The party attacking the validity of the judgment has the burden of establishing its invalidity." Repp v. Repp, 156 Neb. 45, 52, 54 N.W.2d 238, 242 (1952). Plaintiffs argue that the defendant's allegation that the Colorado court failed to have jurisdiction over the defendant was a mere conclusion of law and did not raise a justiciable issue upon which the court could receive evidence.
In Zenker v. Zenker, 161 Neb. 200, 72 N.W.2d 809 (1955), the court held that a decree of divorce rendered in another state may be collaterally attacked by showing that the court was without jurisdiction, either of the subject matter of the suit or of the person of the defendant, without violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the federal Constitution. The law of this state has long been that where a judgment rendered in one state is challenged in another, a want of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject matter is open to inquiry. Repp v. Repp, 156 Neb. 45, 54 N.W.2d 238 (1952). Section § 42-704 of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act provides that the remedies set forth therein are cumulative and "do not affect the availability of remedies under other law."
In the order, the district court made no distinctions between Meister as an individual and Meister's professional corporation. See, Olson v. England , 206 Neb. 256, 292 N.W.2d 48 (1980) ; Repp v. Repp , 156 Neb. 45, 54 N.W.2d 238 (1952).An appeal was filed on April 25, 2019.
Id., quoting Restatement of Judgments § 12, comment c. at 71 (1942). If a judgment on its face appears to be one entered by a court with jurisdiction, such jurisdiction "`will be presumed, unless disproved by extrinsic evidence or by the record itself.'" Olson, 206 Neb. at 264, 292 N.W.2d at 52, quoting Repp v. Repp, 156 Neb. 45, 54 N.W.2d 238 (1952). We reaffirmed Olson in First Fed. Sav. Loan Assn. v. Wyant, 238 Neb. 741, 746, 472 N.W.2d 386, 390 (1991), finding that "[w]hile it is presumed that a foreign court rendering a judgment had jurisdiction over the parties, a foreign judgment can be collaterally attacked by evidence that the rendering court was without such jurisdiction . . . ."
In essence, Wyant contends the district court should have sustained his motion to vacate the Nebraska default judgment because he has a "meritorious defense on the merits" to the Colorado action. In Repp v. Repp, 156 Neb. 45, 54 N.W.2d 238 (1952), this court acknowledged that U.S. Const. art. IV, 1, the full faith and credit clause, prevents the courts in this state from reviewing the merits of a judgment rendered in a sister state. A judgment rendered by a sister state court which had jurisdiction is to be given full faith and credit and has the same validity and effect in this state as in the state rendered.
Thus, the termination of the marital status may be entitled to full faith and credit, and yet, this recognition may be withheld from an accompanying money judgment. As we said in Repp v. Repp, 156 Neb. 45, 54 N.W.2d 238: "* * * when a judgment rendered in one state is challenged in another, a want of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject matter is open to inquiry. The party attacking the validity of the judgment has the burden of establishing its invalidity.
In Lippincott v. Lippincott, 141 Neb. 186, 3 N.W.2d 207, 140 A.L.R. 901, we held that a decree of divorce rendered in another state may be collaterally attacked by showing that the court was without jurisdiction, either of the subject matter of the suit or of the person of defendant, without violating the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution. See, also, Anglim v. Anglim, 140 Neb. 133, 299 N.W. 346; Repp v. Repp, 156 Neb. 45, 54 N.W.2d 238. This rule has been consistently adhered to by the Supreme Court of the United States where constructive service of process only has been had in the state granting the divorce.
Article IV, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." However, as stated in Repp v. Repp, 156 Neb. 45, 54 N.W.2d 238: "It is fundamental, we think, that a judgment of a sister state which does not meet the fundamental requirements of due process as required by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has no validity in any state, even as a matter of comity." "The rule in such cases is that when a judgment rendered in one state is challenged in another, a want of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject matter is open to inquiry.