American Enterprise, by grant deed conveyed its interest in the property to Sam Neider, its president, who in turn conveyed the property to the city of Oakland. [13] In the absence of some exception, limitation or reservation, a grant deed is presumed to convey the grantor's entire interest. (Civ. Code, ยง 1105; Taylor v. Avila, 175 Cal. 203, 206 [ 165 P. 533]; Winchester v. Winchester, 175 Cal. 391, 394 [ 165 P. 965]; Resh v. Pillsbury, 12 Cal.App.2d 226, 228 [ 55 P.2d 264].) [14] The rule which forbids a lessee from disputing his lessor's title (Code Civ. Proc., ยง 1962[4]) has no application to the situation shown by the present record.
On the appeal the portion of the judgment appealed from was reversed on the ground that evidence of the contemporaneous oral agreement was inadmissible and ineffectual under the issues to change the solemn declaration of the grant deeds. ( Resh v. Pillsbury, 12 Cal.App.2d 226 [ 55 P.2d 264, 267].) The judgment of the District Court of Appeal was as follows: "The portions of the judgment appealed from are reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein expressed."
The thrust of this argument is that there can therefore be no valid basis for a constructive trust since one of the requisites for its establishment in such a situation is that the grantee has paid no consideration for the transfer. In support of this proposition defendants cite Cooney v. Glynn (1910) 157 Cal. 583, 587 [ 108 P. 506]; Brison v. Brison (1888) 75 Cal. 525, 532 [17 P. 689, 7 Am.St.Rep. 189]; Lyttle v. Fickling (1945) 72 Cal.App.2d 383, 388 [ 164 P.2d 842]; Resh v. Pillsbury (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 226, 231 [ 55 P.2d 264]; Dalbkermeyer v. Rader (1928) 96 Cal.App. 23, 28-29 [ 273 P. 600]. However this entire argument proceeds from the fundamental premise that the trial court adopted defendants' theory of case: that the 1935 transfer was an absolute one embracing plaintiff's full legal and equitable ownership and that in accordance with the arrangement fashioned by the pertinent documents the mother, being the actual owner in fact as well as in name, operated the property subject only to the first loan from the insurance company.
In the face of these definite statements, appellant saw fit to give to the city absolute deeds containing no reservations of any rights whatsoever. In Resh v. Pillsbury, 12 Cal.App.2d 226, 229 [ 55 P.2d 264], the court said: "We see no escape from the conclusion that the entire title to these properties passed upon the execution and delivery of these deeds. . . . The oral agreement that during her lifetime the grantor should retain the rents and profits from the properties was merged in the written instruments and was nullified thereby (Civ. Code, sec. 1625; Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1856). Evidence of the oral agreement was not admissible under these circumstances for the purpose of changing the effect of the deeds.
Normally, of course, a grant deed, conveys not only the land, but all interests therein. Civil Code, ยงยง 1105 and 1106; Resh v. Pillsbury, 12 Cal.App.2d 226, 55 P.2d 264; Taylor v. Avila, 175 Cal. 203, 165 P. 533. It may be that the trial court concluded that the fixtures and personal property belonged to Van Winkle because it believed that American Enterprise, Inc. had conveyed away all of its rights under the lease.