"Although at-will employees generally may be discharged at any time for any reason, we have recognized limited, public policy exceptions to the at-will presumption if employees establish they were terminated in retaliation for complying with a clear public policy. SeeRessler v. Humane Soc. , 480 N.W.2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992) (holding public policy prohibited employer from discharging employee in retaliation for honoring subpoena and informing employer she was prepared to testify contrary to employer's interest in criminal proceeding); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home , 415 N.W.2d 793, 795 (N.D. 1987) (holding public policy prohibited employer from discharging employee in retaliation for seeking workers compensation benefits). CompareJose , 1999 ND 175, ¶ 21, 599 N.W.2d 293 (holding employees identified no clear public policy which their termination violated); Lee v. Walstad , 368 N.W.2d 542, 547 (N.D. 1985) (same).

[¶ 28] Although employment without a definite term is presumed to be at will, giving the employer the right to terminate an employee at any time with or without cause, there are exceptions to the at-will doctrine. Jose v. Norwest Bank North Dakota, N.A., 1999 ND 175, ¶ 17, 599 N.W.2d 293; Ressler v. Humane Soc. of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429, 431 (N.D. 1992); see N.D.C.C. § 34-03-01. We have recognized limited public policy exceptions to the at-will rule if employees establish they were terminated in retaliation for complying with a clear public policy.

See Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying North Dakota law). This Court has recognized public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. In Ressler v. Humane Society of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992), we held public policy prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for honoring a subpoena and for testifying truthfully. Likewise, in Krein, 415 N.W.2d at 794, this Court held public policy prohibits retaliatory discharge of an employee for seeking workers compensation benefits.

Under North Dakota law (and the law of most other States), an employer may not discharge even an at-will employee for reasons contrary to a clear public policy evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision. Ressler v. Humane Soc'y, 480 N.W.2d 429, 431-32 (N.D. 1992); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 795 (N.D. 1987). We are unaware of any decision that has extended this doctrine to include independent contractors.

ide truthful testimony in legal proceedings.") (internal citation omitted); Page v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817, 825-826 (1996) (Based upon state criminal statutes prohibiting "wilful perjury and false swearing [or] procuring another to do so" and prohibiting "intimidating or impeding any witness or attempting to obstruct or impede the administration of justice in any court," "it is against substantial public policy of West Virginia to discharge an at-will employee because such employee has given or may be called to give truthful testimony in a legal action."); Freeman v. McKellar, 795 F. Supp. 733, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (State criminal statutes prohibiting perjury, prohibiting intimidation of a witness to give false testimony and prohibiting retaliation against witnesses "reflect a sufficiently clear and significant public policy against deterring persons from providing truthful testimony . . . to trigger the narrow exception to the employment at-will doctrine."); Ressler v. Humane Society of Grand Forks, 480 N.W. 2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992) ("[A] retaliatory discharge of an employee for honoring a subpoena and testifying truthfully would violate public policy in North Dakota. That public policy is expressed by our Legislature in our criminal statutes prohibiting the failure to obey a subpoena, the refusal to testify, and the making of a false statement. Those statutes evidence a clear and compelling public policy which goes to the very heart of our judicial system.") The court finds that an employee's truthful testimony or intent to provide truthful testimony is an act consistent with clear and compelling public policy articulated in Oklahoma's statutory law.

See, e.g., Bishop v. Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank of Wichita, 908 F.2d 658, 662 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Recognition of the [witness retaliation] exception supports our tradition of free, direct and truthful testimony at legislative hearings, a policy Oklahoma has implicitly recognized."); Freeman v. McKellar, 795 F.Supp. 733, 742 (E.D.Pa. 1992) (holding that Pennsylvania law "reflect[s] a sufficiently clear and significant public policy" against witness retaliation); Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 286 (Iowa 2000) ("[W]e find ample statutory support for a public policy in Iowa in favor of refusing to commit perjury. . . . [T]his public policy is not simply confined to the refusal to commit perjury but clearly embraces a broader public policy to provide truthful testimony in legal proceedings.") (internal citation omitted); Ressler v. Humane Soc'y of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992) ("[T]he public policy of North Dakota prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for honoring a subpoena and for testifying truthfully."); Sabo v. Schott, 70 Ohio St.3d 527, 639 N.E.2d 783 (1994) ("Plaintiff's allegation that he was fired as a result of having testified truthfully, albeit unfavorably to the defendants, if proven to be true, would constitute conduct on the part of the defendants which violates the public policy of this state.").Page v. Columbia Natural Res., Inc., 198 W.Va. 378, 480 S.E.2d 817, 826 (1996).

Id. Proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is "particularly significant." Id.; see also Ressler v. Humane Soc'y of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429, 433 (N.D. 1992). The fact that the employee's complaints were directed toward or involved the person who ultimately fired her may also provide an inference that the adverse action was related to the protected activity.

The public policy must be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision to prohibit terminating an at-will employee. Id. (citing Ressler v. Humane Soc'y of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429, 431 (N.D. 1992) and Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 794 (N.D. 1987)). [¶ 26] Peterson claims the established policies of NDUS are examples of the public policy of the State of North Dakota that protect tenured college professors from arbitrary and capricious dismissal.

In Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (N.D. 1987), we held an at-will employee could sue an employer in tort for wrongful discharge in retaliation for seeking statutorily authorized workers compensation benefits. In Ressler v. Humane Soc., 480 N.W.2d 429, 431-32 (N.D. 1992), we held an at-will employee could sue an employer for wrongful discharge in retaliation for honoring a subpoena and for testifying truthfully at a trial. InJose v. Northwest Bank, 1999 ND 175, ¶ 21, 599 N.W.2d 293, we cited N.D.C.C. § 34-01-20, but we concluded an at-will employee could not sue an employer for wrongful discharge for participating in an internal employee investigation where the employee defined no clear public policy which the discharge violated.

1981); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo Ironton R.R. Co., 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Mich.Ct.App. 1978) (refusal to alter pollution control reports illegally); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1980); Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd., 416 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Neb. 1987); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 396-97 (Nev. 1984); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (adopting both tort and contract causes of action for wrongful discharge); Boudar v. E.G. G., Inc., 742 P.2d 491, 495 (N.M. 1987); Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (N.C. 1989) (refusal to drive truck in excess of hours allowed by Department of Transportation and to falsify log to show compliance); Ressler v. Humane Soc'y of Grand Forks, 480 N.W.2d 429, 431-32 (N.D. 1992) (testifying truthfully); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515 (Or. 1975) (absence due to jury duty); Reuther v. Fowler Williams Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1978) (performing jury duty); Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (S.C. 1985) (honoring subpoena request to appear before grand jury investigating employer); Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 227 (S.D. 1988); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn. 1984) (filing workers' compensation claim); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985); Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1042 (Utah 1989) (recognizing public policy exception to employment at will, but no action on facts of case); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 589 (Vt. 1986). In Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 590-94, the court of appeals recognized an exception to the doctrine of employment at will when an employee is terminated for refusing to engage in unlawful conduct.