bank of New York as Trustee"). (Id. at 10 (capitalization removed).)
On November 19, 2008, as "representative of the new owner of the property," Defendant Countrywide ("Countrywide") informed Plaintiff of its intent to market and sell the property. (Compl. Ex. 7 at 15.) Countrywide further informed Plaintiff: "Countrywide thus will soon begin legal proceedings necessary to take possession of the property, otherwise known as an eviction." (Id.) According to Countrywide's notice, although it might start the eviction process, it would "not attempt to formally take possession of the property until January 18, 2009 or until legally allowed by state law, whichever is later." (Id.) In other words, as Countrywide provided: ". . . you have until January 18, 2009, or later if required by law, to voluntarily vacate the property. After that time, Countrywide will attempt to take possession in accordance with state law." ( Id.)
On November 20, 2008, the Bank of New York as Trustee filed a complaint for termination of tenancy against Plaintiff, "Mr. Occupant," and "Mrs. Occupant" in the 52nd District Court — 2nd Division in Clarkston, Michigan ("state court"). (Compl. Ex. 7 at 16.) In its state court complaint, the Bank of New York as Trustee asserted that it "has terminated tenancy and has a right to possession of the property because . . . Defendants are wrongfully holding over after the expiration of the redemption period following a mortgage foreclosure sale. (Id. (emphasis removed).) A summons was issued informing Plaintiff of the state court complaint and summoning her to appear in court on December 16, 2008. (Id. at 17.) The summons provides, in part: "If you are in district court on time, you will have the opportunity to give the reasons why you feel you should not be evicted. Bring witnesses, receipts, and other necessary papers with you." (Id.)
Following a hearing in the state court on December 16, 2008, at which Plaintiff was present (see Mot. at 5), 52nd District Court Judge Kelley Kostin issued a judgment finding that the Bank of New York as Trustee has a right to possession of the property. (Compl. Ex. 2 at 3.) The judgment indicates that an order evicting Plaintiff would be issued on or after January 30, 2009. (Id.) The judgment advised Plaintiff that she "may file a motion for a new trial, a motion to set aside a default judgment, or file an appeal and appeal bond." (Id.) There is no indication in Plaintiff's pleadings or the exhibits attached thereto that she took any action in response to the judgment.
On May 11, 2009, pursuant to the judgment, Judge Kostin issued an order of eviction. (Compl. Ex. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff thereafter filed the pending action and motion.
Plaintiff's Emergency Motion
In her motion, Plaintiff asks this Court to stay the writ of eviction pending the disposition of her Complaint. Plaintiff indicates that "newly discovered evidence places [her] and her children in eminent danger of being wrongfully evicted, . . ." (Mot. at 3.)
According to Plaintiff, she and Countrywide "had an agreement or a meeting of the minds" that eviction proceedings would not begin until January 19, 2009" and she was unable to prepare a defense when she "was collaterally stunned and attacked with" the summons to appear for the eviction hearing on December 16, 2008. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff indicates that, although she appeared at the December 16 hearing, she was "unprepared to defend and [was] completely bewildered." (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff provides that, since that time, she has concluded that Defendants have perpetrated major fraud upon her. ( Id.) Plaintiff argues that the Bank of New York as Trustee has failed to present or produce any contract with Plaintiff and therefore lacks standing to bring the eviction proceedings against her. ( Id. at 6.) Plaintiff also alleges that Judge Kostin "made a pre-disposed ruling against [her] . . ." ( Id.)
Analysis
Plaintiff seeks relief from the state court's eviction order in her pending motion. Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject matter to grant Plaintiff relief. Under that doctrine, "lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts." Givens v. Homecomings Financial, 278 Fed. App'x 607, 608-09 (6th Cir. May 20, 2008) (unpublished opinion) (attached as Ex. 1) (citing D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1311 (1983) and Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S. Ct. 149, 150 (1923)). As the Supreme Court recently clarified, application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005).
The circumstances of the present case are identical to those in Givens. Like the plaintiff in that case, Plaintiff lost a state court foreclosure and possession action that culminated in an eviction order. Givens, 278 Fed. App'x at 608. Also like the plaintiff in Givens, Plaintiff is asking a federal district court to temporarily enjoin the execution of the state court order. As the Sixth Circuit concluded in Givens, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's request.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Emergency Ex-Parte Motion for Stay of Eviction Proceedings is DENIED.